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Abstract 
This thesis stages three pairings of artworks and texts – Francisco de Zurbarán and Susan Sontag (chapter 
2); Walter Pater and Peter Doig (chapter 3); Michael Simpson and Gertrude Stein (chapter 4) – that are 
connected through a perceived material and phenomenological association articulated through my 
writing. The basis for their connection is neither historical, thematic nor causal. The matter of writing in 
this thesis is, therefore, key: it is used less as a vehicle to convey falsifiable findings than as a means to 
generate ideas, and an exploratory performance of research. As a result, its form, style and timbre is 
highly contingent on its physical, emotive and intellectual encounters with particular artworks and texts. 
The character of each chapter is distinct in tone, mood and content because these qualities materialise 
through the occasion of their writing; they are individuated ‘bespoke’ responses where my words in each 
chapter are ‘site-specific’, alive to the landscape of particular images and words, enacting and bearing 
witness to the critical nature of association at stake in each chapter. In this way, fundamental questions 
emerge around how the coupling of texts and images suggest themselves. How do they unfold in thought 
and writing? And what is the value and implication of foregrounding the development of their association 
as the objective of research in its own right?  
This manner of approaching art and writing harnesses subjectivity as an active, responsive, and ultimately 
improvisatory, mode of thought and feeling while simultaneously maintaining productive tension with the 
discipline of art history at large. Since subjectivity here makes itself felt in the way that it asserts itself 
through the writing into association of each pairing – through, for example, description, affective 
response, experimental rendering and serendipitous detour – the manner of its writing is both reflective 
and performative. This thesis focuses on the practice rather than the product of research, asking what an 
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Essays are intact and seamless and well-made – except when they 
are not, when they fracture and fail and open themselves up to the 
possibility that they will not please.   1
	 	 	 	 	     Brian Dillon  
 Brian Dillon, Essayism (London: Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2017), p. 21.1
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Murmurations of images and words gather here. A spark precipitates impressionistic and 
unanticipated connections between them, impelling others to join the multitude. As they 
do, their collective form swoops, billows, pirouettes, enfolds, pauses, hangs back and 
peters out. Within the flock closer relationships form. These connections generate 
particular types of behaviour: mirroring, analogous manoeuvring, splitting off. As you 
picture the characteristics of these hypothetical relations you begin to realise not just 
that you cannot keep up, because they are constantly morphing, changing direction, 
adjusting, but also that the individual elements that you set out to observe seem to 
respond to your presence there. The words that you have thrown skywards in an attempt 
to capture, trace, describe in movement, now dance around you too. You watch as those 
words, your words, disperse, silhouetted against a paper-white sky. The space between 
them dilates and contracts, by turns appearing to follow and lead; hardly 
distinguishable, they begin to be absorbed into the swarm.  
Brief Overview 
With my primary focus on the practice, rather than the product, of research, my thesis is 
like a murmuration. It bears witness to the pairings of works of visual art and texts 
which are brought together primarily by an accident of association in the mind of me, 
the observer. The interrogation of this association is enacted through extended readings 
of paintings or texts through ekphrastic descriptions, affective responses, experimental 
renderings and associational detours. It simultaneously tackles the matter of why the 
pairings of a particular text and a particular image suggest themselves in the way that 
they do and what the implications of this approach are for the practice of research in the 
visual arts.  
I often refer to the writing I employ as ‘active’, by which I refer to the way that writing 
here generates its content as it goes along rather than conveying thought after the fact of 
thinking. As present and in-progress the writing of this thesis is self-reflective and self-
reflexive and allows a series of themes and critical frameworks to surface. These 
include: the emergence of thought; critical association and improvisation; the 
relationship between performance, practice and theory; the essay as an experimental 
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form of research; the impact of subjectivity in writing art histories; and types of 
concrete findings expected of a doctoral thesis. 
The pairings around which my thesis swarms are connected by critical and discursive 
association rather than historically, thematically or causally. Subjectivity is the catalyst 
and undercurrent that makes them possible, and is the means by which I explore their 
association. I harness subjectivity obliquely, as an active and responsive mode of 
thought, which lends a specific focus to the pairings of each chapter. The type of 
subjectivity that manifests here is, therefore, enacted through the writing by which the 
pairings emerge, giving primacy to felt experiences and exposing associative thought 
processes. As echoes between images and texts gather, the following chapters wonder at 
the process by which these analogies suggest themselves. How do they come about? 
What happens if we pay attention to their perceived association, rather than passing it 
off as relative, momentary and insignificant? The means and mode of association at play 
here should, therefore, be understood as active and inherent to the thesis’ research 
process, rather than as extraneous. 
By giving primacy to this kind of writing and thinking questions unfold about what 
research into the visual arts can (rather than should) do. Writing like this fuels thought 
around what the practice of research in the visual arts might look, sound and feel like 
and what the implications of such a mode are to disciplines like criticism, art history, 
and art writing. I choose my words – ‘practice of research’ – carefully. One of the things 
that distinguishes this thesis is its approach to keeping in tension its relationship to, both 
a conventional humanities research PhD and a practice-led PhD; it is located 
somewhere between art writing and art history or art writing as art history. It is 
concerned with art history not as a vehicle for recording information but as a 
performance of thought in progress. Similarly it is interested in art writing, less as a 
vehicle to convey falsifiable findings than as a means to generate ideas, an exploratory 
performance of research through the act of writing. By foregrounding art-historical 
writing as a process that drives content, the subtlety and sometimes elusiveness of its 
form – as both object and subject – becomes integral to the research methodology as 
well as to its findings. It is akin in spirit to Paul Klee’s meditation on the character of 
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drawing: ‘A line comes into being,’ he writes, ‘it goes for a walk’;  form, content, 2
affinities and differences develop in the process of writing an idea.  
The way in which this thesis ‘comes into being’ is, in part, by focussing on details and 
on single paintings, texts or at times even single sentences. Attention to the detail of 
artwork is, of course, a familiar art-historical strategy; it functions as the backbone to 
Connoisseurship, Formalism, Neoformalism and Conservation.  T. J. Clark’s, The Sight 3
of Death: An Experiment in Art Writing (2006) is built around devoted attention to two 
paintings, an approach that is supported by copious high resolution colour illustrations 
of the images, both whole and cropped. Clark, you sense, takes pleasure in his keen 
skills of observation and his ability to sustain pages of writing that turn on minutiae: ‘a 
smudge of sun on the horses back’, ‘a splash of white below the sockets [and] the wisp 
of hair against the flat blue of the lake’ and the ‘pinheads up in the castle windows’.  4
Sometimes, this kind of viewing plays a very particular, historically contextualising, 
role in his argument. Of Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake (National Gallery, 
London, 1648), for example, he deduces Poussin’s painting process by focussing on the 
space between the fingers of one of the figures which has been ‘painted delicately [...] 
after the fingers were sufficiently dry’.  On another occasion, speaking of Landscape 5
with a Calm (J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, 1650–1651), Clark disavows an 
earlier claim that Poussin suffered from trembling hands caused by syphilis: ‘All I can 
say, with my eye a foot from the picture surface’, he proclaims with an authority and 
self-assurance that appears granted by his proximity to the painting, ‘is that [Poussin’s 
hands] cannot have been trembling much; or that Poussin must have built up ways of 
painting through the tremors’.  In these examples, focussed viewing is deployed to 6
discern, from the material of the artworks, what the conditions of their making were at 
 Robert Kudielka ed., Paul Klee: The Nature of Creation (London and Burlington: Haywood Gallery and 2
Lund Humphries, 2002), p. 53; original reference in Jürg Spiller ed., The Thinking Eye. The Notebooks of 
Paul Klee, Ralph Mannheim, Charlotte Wielder and Joyce Wittenborn trans. (London and New York: 
Lund Humphries, 1961), p. 105. 
 See Carlo Ginzburg and Anna Davin, ‘Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific 3
Method’, History Workshop, 9 (Spring, 1980), pp. 5–36.
 T. J. Clark, The Sight of Death: An Experiment in Art Writing (New Haven and London: Yale University 4
Press, 2006), pp. 34, 140 and 168 respectively.
 ibid., p. 189.5
 First italics are my own; second italics are in the original. ibid., p. 57.6
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the time of execution with a degree of historical accuracy, Clark assures us, that is 
greater than previous accounts which focus less on the paintings themselves. 
For Daniel Arasse in Take Another Look (2000), however, close-up viewing functions 
slightly differently. Though he uses the technique to question received interpretations of 
works of art, he does not have, as Clark at various points does, ‘texts or archival 
documents to back [him] up’. Arasse knows that this approach might open him up to 
criticism of being ‘not historically serious’ but, he goes on, ‘I think we have to fight 
against a line of thought that claims to be “historical” while actually preventing us from 
thinking’.  Though my position here is far less provocative than Arasse’s articulation, 7
something of his quest to promote the act and process of looking as a generator of 
thought – which also for Arasse entails an embracing of the human imagination’s 
propensity to take liberties – is present here. He knows that his interpretations 
sometimes verge on the excess: ‘You’re going to tell me yet again’ he says, addressing 
Giulia, his implicit critic and to whom his book-length fictionalised letter is directed, 
‘that I’m, going too far – that I’m having a good time, but that I’m also 
overinterpreting’.  I will come to the problem of interpretation in chapter 2 in relation to 8
Susan Sontag, where I will make clear that interpretation is not what this thesis 
contributes. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Arasse argues for the legitimacy of his 
approach on the basis that it enables you to ‘see what a painter and painting are showing 
you’.  Though this thesis is driven by a spirit of, at once, close, imaginative and 9
expansive looking it does so less purposively than Arasse would have it. My thesis 
focuses on potential and associative thinking, catalysed by looking, rather than 
attempting to uncover intended effects, consequences or meanings of texts and images. 
My thesis, to adapt Arasse’s claim then, helps to see what painters and paintings and 
 Daniel Arasse, Take a Closer Look, Alyson Waters trans. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 7
Press, 2013), pp. 13–15.
 ibid. p.86. On other reservations of this kind of ‘over-interpretation’ under the guise of close looking see 8
Whitney Davis, ‘The Close Reading of Artefacts’, in A General Theory of Visual Culture (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011); James Elkins, Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? On the Origins 
of Modern Pictorial Complexity (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Siri Hustvedt, Mysteries of 
the Rectangle: Essays on Painting (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2005); and Susan Sontag, 
Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 2001). See also Sam Rose’s excellent overview of close looking 
in ‘Close Looking and Conviction’, Art History, 40(1) (2016).
 ibid., p. 3.9
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writers and texts, together, didn’t know they were showing you until you started to 
write, see and think them into relation.    
But my focus on details in this thesis never, in any case, figures in isolation. My view is 
generative; placing observations in a more expansive landscape results in the 
accumulation of further connections with other artworks and texts. I use the technique 
of close looking impressionistically. I identify motifs, metaphors, structures, turns of 
phrases, or incidents of painterly or textual handling that appear to enact confluences 
across genres to interrogate the character of the pairings that chapters 2, 3 and 4 pose. 
For example, in chapter 2 I pair an attention on the materiality of a still life painting and 
the phenomenology of my encounter with comparisons with extant responses to the 
same or comparable artworks. This, in turn, spurs broader reflection on critical and 
theoretical approaches to paintings and the relationships between practice and research. 
I enact, therefore, a series of performative and reflective art-historical and art-critical 
encounters with artworks, weaving in and out, and even merging art history, criticism 
and writing as practice, and art history, criticism and writing as theory.   
Preliminary Thoughts on Structure and Tone 
This introduction sets out the means by which the chapters that follow emerge through 
their writing, as a form of practice as research which combines, or rather enmeshes its 
approach to, and enactment of, research. What follows is an extended discussion and 
performance of a particular approach to research material as an activity that we might, 
after Umberto Eco, call ‘in progress’.  This unpredetermined openness guides the 10
shape of the thesis as well as the structure of individual paragraphs and even sentences. 
I often come at a thought obliquely or indirectly, giving the impression of writing 
around it rather than straight on, as you might an argument. My later discussion of 
Michael Oakeshott’s The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind (1955) 
unpicks some of the ways in which the principle of the ‘argument’ is not appropriate in 
this instance. This thesis, instead, takes a more conversational approach to critical 
thinking manifesting in various ways: by the pairings that frame each chapter; by the 
 Umberto Eco, ‘The Poetics of the Open Work’, in Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music, 10
Christopher Cox and Daniel Warner eds. (New York and London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 167–175, p. 
174.
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way that observations are arrived at accumulatively; and by the way that ideas are 
handled, worried, and passed to and fro between the works and figures that inhabit each 
chapter. At a basic level it is ruminative, a form of thinking aloud and passing between 
dialogic relationships, enacting connections between words and images through modes 
of verbal and experiential interchange. Chapter 1 is framed by an in-depth discussion of 
poetic art histories. By cross-referencing a series of wide-ranging instances of poetic or 
lyrical thinking through art history it unpacks key ideas that ground the performative 
approaches – enacted particularly in chapters 2, 3 and 4 – in a bed of substantial art-
historical research. Chapter 2 is characterised by a ventriloquising; it activates the voice 
of Susan Sontag (1933–2004) through reflection on Francisco de Zurbarán’s Still Life 
with Four Vessels (The Prado, c. 1660) (fig. 1).  Chapter 3 enacts a confluence I have 11
perceived in Walter Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ (1868) (1839–1894) and a selection of Peter 
Doig’s paintings (1959–). Through it the work of both shifts fluidly, amorphously, 
together and apart. And, finally, in chapter 4 the work of Michael Simpson (1940–) and 
Gertrude Stein (1874–1946) is annexed, their interrelation one of awkward 
juxtaposition. 
Due to its gradual accumulation this thesis is drawn from a sprawling web of 
multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, critical, epistemological, and phenomenological 
interrelations. It tunes into parallel discussions from different sub-literatures – practice 
as research, the essay, art writing, embodied art histories, conversation, association, 
subjectivity – making use of them, sometimes tangentially, sometimes more directly, to 
help orient my thinking on a particular subject. In place of a separate ‘literature review’ 
I engage with various relevant sub-literatures as I go along instead of addressing them 
in isolation through a separate preliminary section. The positive choice to do so is 
crucial given that one of my major aims is to document, as closely as possible, the felt 
process of research in progress by paying attention to the coincidences of thought, and 
the associations between critical approaches and bodies of literature that emerge.  12
 After this point I will usually, for brevity’s sake, refer to Still Life with Four Vessels as Four Vessels.11
 I will return to the idea of what follows as being ‘documentary’ in my Conclusion where I suggest 12
various ways in which this research could be further developed. 
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That said, I take the time in chapter 1 to contextualise and set the scene for what I call 
my ‘non-methodology’. This discussion is built on, and between, a wide-ranging 
selection of sub-literatures – ranging from philosophy, to art history, criticism and 
scholarship on creative writing – in order to be absolutely clear about what the 
implications of such an ‘in progress’ approach to thinking about the relationships 
between art, writing, subjectivity and critical associations might be. 
What follows is categorically not intended, however, as a debunking of the 
heterogeneous approaches employed by art historians. Indeed, I make use of 
conventional scholarly research and techniques but I am advocating a radical 
methodological pluralism. Methodologies all approach their research from a specific 
point of view and all add something.  But when we constrain ourselves too strictly 13
within any given methodology, lending the impression of deciding in advance what it 
might be, we also inevitably leave something out, as chapter 2 of this thesis 
demonstrates. What is going on here should, therefore, be understood as a supplement 
to, not substitute for, other art-historical methods since my general approach is 
inherently open-ended, a responsive (non-)methodology which reflects and reflects on 
the material of its research as it goes along. 
It is also true, however, that I identify widespread discontent with the discipline’s 
language, prevailing methodologies, and handling of primary sources, voiced by 
 The idea of Methodological Pluralism is more thoroughly theorised and self-consciously implemented 13
in the Philosophy of Sciences and Social Sciences. See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (Guilford: 
Verso, 1993); R. B. Norgaard, ‘The Case for Methodological Pluralism’, Ecological Economics, 1(1) 
(1989), pp. 37–57; Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative 
Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009); S. Hesse-Biber and R. B. Johnson, ‘Coming at Things 
Differently: Future Directions of Possible Engagement with Mixed Methods Research’, Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research, 7(2) (2013).
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numerous art-historians and writers.  Siri Hustvedt, who does not name names, has 14
grave misgivings about those art historians who,  
march through linear, horizontal time with its periods and changing styles, their 
language coloured by an almost phobic relation to the emotional, pre-theoretical, 
vertical qualities of art viewing, a fear related to biases of agency and power and 
to the fact that passion and the body have been understood as effeminate and 
reason and the mental as manly, a dualist tradition that infects our memories, our 
expectations, and our perceptions.   15
And Gavin Parkinson characterises such art histories as entailing:  
the communication of thoughts, feelings, findings, and arguments 
about objects, events, and the past by means of the carefully and 
coherently organized plan; observation of and respect for causality 
and the clock and calendar time of the world; dissolution of 
authorship or announcement of subjectivity in the capture of the 
surveyed material; use of reason in search of rational connectivity 
between human beings, their contexts, behaviour, and work; and the 
exercise of balance and ‘critical distance’ in search of underlying 
motivations, interpreting phenomena in the services of conclusivity by 
means of methods that mimic those of scientific causality (whether 
this goes undeclared or not).  16
This thesis could be understood, then, as another possibility, an alternative to the 
‘rational orthodoxy’, as Parkinson puts it, of the kinds of art histories which he 
 I discuss this at greater length below at various points but especially in the section ‘Art Writing/14
Creative Criticism/Art Criticism/Art History’. See James Elkins, On Pictures and the Words that Fail 
Them (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998); James Elkins, What is Interesting 
Writing in Art History? (Morrisville, North Carolina: lulu.com, 2017); James Elkins, Our Beautiful, Dry 
and Distant Texts (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); James Elkins (2013) <http://
305737.blogspot.co.uk> [accessed 9 May 2013]; W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and 
Visual Representation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art 
History: Meditations on a Coy Science (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989); Michael 
Ann Holly, ‘Mourning and Method’, in Compelling Visuality, Claire Farago and Robert Zwijnenberg eds. 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 165; T. J. Clark, The Sight of Death; 
Mieke Bal, Louise Bourgeois’s Spider: The Architecture of Art Writing (Chicago and London: Chicago 
University Press, 2001); Jaś Elsner, ‘Art History as Ekphrasis’, Art History, 33(1) (2010); Paul Barolsky, 
‘Writing Art History’, in ‘Writing (and) the History of Art’, The Art Bulletin, 78 (1996), p. 398; David 
Carrier, ‘Erwin Panofsky, Leo Steinberg, David Carrier: The Problem of Objectivity in Art Historical 
Interpretation’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 47(4) (Autumn, 1989), p. 346; David Carrier, 
‘Artcriticism–writing, Arthistory–writing, Artwriting’, The Art Bulletin, 78(3) (1996), pp. 401–403; and 
Catherine Grant and Patricia Rubin eds., ‘Creative Writing and Art History’, Art History, 34(2) (2011). To 
this list we could also add Sontag, Against Interpretation. See also Matthew Rampley’s description of the 
‘deadening grid of systematic analysis’, in Rampley, ‘The Poetics of the Image: Art History and the 
Rhetoric of Interpretation’, Marburger Jahrbuch Für Kunstwissenschaft, 35 (2008), p. 8, which I shall 
come to shortly.
 Siri Hustvedt, A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women: Essays on Art Sex and Mind (New York: 15
Simon and Schuster, 2016), p. 472.
 Gavin Parkinson, ‘(Blind Summit) Art Writing Narrative, Middle Voice’, in Grant and Rubin eds., 16
‘Creative Writing and Art History’, p. 270.
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describes and implicitly questions.  For example, I replace, what Parkinson 17
characterises as art history’s ‘organized plan’ with a more gradual, responsive and 
piecemeal approach to research materials as in-process. I nearly always sideline a 
‘respect for causality’, as the section below on the transhistorical will show. And rather 
than ‘rational connectivity’ I harness something more like an intuitive connectivity. I 
make use, on the whole, of proximity rather than ‘distance’, my methods also steering 
clear of ‘scientific causality’. And finally, rather than the ‘dissolution of authorship’ I 
offer an enactment of an active, morphing subjectivity which determines and is 
determined by the form, content and tone of its research materials rather than the more 
static, positional ‘announcement of subjectivity’ that Parkinson identifies.  
One of the difficulties I have encountered through this research is the variety of terms, 
often interchangeable, used to denote subjectively driven engagements with art and art 
history – subjective, personal, aesthetic, poetic and lyrical, for example. The form, 
character and edges of subjectivity are inherently and necessarily fuzzy. As a mode of 
inquiry it reveals itself through a whole series of methodological approaches: 
interpretation, personal voice, autobiography, connoisseurship and ekphrasis. I touch on 
art-historical examples of these modes to unpick their epistemological and interpretative 
implications before landing on a particular variety of subjectivity, theorised by the 
Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile, which aligns more closely with the particular 
subjective mode metabolised here. But to be clear, the scope and character of 
subjectivity playing out here is non vernacular, dialogic, serendipitous, associational, 
active and self-reflexive, emergent and ongoing. 
Extended Overview  
Since the form, style and timbre of this thesis is contingent on its encounters – 
simultaneously performed and observed – with other artworks it is important to set out 
early on the content of the chapters that follow as well as to describe the nature of their 
incubation and emergence across these pages. The beginnings of the thesis were unruly. 
Trying to pinpoint my research questions involved much actual and metaphorical 
gesticulation in the attempt to convey the feeling of the piece to my supervisors. I could 
 Parkinson, ‘(Blind Summit) Art Writing Narrative, Middle Voice’, p. 285.17
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feel the shape of it in my mouth, the ring of it in my head, but my vocal chords and the 
cavity of my mouth and the muscles of my tongue and cheeks felt flaccid and 
uncooperative, unable to translate this amorphous feeling into solid words. Those 
words, in fact, remained out of reach until I began looking closely at specific paintings 
and words.  
As the pairings finally emerged they each elicited their own individuated ‘bespoke’ 
responses. The character of each chapter is, as a result, distinctive in tone, mood and 
content because it materialised through the specific moments of their writing. That is 
not to suggest that this is a jamboree of relative claims in which anything goes. These 
chapters are, in a sense, site specific, roaming around a particular landscape of images 
and words which unfold gradually; they are autonomous and self-contained but at the 
same time interwoven: concerns raised in one chapter find themselves resurfacing 
elsewhere too.  
In my closing remarks I discuss how the processes at play in this thesis might also be 
framed as enacting an improvised handling of art-historical writing and thought. The 
matter of the thesis’s relationship with improvisatory methodologies warrants a few 
words of preliminary explanation here too. The way in which, for example, its trajectory 
is founded on a willingness to be receptive to, adjust with, and ride the wave of 
intuitions that spark associations between works of art, literature and scholarship but 
which is, at the same time, informed by a broader understanding of the disciplines 
which it mines, adheres to Edgar Landgraf’s definition of improvisation. Improvisation, 
he claims, is much maligned by modern and contemporary culture due to its being all 
too often defined by its experimental, un-fixed inventiveness. This, Landgraf contends, 
constitutes a serious over simplification. Improvisation, he goes on, is in fact founded 
on a rigorous understanding of the critical, philosophical and historical context of a 
given discipline. It is ‘not about the absence of rules and structures, nor about the advent 
of true Otherness, but rather can be understood as a self-organising process that relies 
on and stages the particular constraints that encourage the emergence of something new 
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and inventive.’  The ‘self-organising process’ that I put into play here is guided by 18
enmeshed relationships between writing, subjectivity and the ways in which these 
modes behave in particular artistic, literary and historical environments. 
What this improvisatory approach allows for, is the possibility of exploring connections 
that, at first sight, might seem implausible. But this thesis is concerned with the 
difficulty of teasing out and articulating connections that are empirically sensed but, 
because they are apparently unprovable via traditional means of historical investigation, 
might be disregarded as coincidental, provisional, or expressions of passing incidental 
conviction, but not sturdy enough to hold the weight of serious, rigorous scholarly 
research. Though not primarily derived from historical or archival research the 
commitment and sustained attention that I employ through the thesis constitutes a 
thoroughness of thought and application both specific and generalised. I worry, for 
example, at the philosophical implications of associative approaches to writing on art. I 
wonder at the relationships that explicit modes of subjective encounter elicit between art 
and writing and wander, nomadically, between disciplines that touch on the 
interrelationships between art and writing. 
The nature and character of thought that emerges from each of the following chapters is 
reflected back in the form of their writing; the process of their writing bears relaying 
since it captures much of the essence of the thesis.  Chapter 1 came last; it began life as 19
an introduction but, in length and substance, it ended up spilling out of its original 
boundaries, going far beyond its introductory remit, and finally nudging its way into the 
body of the thesis. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were written in the order that they appear here. 
 Edgar Landgraf, Improvisation as Art: Conceptual Challenges, Historical perspectives (New York and 18
London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 5 my emphases. Other key scholarship on improvisation includes, but is 
not limited to: Gilbert Ryle, ‘Improvisation,’ Mind, 85(337) (1976), 69–83; David Gere and Ann Cooper 
Albright, eds., Taken by Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, 2003); Gary Peters, The Philosophy of Improvisation (London and Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009); George E. Lewis and Benjamin Piekut, The Oxford Handbook of 
Critical Improvisation Studies Volume 1, First Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and 
Simon Shaw-Miller, Improvisation: Orphic Gaze in the Age of Jazz (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 
forthcoming 2020)
 I should make clear at this point, as I do later, that the kernel for this thesis was developed through my 19
Master’s dissertation entitled, ‘Picturing Subjective Art Histories: The Accumulative Eye in the Paintings 
of Peter Doig’ (University of Bristol, 2009) which is where I first made the association between Doig’s 
painting and Pater’s writing. I did not however return to this material again until after writing chapter 2 of 
this thesis on Zurbarán’s Four Vessels and Sontag’s writing.
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Chapter 2 began with a long session of browsing the digital archive of the Prado 
collection when I chanced on Zurbarán’s Four Vessels.  This super high-resolution 20
image that I found myself zooming into and out of, sliding my eye and cursor across – 
and that appeared to glow (as digital reproductions are wont to do) from my computer 
screen – engendered a feeling in me that this image, this thing, must be written, that I 
must find appropriate words and order them in such a way that they feel right, do justice 
or form a tacit understanding of the painting. My writing, to start with, appeared on the 
page in the manner of an exercise in automatic writing. I became fascinated with how 
and why it was taking the shape that it was. As time went on, Sontag’s words began to 
interject in the space between my own and Zurbarán’s marks. Their difficulty, their 
forthrightness, their ambiguity began to assert themselves, setting up a triangle of 
relations which the chapter traces. 
Like the painting to which it responds, chapter 2 is a staging. It mounts a series of art-
historical and critical interpretations of Zurbarán’s still life from a variety of angles. 
Although Sontag never wrote on Zurbarán, there are affinities (and crucial differences) 
between her approach to artworks and my own, and between Four Vessels and the 
works of art on which she did write. The chapter questions the significance of such felt 
affinities by ventriloquising Sontag’s writerly voice, tone, sentiments – redeploying her 
criticism and interpretative approaches – while simultaneously remaining responsive to 
the effect of her bringing into play the role of her own active subjectivity through her 
practice and theory of art criticism. The chapter wonders at the extent to which the 
works of Sontag and Zurbarán, taken together and in partnership with my thesis, offer a 
phenomenological enactment of the physical and intellectual encounter with art and 
ideas. It suggests that considered art writing might in itself be capable of producing 
forms of knowledge about art that go beyond historical truths or likelihoods. 
 It is of course often said that works of art should be viewed in the flesh and that digital reproductions 20
do not do them justice but it intrigues me that I could be so taken by the process of viewing this small 
painting via on-screen reproduction. See James Elkins on the kind of unnaturally or anachronistically 
close-viewing – or what Elkins terms ‘pathological’ ‘peering’ – that ultra high-definition images of art, 
such as those generated by the Google Art Project, engender. See Elkins, ‘Is Google Bringing us too 
Close to Art?’, The Daily Dot, 21-03-13 [last accessed, January 3, 2019].
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Chapter 3 was a different proposition, a return to a pairing I had explored, briefly, 
before and which was originally sparked by the 2008 solo exhibition of Peter Doig’s 
work at Tate Britain, an exhibition that left me physically exhilarated and emotionally 
reeling.  That experience formed the catalyst for my 2009 Master’s dissertation on 21
what I termed ‘Embodied Art Histories’, an approach to art history of which I came to 
see Doig’s work as a visual embodiment. In developing Doig and Pater’s relationship in 
the context of this thesis, their coming together took on the characteristics of water. 
Where chapter 2 is structured, separated into clearly defined subsections, chapter 3 finds 
the mellifluousness of its materials more difficult to handle. Its trajectory meanders, 
slippages occur disrupting straightforward logical orders. Themes emerge and are later 
submerged; impressions and partial impressions prevail. Chapter 3 is wayward, ill-
defined, its writing muddied and awash with uncertainty. As a result of trying to orient 
my writing within the landscape of this chapter it felt caught in a series of fluctuating 
eddies and flows, as if my words floated, drowned and were washed-up by the 
confluence of Pater’s writing and Doig’s paintings. 
Both Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ and Doig’s painting are inflected with a sense of serendipity, 
through a lyrical handling of their materials in a manner that might be considered self-
indulgent. The accusation of solipsism has been levelled, at various points, at Walter 
Pater, Gertrude Stein and Susan Sontag, three writers that form part of my three pairings 
here. Stein, as we will see, has often been described as a ‘self-promoter, endlessly self-
important’.  For Perry Meisel ‘Pater’s solipsism […] is erected on a spatial metaphor 22
whose truth he is intent to deny as he requires it in order to deny it’.  Irving Howe’s 23
reception of ‘the new sensibility’ of the 1960s, of which Sontag was a leading theorist, 
similarly implies a critique of solipsism, as James Penner has pointed out. Howe 
declared that, ‘The new sensibility is impatient with ideas. It is impatient with literary 
structures of complexity and coherence […]. It wants works of literature – though 
 Lizzie Lloyd, ‘Picturing Subjective Art Histories: The Accumulative Eye in the Paintings of Peter Doig’ 21
(MA thesis: University of Bristol, 2009).
 Chloe Schama, ‘Literary Landmarks: A History of American Women Writers’, interview with Chloe 22
Schama, Smithsonian Magazine (March 6 2009) http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/literary-
landmarks-a-history-of-american-women-writers-56536736/ [accessed 10 January 2017].
 Perry Meisel, The Absent Father: Virginia Woolf and Walter Pater (New Haven: Yale University Press, 23
1980), pp. 114–115.
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literature may be the wrong word – that will be as absolute as the sun, as unarguable as 
the orgasm, and as delicious as the lollipop’.  But Penner sees Howe’s outburst as 24
‘anchored in gendered binaries’: ‘The rational – read: masculine – tradition of high 
modernism is pitted against the facile and self-indulgent sensibility of “lollipops and 
“orgasms”: the frivolous devotion to camp and Dionysian fantasies of easy ecstasy’.   25
This thesis too is streaked through with a serendipity that it takes seriously, a strategy 
that renders our positions as readers, writers, painters, viewers and scholars vulnerable 
to accusations of solipsism, or so it appears. But perhaps we ought to reevaluate the role 
of serendipity in the construction of our academic house of cards. Is it extraneous, a 
bracketed coincidental curiosity, or might it be developed to become intrinsic to the 
form, character, content and course of our research?  Likewise rather than being 26
skeptical of lyrical uses of language or paint (evidenced in Doig and Pater) this thesis 
sees the lyrical as evidence of, and again intrinsic to, a specific method of thinking, an 
embodiment which I hope that this writing also enacts. We are used to thinking about 
painting and creative writing in these terms, as expressions of content through 
composition not just depiction, but the form or style of academic or critical writing is 
less commonly considered in terms of its ability do research in its own right. 
In chapter 4 the process of writing Michael Simpson’s paintings and Gertrude Stein’s 
writing into relation felt different again. It was characterised by an awkwardness and 
inflexibility that I struggled to negotiate. It involved a shuttling between forms and 
ideas that sometimes felt in tune and at others prickly, obstreperous and defiant. Once 
again, the form and character of the works I was researching seemed to be affecting the 
form and character of the chapter. My subjectivity, as expressed through style and tone, 
is at once transformed by the material it addresses and transforms the material itself 
through the particularity of its pairings and its discursive encounter with them.  
 Irving Howe, ‘The New York Intellectuals’, in Irving Howe: Selected Writings 1950–1990 (New York: 24
Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990), p. 273.
 James Penner, ‘Gendering Susan Sontag’s Criticism in the 1960s: the New York Intellectuals, the 25
Counter Culture, and the Kulturkampf over ‘the New Sensibility’’, Women’s Studies, 37 (2008), p. 933. 
 Richard Shiff, Doubt (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 11.26
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In essaying Simpson’s and Stein’s attunement chapter 4 is characterised by greater 
fragmentation and experimentation than the previous chapters. Instead of the fluidities 
and confluences which mark chapter 3, chapter 4 is streaked through with juxtaposition. 
Stein and Simpson’s contiguities appear as a series of frieze-framed analogies due to 
their comparable treatment of paint and words through which similar aesthetic 
mannerisms reverberate. I present these in list-like formations, echoing the types of 
compressed perspectival arrangements and terse renditions present in their work. As 
such language comes increasingly under pressure, evidenced in another aspect of the 
chapter: the possibility and difficulty of articulating and translating an experience – of 
an artwork or a text or both at once – into words.  
The results of these essays are inevitably imperfect but the process by which they are 
investigated registers the effects of looking and thinking and writing between, across 
and sometimes even awry. In my mind’s eye, they function as experiments in bringing 
disparate works together and seeing what happens when the relationships of such 
pairings are given time to prove. What I referred to earlier as their function as a means 
to ‘generate ideas, an exploratory performance of research through the act of writing’ 
also stands in relation to chapter 1 which is not so much a ‘case study’ but closer to a 
more conventional (in this case anti-) methodological chapter. But even here, chapter 
1’s trajectory is improvisatory; it forms the site of various encounters with and between 
art historians, philosophers and literary critics of its own, but it also grounds some of 
the approaches to thinking about and generating the material that appears in subsequent 
chapters. 
Though separate, with their own distinct feel, the following chapters are not, therefore, 
entirely autonomous. It is the nature of, what might be called, ‘morphological thinking’ 
to allow multi-directional links to cluster between and around them. This is how 
conversations emerge, and resonances appear and cross-fertilise, often through detours. 
One such detour that is worth pointing out, is the way the previous two sentences 
resonate with instances of Wai Chee Dimock’s turns of phrase. Dimock, who I will refer 
to at various points throughout this thesis, describes her take on literary history, for 
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example, as the result of ‘site-specific input generating a variable morphology’.  Her 27
metaphorically inflected creative thinking around literary history sees her modelling, 
what she calls, a ‘diachronic historicism’ ‘on the traveling frequencies of sound’ that are 
suggestive of ‘the traveling frequencies of literary texts: frequencies received and 
amplified across time, moving farther and farther from their points of origin, causing 
unexpected vibrations in unexpected places’.   28
To continue borrowing from Dimock, these chapters set in motion just such ‘unexpected 
vibrations’. Vibrating pairings – which often, incidentally, through their writing turn 
into clusters – inhabit each chapter which can be read separately, but they also work 
together, receiving, feeding-back, amplifying, their resonant frequencies overlaying and 
building up a particular approach to looking and thinking between art, writing and 
history. Tom McCarthy frames the matter of writing and reading literature in similar 
terms, as a form of audio synthesis. In Transmission and the Individual Remix (2012) he 
promotes a form of reading that pays heed ‘to a set of signals that have been repeating, 
pulsing, modulating in the airspace of the novel, poem, play – in their lines, between 
them and around them—since each of these forms began’.   29
‘Repeating, pulsing and modulating’ are strong features in all of these chapters; they are 
a way of probing, turning over, returning and adding to ideas that swarm and resonate 
around the space of this thesis, a way of practicing and elucidating the possibilities at 
stake in its approach. Each chapter should, as I will discuss, be understood as extended 
essays, literal trials or attempts at seeing what happens if two things – that do not 
necessarily, historically, geographically or causally belong together – are allowed to 
meet, to sit, or be together. How does our understanding of them alter? And what kind 
of unexpected discussions emerge from them?  
 Wai Chee Dimock, ‘Weak Theory: Henry James, Colm Tóibín, and W. B. Yeats’, Critical Inquiry, 39(4) 27
(2013), p. 737.
 Dimock, ‘Theory of Resonance’, PMLA, 112(5) (1997), p. 1061.28
 Tom McCarthy, Transmission and the Individual Remix: How Literature Works (London: Jonathan 29
Cape, 2012).
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Chapter 1  
Thinking Around a Poetic Art History 
!18
One potential problem with the approach taken in this thesis is the question of where it 
fits with the wider discipline of Art History. A discussion of Matthew Rampley’s article 
‘The Poetics of the Image: Art History and the Rhetoric of Interpretation’ (2008) serves 
as a device to outline points of potential friction sparked by how I navigate the material 
that emerges through this thesis, since the lyrical and imagistic strategies for handling 
art histories taken here in some respects ally with his examples.  Rampley discusses the 30
impact that the poetic approaches of Roberto Longhi, Adrian Stokes, Mieke Bal, and 
Georges Didi-Huberman have had on art history. He sees theirs as alternatives to the 
‘scientific methods’ of doing art history which ‘bury the artwork in a formidable 
apparatus of dry scholarly analysis that robs it of its specificity to such an extent that its 
cultural and aesthetic value become lost’ resulting in an unwelcome ‘taming’ – a 
sentiment that this thesis shares.   31
Though describing the work of these poetic art histories as ‘striking’, ‘remarkable’, 
‘novel’, ‘important’, and even ‘astonishing’ Rampley remains skeptical, the reasons for 
which are revealing. He is unconvinced by Bal’s assumption that ‘one’s own subjective 
position can […] be rendered transparent’, leading him to judge her observations as 
‘having little relevance to the discipline’.  He sees Didi-Huberman’s determination not 32
to attempt to elucidate the uncertainty of the image through a systematic approach to 
interpretation as offering no ‘theory of interpretation at all, but rather, an account of 
aesthetic experience’.  He sees Stokes’s writing as ‘too individual, too rooted in his 33
personal aesthetic absorption in stone for it to serve as a means of constructing a shared 
community of knowledge’. And he objects to the way that Longhi’s descriptions are 
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’.30
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’, p. 7. We will come back to the idea of ‘taming’ art in chapter 2 in relation to Susan 31
Sontag.
 I will come to the idea of transparency of subjectivity shortly when I will argue that subjectivity as a(n 32
anti-) methodological approach is not an imposition of itself onto some exterior form but a state of 
immanence as the activity of writing is being carried out. See Giovanni Gentile in my later discussion of 
subjectivity, in particular Gentile’s notion of how ‘humanity thinks, speaks and yearns, and by thinking it 
thinks itself and all the rest into being’ and that ‘this is so because, in practice, the individual is not 
conceivable outside the relationship in which the object of experience is indissolubly linked to the subject 
of experience. The two are linked through the act of thought by which experience is mediated and 
realized’, Gentile, ‘Basic Concepts of Actualism’, Thought Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni in 
Gentile Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Bruce Haddock and James Wakefield eds., Gentile 
essays trans. Lizzie Lloyd and James Wakefield, 20(1–2) (2014), pp. 348 and 345 and Rampley, ‘Poetics’, 
p.18.
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’, p. 24.33
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‘rooted in a highly subjective aesthetic response which can neither be challenged nor 
confirmed’ and cannot, therefore, ‘serve as a prompt for further historical 
investigation.’  34
Rampley’s critique turns on two cruxes: The first is that though these poetic forms of 
writing are acts of resistance against ‘the deadening grid of systematic analysis that has 
been such a central force within so much art historical discourse’ they fail to posit an 
alternative.  The second is split into two related parts. On the one hand it is founded on 35
Rampley’s idea of the type of knowledge to which art-historical writing should give 
rise. But it also leads to a questioning of the relationship between the personal nature of 
responses and/or interpretation and their usefulness for the collective labour of the 
discipline.  36
According to Rampley his exemplars fail to offer an alternative mode of discourse to 
that which they seek to subvert.  They are evidence of individual anomalies but their 37
importance to the future of art history is limited because they have not spawned 
sufficient followers. He concludes: 
Considering the four authors I have examined, it appears while the 
weaknesses within art history are exposed, constructing a counter 
discourse creates as many difficulties as it solves. The image remains 
‘tamed’, albeit in a different way. What does emerge out of this 
discussion is the need to consider not simply the contribution of 
individual authors, but also more fundamental issues to do with the 
status of art history as a shared enterprise and the implications that 
might have for a critical assessment of how art historical knowledge 
 ibid., p. 16. My emphases. Per Jonas Nordhagen argues for a reevaluation of the persistent 34
characterisation of Longhi as ‘a late survivor of a long-since extinct race of gentleman amateur, with his 
endless introvert musings and his purple passages’, in ‘Roberto Longhi (1890–1970) and the Concept of 
the Connoisseur’, in Margaretha Rossholm Lagerlöf and Dan Karlholm eds. Subjectivity and 
Methodology in Art History (Eidos 8. Skrifter från Konstvetenskapliga institutionen vid Stockholms 
universitet, 2003), p. 100.
 The cause of this ‘deadening grid of systematic analysis’ Rampley puts down to the scientific or 35
‘wissenschaftlich’ impetus of the Vienna School from the late of Art History from 1870s onwards. 
Rampley, ‘Poetics’, p. 8.
 Among other things this thesis will draw out analogies between the ‘subjective’ tendencies of such 36
accounts and a growing interest in embodied critiques in contemporary scholarship, as my discussion of 
Walter Pater in chapter 3 will show. 
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’, pp. 11–18.37
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is generated, what ‘knowledge’ in this context means, and to whom 
it is addressed.   38
The tug of historical legitimacy lingers in this passage; Rampley cannot shake off the 
question of whether or not his exemplars’ claims can be substantiated by historical 
evidence.  This sense emerges in various ways. Firstly, phrases like ‘serve as a 39
prompt’, ‘serve as a means of’, and referring to art history as ‘a collective enterprise’ 
position the writing of art history as if it were a service, to be capitalised – through 
argument and elucidation – and serving as, above all, a useful marketable exchange.  40
Language is framed as a vehicle for conveyance rather than as valuable in its own right. 
Secondly, because of their subjective aesthetic responses poetic art histories ‘end up 
having little relevance’ or are ‘deeply problematic’ because, especially in the case of 
Stokes and Longhi, they ‘can be neither challenged nor confirmed’.  And thirdly, 41
Rampley turns the argument around suggesting the exemplars themselves conduct a 
taming – comparable to that resulting from scientific models of art history – whereby, 
‘No longer lost in the hermeneutic jargon of [scientific] art history, they become lost in 
another kind of discourse, in which the language of representation blots out the object of 
discourse.’  Here ‘the language of representation’, that is, the language of discourse 42
and its articulating subject, is pitted in opposition to ‘the object of discourse’. This 
thesis, however, sees the two, or rather three strands – object, subject, and language – 
not in competition, vying for prominence, but at various points in step, or converging. 
But what constitutes poetry or the poetic? Michael Oakeshott defines it as the ‘activity 
of making images of a certain kind and moving about among them in a manner 
appropriate to their character.’  This ‘moving about among’ visual and verbal images 43
 ibid., pp.10 and 26.38
 A similar objection is made by Rampley in his argument against citing adaptive mutation as the cause 39
for origins of art in his introduction to The Seductions of Darwin: Art, Evolution, Neuroscience, 
(Pennsylvania: Penn. State University Press, 2017).
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’, pp. 17 and 25.40
 ibid., p. 11.41
 ibid., p. 25.42
 Michael Oakeshott, The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind (Cambridge: Bowes and 43
Bowes, 1959), p. 31.
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‘in a manner appropriate to their character’ is just what this thesis essays.  Identifying 44
such appropriateness of character involves a process in which multiple strands need 
careful and simultaneous attendance: negotiating the felt experience of close seeing and 
reading; maintaining the connection between words and images that suggest themselves 
in the moment of writing; following those relationships to test how far they take us; and 
regarding the words through which those relationships emerge as enmeshed and 
illuminative in their own right. 
It does so by means of comparison, nothing new there but a development of the 
Renaissance activity of paragone.  The term comparison, however, is too leaden, too 45
absolute, too dichotomous to encompass the nature of the relationships between texts 
and images that I am proposing. The term emergence better captures their unfurling 
resonances and resemblances. Analogies gather here, falteringly, suggesting themselves 
as words on these pages congregate. The aim of this thesis is to listen to the emergence 
of these ideas and observe their conversing across subjects, disciplines and time.  
What enables this emergence is its open regard to subjectivity. In a 1969 letter to James 
Ackerman published in Daedalus, Leo Steinberg declares how he ‘admire[s] the art 
historian who lets the ground of his private involvement show. Though we all hope to 
reach objectively valid conclusions’, he concedes, ‘this purpose is not served by 
disguising the subjectivity of interest, method, and personal history that in fact 
conditions our work.’  I take this idea further to encompass how the language of an 46
encounter, that comes about in the form of mutual affective experiences between 
subjects and objects, may also let the process of its involvement show. The language 
that sets itself down here, one depression of the keyboard at a time, is meant to form 
part of the conversation, it is held alongside the words and images and ideas of its other 
participants. I seek not to disguise how this thesis came into being, but to foreground 
the inherent contingency of its encounters.  
 The use of the phrase ‘in a certain manner’ is an explicit reference to Aristotle, Poetics, i 7-8 ix. 2.44
 My reference to paragone is intended only to acknowledge the lineage of the methods I am employing. 45
The following pairings are deployed, not as comparisons or a means of championing one media over 
another, but as confluences in which reciprocal analogies between media and modes of expression 
emerge.
 Leo Steinberg, ‘Objectivity and the Shrinking Self’, Daedalus, 98 (1969), p. 826.46
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Put like this it recalls Oakeshott’s eulogising of scholarship, research and writing not as 
a service, as my reading of Rampley’s article suggests, but as a more open pursuit, akin 
to a metaphorical conversation. Scholarship, Oakeshott writes, is not ‘an enterprise 
designed to yield extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an 
activity of exegesis’.  It is not (or should not be) a process of oneupmanship. Nor is it 47
necessarily a process whereby, in this case, texts and images are explained or interpreted 
in order to bring about greater clarity. Oakeshott’s model allows for ‘different universes 
of discourse [to] meet, acknowledge each other and enjoy an oblique relationship’.  He 48
envisions scholarship as something like a stage on which a series of intellectual 
discussions enter, meet, attract, repel and sometimes, though not necessarily, merge, 
echo, and even cross-fertilise. Scholarship, played out like this, in and through 
conversation, poses considerable risks; it is, as Oakeshott puts it, ‘an unrehearsed 
intellectual adventure.’   49
Conversation and ‘Poetic Imagining’ 
There are precedents for foregrounding conversation in scholarship including Plato’s 
Dialogues (fourth century BC), François Fénelon’s, Dialogues of the Dead (c. 1690), 
and Walter Landor’s Imaginary Conversations (1824-1829) conducted between 
historical and mythical characters ranging from Ancient Greece to the Romantic period; 
Maurice Blanchot’s notoriously difficult Infinite Conversation (1969); Jacques 
Derrida’s ‘Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing’ (1978), a text that sways between prose 
and conversation conducted between indeterminate interlocutors; and Matthew 
Collings’s ‘An Oral History of Western Art’ in ArtReview (2008 onwards), a series of 
imaginary conversations with historical figures. But the character of the hypothetical 
discourses enacted here are more akin to the spirit of Oakeshott’s conversation as 
actively reflective and reflexive. That last phrase, actively reflective and reflexive, 
should not be construed as oxymoronic since ‘contemplating’ is to enact ‘a specific 
 Oakeshott, The Voice of Poetry, p. 10.47
 ibid., p. 11.48
 ibid., p. 11.49
!23
mode of imagining and moving about among images’.  Conversation is the mode 50
through which we contemplate ‘poetic imagining’. Artists, writers and philosophers, 
Oakeshott argues, ‘are not doing two things – observing, thinking, remembering, 
hearing, feeling etc. and then ‘expressing’ or making analogues, imitations, or 
reproductions of what they have seen, heard, remembered, felt etc. in the practical 
world, and doing it well or ill, correctly or incorrectly – they are doing one thing, 
imagining poetically.’   51
The way that this imagining emerges is key. Personal experiences tell us that 
conversations are often serendipitous: an exchange with a fellow dog owner, a 
misunderstanding with a partner, a throwaway aside to a colleague. They are rarely 
structured, even if content and tone is planned they often take on a life and direction of 
their own. Conversations arise. This thesis turns on just such an emergence of remote 
elements that gather together, apparently naturally or at least unbidden. Artist and writer 
Agnieszka Kurant characterises emergence as a resistance to ‘computation and 
predicting’. She continues, ‘the complex systems within which emergence occurs – 
from termite colonies to social movements and cities, from the human to the Internet, 
manifest nonlinear, unpredictable behaviours that nevertheless produce novel and 
coherent structures and patterns’.  In attending to the ‘non-linear, unpredictable’ 52
elements clustering here I am less concerned with why the pairings in this thesis come 
together than with how they do so, and what the implications of their doing so are for 
further thinking between visual art and writing.  This is another way in which my 53
 ibid., pp. 36–37.50
 ibid., p. 39. I will return to the idea of the simultaneity of this position in the section that follows 51
entitled ‘Practice-based Research’. Here I argue for a type of art-historical writing that is both performed 
and informative, practical and theoretical, active and reflective. 
 Agnieszka Kurant, ‘Uncomputables’, Cabinet, 61 (Spring-Summer 2016), p. 51.52
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer a broad account of Associationism. See James Mill, 53
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, and George Grote 
critical notes, John Stuart Mill ed., vol. 2 (London: Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869); David 
Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, etc. (London: J. Johnson, 
1791); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch eds. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition 1978, online edition 2014); Dugald Stewart, Elements 
of the Philosophy of the Human Mind in Works of Dugald Stewart, in Seven Volumes, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Hillard and Brown, 1829); James Engell, The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism 
(London, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U.P, 1981); Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay 
on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Cairns Craig, 
Associationism and the Literary Imagination: From the Phantasmal Chaos (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007); John Ruskin, Modern Painters, Vol. I (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1848). 
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thesis negotiates the potential accusation of solipsism. By foregrounding the process of 
thinking through how a resonance is triggered rather than what a particular resonance 
might be, claims of relativism or universal irrelevance dissipate. 
Art History as Practice 
To expand on that thought, let me return to one of Rampley’s principle concerns which 
was the apparent lack of knowledge to which poetic art histories give rise. In the context 
of a doctoral thesis which may be expected to yield new knowledge this is pertinent. 
The fact that this project straddles a conventional humanities research PhD and a 
practice-led PhD, however, goes someway to mitigate such concerns but only if we first 
understand what is at stake in the two approaches.  
The model for a practice-led PhD varies widely across disciplines and institutions, but 
some consensus is emerging as to their key characteristics. Not only does the practical 
element form a large part of these submissions, practice also leads the research process 
so that, according to Robin Nelson, ‘theory and practice are “imbricated within each 
other’’ in praxis’.  James Elkins identifies three common characteristics of practice-led 54
doctorates:  
– A mode of conception that is at once active and self-reflexive.  
– An implicit centrality of the body and phenomenological mode of inquiry. 
– And the suggestion of a framework which allows for the production of new insights.   55
Hazel Smith and Roger Dean emphasise the inherent interconnectedness of practice-led 
research, and its foregrounding of process as in a state of becoming.  And Brad 56
Haseman and Daniel Mafe describe such research as ‘unruly, ambiguous, and marked 
 Practice-led PhDs are also called Practice-based PhDs or more broadly as Practice as Research. For 54
further discussion of the appropriateness of these labels see Robin Nelson ed., Practice as Research in the 
Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
pp. 9, 10, and 62.
 James Elkins, ‘Artists with PhDs: Debates About the New Studio Art Doctoral Degree’, Academia .edu 55
<http://www.academia.edu/
168372Artists_with_PhDs_On_the_New_Doctoral_Degree_in_Studio_Art_opening> [accessed 22 
November 2013].
 Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean, ‘Introduction: Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice – Towards 56
the Iterative Cyclic Web’, in Practice-led Research Research-led Practice in the Creative Arts, Smith and 
Dean eds., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
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by extremes of interpretative anxiety for the reflexive researcher’. It is this way 
Haseman and Mafe argue, ‘because it is deeply emergent in nature’.  57
Perhaps most contested is the degree to which such PhDs produce and demonstrate new 
‘knowledge’ which is especially relevant given Rampley’s critique of poetic art 
histories. So what constitutes knowledge? According to Nelson the inflection of this 
discussion requires some rethinking. We should not, he argues, be referring to what 
knowledge these PhDs produce, instead we should be asking ourselves what types of 
knowledge, or rather ‘knowing’ arise from them. It is an important distinction which 
Nelson clarifies using philosopher David Pears’s example of riding a bike: 
I know how to ride a bicycle, but I cannot say how I balance because 
I have no method. I may know that certain muscles are involved, but 
that factual knowledge comes later, if at all, and it could hardly be 
used in instruction.  58
Nelson’s conception of knowing depends on a distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative research. The former is a data-based knowledge which he says is founded on 
deductive methods of research developed in the natural sciences and closely aligned 
with positivist methodologies. Qualitative research, which emerged as a form of 
resistance to quantitative methodologies, is inductive and embraces a variety of methods 
of research.  Quantitative research is widely characterised as strong and stable, dealing 59
in hard knowledge and data while qualitative research is defined as ‘softer’, more 
 Brad Haseman and Daniel Mafe, ‘Acquiring Know-How: Research Training for Practice-led 57
Researchers’, in Practice-led Research, Smith and Dean eds., p. 220. There is a huge body of literature on 
the matter of emergence usually coming out of the Social Sciences but increasingly in relation to Art 
Practice, including but not limited to: Haseman and Mafe, ‘Acquiring Know-How’; Paul Corning, ‘The 
Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence”: The Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory’, Complexity, 7 (6) (2002); 
Raymond A. Eve, Sara Horsfall, Mary E. Lee, eds., Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology: Myths, Models, 
and Theories (California, London, New Delhi: Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 1997); Sharlene Nagy 
Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy eds., Handbook of Emergent Methods (New York: Guilford Press, 2010).
 David Pears, following Heidegger’s notion of material thinking, cited in Nelson, Practice as Research, 58
p. 9. 
 Patricia Leavy also frames the narrative relationship between the two research paradigms in this way in 59
Method Meets Art (New York: Guilford Press, 2015), p. 8. Nelson takes the work of Newton and Comte 
as being representative of quantitative knowledge based on their belief in the certainties of scientific 
research methods and findings. The qualitative method is espoused by thinkers like Einstein, Heisenberg, 
Plank and others Practice as Research, 2013, p. 49. See Brad Haseman for an interesting complication of 
the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research, ‘A Manifesto for Performative Research’, 
Media International Australia incorporating Culture and Policy, 118 (2006), p. 97.
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‘fluid’, leading to ‘soft knowledge’ and often retains some ambiguity.  I will return to, 60
and revise, the valuative connotations of terms like soft, fluid, weak, and even leaky in 
relation to research at various points in this thesis.   61
In aligning itself between a research and a practice-led PhD, this thesis intends to 
dissolve the binary modes by which academia, traditionally, sets scholarly subjects 
against ‘creative’ practices. Take the discipline variously, and unsatisfactorily, described 
as fictocriticism, creative criticism, creative non-fiction, reformative criticism, post-
criticism, anarcho-scholasticism, Other criticism, and philosophic criticism.  The 62
model for assessing such theses is to separate, artificially and unsatisfactorily, practice 
from criticism or theory. The 2016 conference ‘Hybrid Writing: Literature as Criticism, 
Criticism as Literature’, organised by the department of Creative Writing at University 
of East Anglia, was bristling with frustrations, voiced by speakers and audience alike, 
about the misleading severance of creativity from criticism as if the creative could not 
be critical and the critical not creative.  This thesis, by contrast, is inflected with the 63
 Nelson, Practice as Research, pp. 52–62. Of course, some of the distinctions between the qualitative 60
and quantitative draw on basic distinctions drawn in the German debate of the nineteenth-century 
between the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften.
 See Dimock, ‘Weak Theory’, and her use of the term ‘leaky’ which is discussed in chapter 3 in relation 61
to Peter Doig and Walter Pater’s fluidity. See also Michaela Atienza’s discussion of the inherent 
‘instability’ of fictocriticism ‘Strange Technology: Fictocriticism and the Cyborg’, Journal of English and 
Comparative Literature, 14(1) (2014), p. 59. And Helen Flavell’s definition of fictocriticsm in Writing-
between: Australian and Canadian Ficto-criticism (Diss. Murdoch University, 2004), pp. 30–31.
 Interesting examples include, but are not limited to: Oscar Wilde, ‘The Critic As Artist’, in Intentions 62
(London: James R. Osgood, McIlvaine and Co., 1891); Jean Cocteau, ‘The Essay of Indirect Criticism’, 
T. and R. Weiss eds., Quarterly Review of Literature, 12(4) (1964); Jackie Stacey and Janet Wolff, 
Writing Otherwise: Experiments in Cultural Criticism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); 
Bruce Hainley, Under the Sign of [sic]: Sturtevant’s Volte-face (South Pasadena: Semiotexte, 2013). For 
other twentieth and twenty-first century examples see the excellent: Stephen Benson and Clare Connors 
eds., Creative Criticism: An Anthology and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) which 
includes Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments (London: Vintage, 2002); Wayne 
Koestenbaum, Hotel Theory (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2007). See also Ali Smith, Artful, (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 2012); Mark Wallace and Stephen Marks eds., Telling It Slant: Avant-Garde Poetics of 
the 1990s (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001); Carol Mavor, Black and Blue: The Bruising 
Passion of Camera Lucida, La Jetée, Sans Soleil, and Hiroshima mon Amour (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012). Another relevant variant of this genre of hybrid writing is Ethnographic Fiction, 
see S. Marston and S. de Leeuw, ‘Creativity and Geography: Toward a Politicized Intervention’, The 
Geographical Review, 103(2) (2013); J. Wylie, ‘A single day’s walking: narrating self and landscape on 
the South West Coast Path’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 30(2) (2005).
 ‘Hybrid Writing: Literature as Criticism, Criticism as Literature’ (University of East Anglia, 17 63
December, 2016). From the conference papers, note especially Tania Hershman, ‘What if we were all 
allowed to separate and come together’ (2016), Meryl Pugh, ‘Against Cohering – Or Why the Bluebell is 
a Poor Analogy for the Literary-Critical text’ (2016) and Anna Metcalfe ‘‘I hope to show’, or the Last 
Thing out of Pandora’s Box’ (2016). 
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openness of a practice-led PhD but without the artificial separation of theory or 
methodology from practice. Here theory is practice; practice is theory. 
To the question of what this kind of hybrid approach to research and writing can yield 
fictocritc Michela Atienza provides a tantalising, if unresolved, response. She calls for a 
sharpening of focus not just on the ways that fictocriticism ‘deviates from the academic 
writing tradition […] but on its fusion with another form of writing.’  Atienza sees a 64
‘mutation’ of the two modes from which fictocriticism borrows (creative/fiction and 
criticism) to ‘allow us to say “something else”’.  This thesis intends to set up the 65
conditions in which this ‘something else’ might thrive.  
Art Transhistorically  
Recurrent patterns of thought emerge from this thesis. One is the historically disparate 
nature of the works that come into contact. In fact, very early on in my project I thought 
that I might focus on the philosophical implications of transhistorical or anachronistic 
connections that I had begun to make between the work of writers and artists. But as the 
thesis developed, this element became more of an observation than a developed topic in 
its own right. I give it its own subsection here though partly, to acknowledge the 
significant frissons and implications of such transhistorical pairings, and partly to 
acknowledge the self-contained potential for this element of my thesis to be developed 
further in the future. I will, therefore, say only a few words about its role in the 
subsequent chapters. 
The purpose of bringing historically, geographically, and in most other ways disparate 
objects into orbit in these case studies is to give time and value to perceived, but 
incidentally ahistorical associations. My chapters attempt to write through, as precisely 
as possible, how texts and images partake in shared conversations even without their 
knowing. Accordingly they engage with a recent shift in scholarship – enabled by 
reception studies though departing from it in crucial ways – which argues for the value 
 Atienza, ‘Strange Technology’, p. 42.64
 ibid., p. 43.65
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of drawing scholarly comparisons between artworks across substantial lengths of time, a 
shift exemplified in the works of Mieke Bal, Elizabeth Prettejohn, Amy Powell Knight, 
Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood.  Rather than identifying influences between 66
artworks, or seeing the modern or contemporary in the old or vice versa, the 
transhistorical dialogues I draw on see conversations between artworks that might 
appear entirely separate (whose original artistic or cultural functions were different or 
whose origins are temporally and geographically mismatched) but that, in various ways, 
appear to speak analogically and associatively across the temporal span that, on the 
surface, divides them.  
The strength of what is sometimes termed an anachronic approach to framing art-
historical relationships brings to the fore a series of overlapping qualities peculiar to the 
study of artworks. Close attention to the artwork highlights the way that they contain 
within them, and their encounters, networks of relations with other artworks. Some have 
termed this ‘promiscuity’, a capacity to relate to different things at different times.  My 67
approach, however, is distinct for the way that it combines the anachronic with the 
associative. It is a technique more developed in literary spheres but Aby Warburg and 
his Mnemosyne Atlas (1924–29) constitutes an important example from art history. But 
this thesis is also cognisant of the problematics of such (non-)systems of mapping 
knowledge or understanding. It wonders, but does not answer, questions about how we 
reconcile, for example, the danger of flattening out difference in the homogenous 
 On reception studies see Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception (Minneapolis: 66
University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Wolfgang Iser, A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Charles Martindale, Redeeming the Text: Latin 
Poetry and the Hermeneutics of Reception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Charles 
Martindale and Richard F. Thomas, Classics and the Uses of Reception (Maldon and Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006). On transhistorical studies see, Mieke Bal, Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous 
History (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Paul Crowther, The Transhistorical 
Image: Philosophizing Art and its History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Alexander 
Nagel and Christopher Wood, Anachronic Renaissance (New York: Zone Books, 2010); Alexander Nagel, 
Medieval Modern: Art out of Time (London: Thames and Hudson, 2012); Amy Knight Powell, 
Depositions: Scenes from the Late Medieval Church and the Modern Museum (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2012); Christopher Wood, ‘Reception and the Classics’, in W. Brockliss, P. Chaudhuri, A. Haimson 
Lushkov, and K. Wasdin eds., Reception and the Classics: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Classical 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Hal Foster, ‘Preposterous Timing’, London 
Review of Books, 34(21) (8 November 2012); Elizabeth Prettejohn, The Modernity of Ancient Sculpture: 
Greek Sculpture and Modern Art from Winckelmann to Picasso (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 
2012); Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art 
(Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2005); and Didi-Huberman, Devant le temps: histoire de l’art et 
anachronisme des images (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2000).
 Knight Powell, Depositions, p. 263.67
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subjects of art history while also not holing ourselves up in closed boxes of art-
historical periodisation? And what do transhistorical connections or analogies tell us 
about the artworks and art historians in question? 
The Essay 
There is a sense of precariousness in making transhistorical connections, however, a 
sense which is conveyed in part by my choice to refer to the chapters that follow as case 
studies and also essays. Having explained my use of the term ‘case study’, the ‘essay’ 
also deserves some unpacking as it connects to a genre of writing often characterised by 
a specific character of thought to which this thesis is sympathetic. Due to its relativity, 
transience, and perceived insufficient originality or rigour, Theodor Adorno, in 1958, 
identified the essay’s lack of status as one of its defining features. He posited the essay 
as in diametric opposition to the qualities associated with scholarly writing.  Here, I put 68
forward the essay as itself a form of scholarly thought. So when Rampley critiques 
poetic art histories for their lack of clearly stated methodology in the name of the 
‘shared enterprise’ of scholarship we might turn to Adorno for an alternative 
perspective. Adorno writes that the essay ‘draws the fullest conclusions from the 
critique of systems’. It is its non-methodology that marks the essay out as distinctive 
and uniquely valuable. He sees this absence of systems as being ‘radical in its non-
radicalism, in refraining from any reduction to a principle, in its accentuation of the 
partial against the total, in its fragmentary character’.  The essay ‘thinks conjointly and 69
in freedom about things that meet in its freely chosen object’ as if it had a mind of its 
 My paraphrasing of Adorno here is loose. His words are: ‘the academic guild accepts as philosophy 68
only what is clothed in the dignity of the universal – and today perhaps the originary.’ ‘The Essay as 
Form’, in Notes of Literature, Rolf Tiedemann ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 3.
 ibid., p. 9.69
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own.  It starts to take on the characteristics of a living organism which is responsive to 70
and metabolises the distinct elements that it brings together through discussion. The 
following essays should be seen as examples of just such thinking ‘conjointly and in 
freedom’ with the artworks and texts around which they roam. They set up a series of 
distinct, speculative landscapes through which encounters with objects take place.  71
Types of Subjectivity 
A characteristic of both the essay and ficto- or creative criticism is their self-conscious 
enlisting of the subjectivity of the writer to enact their relationships with research 
through language.  Because subjectivity is inherently amorphous and notoriously 72
difficult to define, I want to be clear about the type of subjectivity at play here by first 
setting out what it is not. This is not an embrace of Epicurean thought in which all 
 ibid., p. 11. There is an enormous body of literature on the essay but among the most useful are: Phillip 70
Lopate, The Art of the Personal Essay: An Anthology from the Classical Era to the Present 
(Peterborough: Anchor Books, 1994); Claire de Obaldia, The Essayistic Spirit: Literature, Modern 
Criticism, and the Essay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Carl Klaus, The Made-Up Self: 
Impersonation in the Personal Essay (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2010); Patricia Foster and Jeff 
Porter eds., Understanding The Essay (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2012); Carl Klaus and Ned 
Stuckey eds., Essayists on the Essay: Montaigne to Our Time (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 
2012); Réda Bensmaïa ed., The Barthes Effect: The Essay as Reflective Text, Pat Fedkiew trans. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Graham Good, The Observing Self: Rediscovering 
the Essay (New York: Routledge, 1988); G. Douglas Atkins, Estranging the Familiar: Toward a 
Revitalized Critical Writing (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2008); Atkins, Tracing the Essay: 
Through Experience to Truth (University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA: 2005); Jill Talbot ed., 
Metawritings: Toward a Theory of Nonfiction (University of Iowa Press, 2012); David Lazar, Essaying 
the Essay (Gettysburg, PA: Welcome Table Press, 2014); David Lazar ed., Truth in Nonfiction: 
Essays (University of Iowa Press, 2008); Virginia Woolf, ‘The Modern Essay’, The Common Reader, Vol. 
1 (London: Vintage, 2003); Jean Starodbinski, ‘Can One Define the Essay?’, in Essayists on the Essay: 
Montaigne to Our Time, Carl Klaus and Ned Stuckey-French eds. (Iowa: Iowa University Press, 2012); 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis, ‘f-Words: An Essay on the Essay’, American Literature, 68(1) (1996); R. Lane 
Kauffman, ‘The Skewed Path: Essaying as Un-Methodical Method’, Diogenes, 36 (1988). See also 
Pater’s description of essays as containing ‘much of accident in this essentially informal, this un-
methodical method’, in Plato and Platonism (London: Aeterna Press, 2012). Other examples of hard to 
categorise essayists include, Maggie Nelson, Wayne Koestenbaum, and John D’Agata, Eliot Weinberger, 
Lydia Davis.
 My use of the term ‘landscape’ here is indebted to Steven Connors’s account of Michel Serres’s thought 71
which he describes in terms of ‘topologies’, in ‘Serres and the Shape of Thought’ paper presented at 
‘Literature and Science’ conference held in Ascoli Piceno, Italy 20–22 May 2002. It appears in Anglistik, 
15 (2004) and http://www.stevenconnor.com/topologies/ [accessed 2 December 2018].
 See Michael Ann Holly and Marquard Smith eds., What Is Research in the Visual Arts? (Williamstown 72
MA.: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2008); Dana Arnold ed., Art History: Contemporary 
Perspectives on Method (Maldon and Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010) and Amelia Jones and Andrew 
Stephenson eds., Performing the Body/Performing the Text (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); 
Eleni Gemtou, ‘Subjectivity in Art History and Art Criticism’, Rupkatha Journal on Interdisciplinary 
Studies in Humanities, 2(1) (2010); Lagerlöf and Karlholm, Subjectivity and Methodology.
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sense-perceptions are considered true.  But it also seeks not to dismiss such positions 73
either. A more nuanced claim might be to say that all sense-perceptions, when shared 
and offered up to discussion, are worthy of further attention. If, after further inquiry, that 
sense-perception still holds – in that its articulation in words still convinces or compels 
– then perhaps it might be claimed to be true or, at least, of interest, inducing further 
thought, sense-perceptions, and associative connections. What the resulting value of 
these observations might be is less easy to anticipate; they are ‘site-specific’, as Dimock 
has it, and therefore inextricably linked with the particular landscape of research from 
which they emerge.  What is absolutely clear is that, in order to gauge their value, 74
sense-perceptions first need a thorough airing.  
A tangential look at Panofsky’s uncertain attitude to the role of subjectivity helps anchor 
our understanding of the type of subjectivity at play here. In ‘History of Art as a 
Humanistic Discipline’ (1955) he claims, on the surface at least, to recognise the value 
of subjectivity, though he suggests separating our ‘intuitive aesthetic re-
creation’ (present subjective accounts) of objects and our ‘rational archaeological 
analysis’ (objective recovery of past events). The subjective and objective – which 
Panofsky also affiliates with another classic binary, art and science – seem to coexist 
since the professional art historian should be ‘continually checking the results of his 
archeological research against the evidence of his re-creative experiences’.  But the 75
two interpretative modes ‘interpenetrate’ in Panofsky’s mind: one does not succeed the 
other in temporal or qualitative terms. It is not a question of ‘first buying a ticket 
[metaphor for subjective experience] and then boarding a train [doing objective 
research]’.   76
 See Gisela Striker, Essays in Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 73
Press, 1996), pp. 77–91; K.M. Vogt, ‘All Sense-Perceptions Are True: Epicurean Responses to Skepticism 
and Relativism’, in J. Lezra and L. Blake eds., Lucretius and Modernity. The New Antiquity (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
 Dimock, ‘Weak Theory’, p. 737.74
 Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts (London: Peregrine Books, 1970), p. 41.75
 ibid., p. 39.76
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This sense of the interpenetration of modes is crucial here. It partly accounts for the way 
that the thesis distinguishes itself from autobiographic and confessional writings.  I am 77
sympathetic to Rampley’s frustration with the flavour of Adrian Stokes’s writing that is 
so closely bound to his own childhood, thereby barring the reader from the discussion.  78
The problem with subjectivity when used to this end is its tendency towards a closed-
circuit instrumentalisation: one’s position in society accounts for the direction of one’s 
research. In such instances it becomes a means for determining the rational bases for 
choices in research, a kind of anterior logic or justification for your field of and 
approach to research. 
I will take a short detour in order to demonstrate how this thesis deviates from other 
examples of art-historical approaches in which subjectivity acts as an active agent.  
In the 2003 publication Subjectivity and Methodology in Art History contributions by 
Keith Moxey and Lena Johannesson make use of just such explicitly autobiographical 
modes, though each comes at them from different angles. Moxey attempts to help his 
readers’ understanding of ‘the perspective that informs [his] writing’ while Johannesson 
deploys her personal experiences as stimuli from which her research develops.  In both 79
cases, the employment of the autobiographical subjectivist strategy tends toward the 
reductive. Moxey traces the reasons for the shape of and ‘investment’ in his research 
back to his South American background.  He attempts to identify definitively the 80
reasons for his scholarly peregrinations while also recognising the incompleteness of his 
perspective. He knows that ‘neither the discursive practices that have formed [him] nor 
the nature of [his] own intervention in those practices of history writing is transparently 
available to [him]’.  His convictions lead him to conclude that ‘autobiographic self-81
fictions […] can serve as a means of creating effective narratives of persuasion’. His 
 See Suzanne Preston Blier, ‘Autobiography and Art History: The Imperative of Peripheral Vision’, 77
RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics, 39 (Spring 2001); Paul de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-facemement’, 
Modern Language Notes, 94 (1979); James Olney, Metaphors of the Self: The Meaning of Autobiography, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Paul John Eakin, Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the 
Art of Self-Invention (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’, p. 16. And also Carrier, ‘Erwin Panofsky, Leo Steinberg, David Carrier’, p. 346.78
 See Keith Moxey, ‘The History of Art after the Death’ and Lena Johannesson, ‘On “The Irrational 79
Remainder” and the Instrumentalised Ego’, in Lagerlöf and Karlholm eds., Subjectivity and Methodology.
 Moxey, ‘The History of Art after the Death’, p. 121.80
 ibid., p. 120.81
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deployment of subjective modes are, therefore, primarily instrumentalist (they ‘serve as 
a means of’) and rhetorical (‘creating effective narrative of persuasion’).  82
Conversely Johannesson describes autobiographic subjectivity – or what she calls the 
‘intellectually disturbed subjectivity ego’ as opposed to the ‘methodologically trained 
professional or instrumentalised ego’ – as the ‘primus motor’ for her research. In her 
handling the ‘biographical’ is just a launch pad to be abandoned once the ultimate goal 
of unearthing objective professional conclusions has been reached.  This is Panofsky’s 83
metaphor of ‘first buying a ticket and then boarding a train’ in action.  The problem is 84
that Johannesson’s autobiographic subjective force is premised on a characterisation of 
subjectivities as irrational, untrustworthy, unprofessional, tendentious or ‘intellectually 
disturbed’, as she put it, to be constrained within a more logical ‘methodologically 
trained [and] professional’ discursive analysis.  This kind of inveterate 85
‘acknowledgment of positionality’ aspires to objectivity through the frame of the 
subjective and is sharply criticised by Michael Schreyach: ‘You divulge assumptions, 
prejudices, predilections, tastes, interests, politics, investments’, he writes, in order to 
see the ‘problems of subjective preference […] solved, simply because you have 
acknowledged them’. It is strategic and serves to ‘neutralize anticipated counter-
arguments’, and amounts to ‘self-exposure, not self-criticism’.  Such aligning of 86
subjectivity with uncritical self-exposure or solipsism is something I have tried to avoid. 
 ibid., p. 123.82
 Johannesson, ‘On the ‘Irrational Remainder’’, pp. 78–79.83
 Panofsky, Meaning (1970), p. 39.84
 Johannesson, ‘On the ‘Irrational Remainder’’, p. 78.85
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Despite the non-autobiographic nature of what follows I do employ the personal voice.  87
Poststructuralist theory has made us wary of subjective accounts due to their inevitable 
entanglements with the unconscious, the culturally and historically loaded nature of 
language and the political and social power dynamics bound up in questions of (the 
semblance of) agency and identity. This awareness has paved the way for fields of 
scholarship such as Feminist, Queer, and Postcolonial studies.  According to Moxey 88
such fields tend more readily to accept the personal voice because ‘their findings and 
conclusions are specifically defined as forms of local knowledge rather than as 
pretensions to universality’.  Such an emphasis on the multiplicity of perspectives and 89
narrative readings of art history has been crucial for shaking deep-rooted assumptions 
about, say, the domination of white male artists and revising American and European 
dominance, in favour of a more heterogeneous, global picture.  The importance of 90
motivations behind and the implications of such research cannot be overstated, and 
 For discussion on the use of the personal voice in academia see the special issue Cathy N. Davidson 87
‘Critical Fictions: Four Views on the Place of the Personal in Scholarship’, PMLA, 111(5) (1996); ‘The 
Inevitability of the Personal’, Norman N. Holland et al., PMLA, 111(5) (1996); Gertrude Himmelfarb, 
‘Professor Narcissus: In Today’s Academy, Everything is Personal’, The Weekly Standard (June 2, 1997) 
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/professor-narcissus/article/9782 [accessed 3/10/17]; H. 
Aram Veeser ed., Confessions of the Critics, (London; New York: Routledge, 1996); Judith Hallett and 
Thomas Van Nortwick eds., Compromising Traditions: The Personal Voice in Classical Scholarship 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
 For example, Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, Alan Sheridan trans. (London: Tavistock, 1977); 88
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1972); Roland Barthes, 
Mythologies (London: Cape, 1972); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 
1976).
 Moxey, ‘The History of Art after the Death’, p. 110. 89
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Their deeply political and historicist agendas risked loosing the ‘art’ from ‘art history’. See Jonathan 
Harris, The New Art History: A Critical Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); A. L. 
Rees and Frances Borzello, The New Art History (London: Camden Press, 1986); Bill Beckley and David 
Schapiro eds., Uncontrollable Beauty (New York: Allworth Press, 1998).
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there is clearly much more work to do, but it is a body of literature to which this thesis 
does not contribute.  91
Subjectivity, as it appears here, is not connected to the vernacular use of the term either. 
Its casual use tends to value any or all claims about responses to art, giving us the all 
clear to think and feel whatever we like about art because ‘after all, it’s all subjective’. 
Such a claim is not just ungrounded but tends at best to lead us nowhere very interesting 
and at worst, to become entirely meaningless. The nature of our responses must in some 
way be relatable to, they must trace a particular network of thought. As Margaretha 
Lagerlöf puts it, ‘if we are to inform our interlocutors about [a] work, we have to stay 
within the realm of shared experiences’.  There must be some consensus on the 92
references evoked by a work of art or literature. If that consensus is not there already the 
responder needs to demonstrate the basis of her response. She must convey the 
configuration of her response in relation to the object, by simultaneously unpacking the 
physical, emotional, psychological, associational, phenomenological characteristics of 
the object as they occur to her. But she must also think about the nature of her 
experience and how it might connect to and bear on other, similar or distinct, 
experiences. This thesis seeks to do just that. 
According to Lagerlöf the importance of subjectivity in the methodological 
development of art history is greater than for the other humanities: ‘In observing the 
subjective nuances in art historical examinations,’ she writes, ‘we also need to explore 
the individual and particular qualities in works of art – qualities we can only try to reach 
 See Amanda Boetzkes, ‘Phenomenology and Interpretation beyond the Flesh’, in Art History: 91
Contemporary Perspectives on Method, p. 34; Amelia Jones, ‘Meaning, Identity and Embodiment: The 
Uses of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology in Art History’, in Dana Arnold and Margaret Iversen eds., Art 
and Thought (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). See also Mary Ann Caws, Women of Bloomsbury: 
Virginia, Vanessa and Carrington (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 1990). For 
examples of scholarship on feminism and autobiography see the excellent, Nancy Miller, Getting 
Personal: Feminist Occasions and other Autobiographical Acts (New York and London: Routledge, 
1991); Shari Penstock ed., The Private Self: Theory and Practice of Women’s Autobiographical Writings 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Bella Brodski and Celeste Schenck eds., Life/
Lines: Theorising Women’s Autobiography (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Leigh Gilmore, 
Autobiographics: A Feminist Theory of Women’s Self-Representation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994); Rachel Blau du Plessis, The Pink Guitar: Writing as Feminist Practice (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1990) among many more.
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through language, in testing categorical remarks, in the break up and reformulation of 
such categories, and ultimately in the changing of typologies’.  Thus, subjectivity gets 93
to work through the articulation of the artwork in language. As language conveys and 
recreates subjective responses, often in tandem, it clarifies and distorts, conjoining and 
distancing experiences in complicated but interesting ways. 
The type of subjectivity enacted here, then, turns on simultaneously active and self-
reflexive responses to artworks. It is concerned less with what feelings, tastes and 
opinions are generated by encounters with artworks, and more with how those responses 
come into being, how they compare to other responses and how they are manifested 
through writing. Where else do such responses lead us? And what is the nature of the 
alteration that takes place during the reception, absorption and transmission of images, 
sensory stimuli, ideas and words? Though the porous relations between experience and 
research are phenomenologically-charged in this project, I employ the idea of 
phenomenology as a description of the way in which we relate to the world (and art) on 
the most basic level, without recourse necessarily to the specialist language of 
phenomenological philosophy, as I will shortly discuss in relation to Giovanni Gentile.  
Subjectivity through Art History 
Subjectivity, as we have seen, makes itself felt through social and cultural theory in a 
whole series of guises, from Psychoanalysis to Feminism, Marxism, Poststructuralism, 
Humanism and Postmodernism.  As different as these frameworks are they all conceive 94
of subjectivity as manifesting, constituting or reflecting particular cultural, political and 
social ‘positions’. This thesis, however, is less interested in the position of the writing 
subject, either implicit or explicit, than in the process of the writing subject actively 
metabolising the texture and mood of the relationships that her research materials elicit. 
It is interested in the ways that subjectivity is reflected through the language that most 
befits the particularity of each encounter. In its attempts to translate that often non-
 ibid., p. 13.93
 Robert Strozier provides a useful overview and history in Foucault, Subjectivity and Identity. Historical 94
Constructions of Subject and Self (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001) though Strozier’s broader 
concern is with the implications of subjectivity on ethnic identity and societal racism.
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verbal experience into words for others to grasp, it simultaneously creates and performs 
a form of inexact, hard-fought equivalence or documentation.  
Outlining some instances of subjective iterations from the historiography of art reveals 
at once subjectivity’s ubiquity and variousness. Its explicit deployment as critical 
methodology is enacted by writers such as Walter Pater, John Ruskin, Charles 
Baudelaire, Oscar Wilde, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf .  Subjective judgements in 95
appraisals of style are drawn on by connoisseurs such as Roberto Longhi, Giovanni 
Morelli, Bernard Berenson and Max Friedländer.  In fact, in passing, it is worth noting 96
that according to Per Jonas Nordhagen, one of the reasons for the rejection of 
connoisseurial methods in academic scholarship until very recently is precisely 
connoisseurship’s foregrounding of subjectivity: its ‘way of approaching art that 
appears both uncontrollably subjective and strongly ego-directed’.  Stokes’s particular 97
breed of art history, as we have already seen, married the psychoanalytic self with 
autobiography, fiction, and art history.  His embodied, sensuous and situated writing 98
not only acknowledges its subjectivity as a starting point but continues to make 
imaginative use of it throughout.  99
In some cases the subjective is characterised as a marker of social or political, rather 
than personal, ‘difference’. The collateral implication of the New Art-Historical drive to 
make art history engage with ‘the real world’ during the 1970s and 80s and break from 
 Walter Pater, Marius the Epicurean: His Sensations and Ideas (London and New York: Everyman’s 95
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Wordsworth Editions, 1992); Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Vols. 1 and 2, C. K. Scott-
Moncrieff trans. (New York: Random House, 1934); Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own 
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the old establishment paradigms, for example, saw the very particularity of subjectivity 
subsumed by a more forthright social and political mission. It is somewhat surprising, 
then, that in his ‘experiment in art writing’ of 2006, T. J. Clark, one of The New Art 
History’s most vociferous contributors, grew tired of the ‘constant, cursory hauling of 
visual (and verbal) images before the court of political judgement’.   100
More personal, even idiosyncratic, subjectivities come to the fore when art historians 
register not just their social positions but the particularity of their sensuous and affective 
relationships with their research interests. Here the work of scholars like Whitney 
Davis, Richard Shiff, T. J. Clark (more recently), Peter de Bolla, James Elkins, Donald 
Preziosi, Claire Farago, Robert Zwijnenberg, and Lagerlöf can be identified as 
reflecting independently on the impact of the author’s felt experience of art in their art 
history writing.  101
But it could also be argued that subjectivity is everywhere in art history and that the 
discipline’s veil of objectivity has always been, in any case, illusory.  Don Fowler’s 102
seminal 1991 article on ekphrasis identified an ‘almost moral distaste’ for description in 
the discipline. He wrote: ‘what we are interested in in narratives is neither plot nor 
pictures but ideology.’  Description up to this point had been demonised for its ability 103
to conceal ideology. In order not to fall into the web of such covert ideologies, then, we 
had been encouraged to aspire to a seemingly more transparent analytical mode. And 
yet, as Jaś Elsner, building on Fowler’s discussion, argues, art history ‘far from being a 
rigorous pursuit [...] is nothing other than ekphrasis, or more precisely an extended 
argument built on ekphrasis’. Elsner’s conception of description is usefully broad: 
 Clark, The Sight of Death, p. viii.100
 Among non-art historians you could site Arasse, Take a Closer Look; Peter de Bolla, Art Matters 101
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descriptions ‘conspire to translate the visual and sensual nature of a work of art into a 
linguistic formulation capable of being voiced in a discursive argument.’  Without our 104
subjectivities working as mediators of artworks, therefore, art history could not exist.  
The following chapters register the impact of subjectivity variously and incrementally, 
then. To some extent subjectivity affects our object selections, going some way to 
account (wither positively or negatively) for why we are drawn to study one object, 
artist, text, history or period rather than another. Secondly, throughout our research we 
are engaged in framing arguments, images, personalities and objects. We characterise 
them through careful and deliberate editing and quotation – every decision that we make 
is motivated by judgement. Thirdly, the accidental nature of links that we make in our 
research – and that shape the form and content of our archives – should not be 
overlooked though it is rarely made explicit. Richard Shiff is one of a growing number 
of scholars to embrace the serendipity of research, describing his handling of history as 
being driven by ‘the chance illuminations that arbitrary sequences of documents 
provide.’  Fourthly, and here the activation of subjectivity is more overt, it begins to 105
extend its reach by precipitating a whole line of inquiry as we saw with Johannesson.  106
A fifth variant, propounded by Panofsky, sees subjectivity functioning in parallel with 
more traditional historical data recovery in which, ‘intuitive aesthetic recreation and 
archaeological research are interconnected, to form […] an ‘organic situation’’, in 
theory at least.  And lastly, in its most expansive role, subjectivity is at once the means 107
and the end of investigation allowing for a dissolution of positivism in favour of a more 
meandering, speculative and imaginative trajectory.  
Subjectivity and Giovanni Gentile 
In contextualising the type of subjectivity active here an obvious course might have 
been to start with phenomenology. I could have recounted phenomenology’s numerous 
 Elsner, ‘Art History as Ekphrasis’, p. 12.104
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strands which have proliferated in various guises.  I could have implemented the most 108
relevant, perhaps even following a particular phenomenologist, and framed my thesis 
with a set of clearly defined precepts (or as clearly defined as phenomenology’s 
inherently non-systemic nature allows).  But this would undermine the spirit in which 109
this thesis is conceived and carried out. One of my concerns is to pay attention to the 
ways in which ideas have morphed through the writing of this thesis, and to preserve 
these elements in its final form. As such my approach is not predetermined; pairings 
suggest themselves but to begin with I am not sure why. It is only through a concerted 
worrying of them that the particular character and form of the thought which emerges 
from the pairings becomes explicit. The rest follows. 
A ‘chance illumination’ of my own: through the course of the years preparing this thesis 
I was also working freelance and was commissioned to translate a series of texts by a 
twentieth-century Italian philosopher, relatively little known outside Italy, Giovanni 
Gentile.  What I found from working, as it were, inside Gentile’s texts was a 110
serendipitous reverberation of many of the ideas and approaches that I had already set in 
motion through the encounters in my case studies. Gentile’s thinking helped to define 
 For an excellent account of phenomenology see Simon Glendinning, In the Name of Phenomenology 108
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007) who argues for understanding phenomenology as more 
multifarious and non-systematic than the impression given by phenomenological arguments that focus too 
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Hegel and later in the early twentieth century with Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul 
Ricœur. Other particular strands of phenomenology include G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 
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Phenomenology, F. Kersten trans. (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Klewer Academic, 1982) and 
Experience and Judgement: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, Ludwig Landgrebe ed., James S. 
Churchill and Karl Ameriks trans. (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1973); Martin Heidegger, Being 
and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson trans. (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1962); 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Colin Smith trans. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 
Hacker and Joachim Schulte trans. (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2009); J.L. Austin, How to do things 
with Words, J.O. Urmson ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, David E. Linge trans. and ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) and Truth 
and Method, Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall trans. (London, New York: Bloomsbury 2013); 
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the nature, purpose and interpretative potential of the kind of subjectivity that I was 
intuitively employing. His thought does not, therefore, impose upon the thesis but it 
does help to crystallise certain things contained within it, while nonetheless leaving the 
fuzzy edges of its encounters intact. 
In referencing Gentile, I should point out, I make use of his epistemology, as opposed to 
his political philosophy. I deliberately separate the man, his politics and his actions from 
his philosophy because of his turn to fascism later in life, a turn with which this thesis 
does not identify. His political actions have, however, largely dominated his scholarly 
reception, impeding his influence on current thought, but there is much to gain from his 
treatment of subjective behaviour and its impact on the everyday business of making 
decisions and connections. 
Most importantly, Gentile’s model of subjectivity – which he sometimes refers to as 
‘Ego’, ‘spirit’, ‘act’, or ‘self-conscious-ego’ – turns on a porous, overlapping connection 
between the objects and subjects of experience. The act of thought mediates, indeed 
realises experience.  Subjectivity is bound in a ‘reciprocal relationship’ of its own 111
making through the very act of thought itself. Crucially this reciprocity is connected to 
the world ‘via sensible experience’ or the ‘act’ of participating in this world. The 
thinker, according to Gentile, brings together the world and the self; he is ‘an untiring 
and diligent creator and custodian, actor and spectator.’  Subjectivity is, therefore, 112
both active and responsive. It is constantly engaged in what Gentile termed an ‘Internal 
Dialogue Procedure’ which scholar Daniela Coli characterises as ‘an open thinking 
process’, and which strongly aligns with the process of intersubjective triangulation or 
dialogic thinking aloud that forms the backbone of this thesis.  113
 Gentile, ‘Basic Concepts of Actualism’, pp. 355–357.111
 ibid., p. 348.112
 Gentile sees both subject and object as essentially porous and does not hold that any distinction exists 113
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‘Gentile and Modernity’, Thought Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni in Gentile Collingwood and 
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!42
The subjectivity at play here likewise constitutes an active, sometimes speculative, 
thought in the present. It is an ongoing action, an ‘act’ or what Gentile, typically 
circuitously describes as: ‘act in act, not a completed act, or a partially completed act, 
and part of the act of completing itself’ (note, incidentally, the Steinian characteristics of 
this phrase).  It is categorically not the result of research already completed, therefore 114
setting itself not apart from its objects of interests but a volatile extension of them, an 
act in the process of becoming.  115
This similarity, between Gentile’s concept of subjectivity in theory and my 
implementation of subjectivity in practice, is threaded throughout the thesis, reflecting 
on its implications for the writing of art-historical research more generally. One 
common criticism of such research is its assumption that one’s subjectivity is knowable, 
a critique Rampley makes of Bal’s work. But Rampley’s critique gives the impression 
that subjectivity is a solid, static form. If we follow Gentile’s notion of subjectivity:  
The Ego is neither soul-substance nor a thing [...] It is everything 
because it is not anything. If it has to be something, it is a determined 
spirit, a spirit that realizes itself in its own world as a poem, an action, 
a word, a system of thought. But this world is real to the extent that 
as the poem is being composed, the action is taking place, the word 
is uttered and the thought arises and becomes part of a system.   116
Though I would take issue with the final claim about thought becoming ‘part of a 
system’, what Gentile otherwise claims about subjectivity rings true here: it is neither 
fixed (‘a thing’), nor a position, but in a state of constant flux, shifting and amending, it 
‘realises itself’ through sensible responses with its surroundings. If we accept such a 
proposition, the validity of Rampley’s critique of Bal, and by implication other poetic 
art historians, abates.  
 Gentile, ‘The Method of Immanence’, Thought Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni in Gentile 114
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 Gentile, ‘Basic Concepts of Actualism’, p. 349.116
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A further danger at stake in historical or critical accounts that give primacy to subjective 
responses, and already alluded to, is the charge of solipsism, that is, a lack of relevance 
or engagement beyond the self. Both Sontag and Pater stood so accused so I will discuss 
the matter at greater length in chapter 3, but Gentile was well aware of the risk of 
solipsism too. If we look again at Rampley’s critique we see that his four examples 
have, for him, only limited use or interest because they foreground the self over 
universal concerns. But ‘the solipsist’s Ego,’ as Gentile makes clear, ‘is a particular and 
negative Ego; it senses its own isolation and the impossibility of escaping it. So the 
solipsist is an egotist, denying the good just as he denies the truth. But his Ego is 
negative because it is identical to itself; and that makes it a thing, not a spirit.’ And so 
we return to the crucial notion that the subject neither conceives of itself as an object, 
nor allows itself to be objectified; it is an active, living act, without predetermined form 
or limit. If we accept ‘the principle of the infinite progressive universalisation of the 
Ego itself’ then we see subjectivity excluding ‘nothing from itself’. It is capacious; it 
behaves not through closed circuit insularity but through a continuous and 
unpremeditated response and adjustment to the world. As such, it is more akin to an 
expanding spiral, through the act of active and ongoing thought or what Gentile calls, 
‘pensiero pensante’ (thought thinking).  117
The implications of Gentile’s Actualist thought are far-reaching for they also answer 
another of Rampley’s issues concerning the type of useful knowledge which poetic art 
histories can contribute to the collective discipline. Here, Gentile’s concept of the 
definition of knowledge is crucial. Knowledge does not involve a mastering of 
information: ‘knowing as being’.  Coli unpacks this, describing how Gentile ‘casts 118
knowledge as the mediation of the thinking subject and thought object, for which 
knowledge is a continual process of the actuality of theory and practice.’  As such, 119
knowledge, like subjectivity, is freed from the boundaries of being rendered static, and 
measurable (to be gained, contributed or proven) and is instead cast in terms of being in 
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a constant state of becoming: what Gentile would term ‘immanence’ and what I have 
referred to as ‘emergence’.    120
The Implications of Matthew Rampley’s Critique 
Throughout this chapter I have referred to Rampley’s critique of poetic art histories but 
his reading begs a series of questions that are fundamental to this thesis and worth 
unpicking further: How should we define the type of insight that stems from a thesis of 
this kind? Can that insight be considered knowledge? And is it useful?  
To recap, for Rampley poetic art histories are: 
A: too subjective to have any claim or value as conveyors of knowledge, partly because 
you cannot confirm or deny their observations. They are impossible to defend 
discursively. 
B: have spawned no followers and therefore function as anomalies rather than useful 
contributions to what he calls, ‘the collective enterprise of art history’. 
C: use language that supplants or suppresses the objects they claim to address. 
A:1 Triangulation 
The claims made in this thesis, though stemming from subjective intuitions about the 
associations between a text and an image, intimate a relationship that, I am saying, 
appears to exist and does so in specific ways. Each pairing relies on a balance between 
what Gentile might call an internal dialogue and a staged or hypothetical dialogue that I 
follow up between paintings and texts. They are built from a ‘triangulation’ of positions, 
as Donald Davidson would put it, which are loosely correlated and compared.  I am 121
not claiming that they have to be seen as such, just that they might be, and when they 
are I pay close attention to the dynamics and implications at stake both for these newly 
established relationships and for the approach to images, texts, and history in general. 
I support this claim by situating myself between two key ideas, Davidson’s 
‘triangulation’ and Oakeshott’s ‘pursuit of intimations’.  
 Gentile, ‘The Method of Immanence’, pp. 235–275.120
 Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 128.121
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This thesis contains multiple concurrent voices which I tune in to and out of, sometimes 
synchronously, at others adjusting the volume on one or two. Davidson would call this 
process ‘triangulation’: ‘the result of a threefold interaction, an interaction that is two-
fold from the point of view of each of the two agents: each is interacting simultaneously 
with the world and with the other agent.’  For Davidson, it is the only way to account 122
for the ‘existence, and therefore the emergence of thought’. This is precisely what I am 
seeking to track: the emergence of critical associations that are sparked by the feeling of 
encounter – between paintings, my words, and the words of others – in which a 
confluence of approaches is registered and explored. In triangulation, ‘each creature 
learns to correlate the reactions of other creatures with changes or objects in the world 
to which it also reacts’.  It is not that our reactions to the world have to conform, of 123
course, but sharing our reactions, however personal or supposedly ‘subjective’, ‘gives 
us the only account of how experience gives a specific content to our thoughts’.  It 124
reminds us that thought derives from the specificity of the experience of a feeling 
subject.  Sharing responses to our environments, Davidson argues, is crucial because ‘it 
is what causes a belief that gives it its content’.  Consider this thesis to be a sharing of 125
separate, though here coalescing, experiences – between painters, writers and scholars – 
retaining in its expression the lived experience of these encounters.  
The fundamental basis of Davidson’s claim is that subjective, intersubjective and 
objective knowledges are ‘objective in the sense that their truth is independent of their 
being believed to be true’.  This, however, is where his model begins to diverge from 126
my own. Davidson assumes that each point of the triangle need bear no relationship of 
similarity or confluence. His triangulation is one of generality: any triangulation is valid 
because it is the belief (however unconnected) of each agent that produces content and 
therefore truth. It may be that those agents in the end produce contents that are in some 
 ibid., p. 128.122
 ibid., p. 128–9.123
 Davidson would reject my use of the term subjective here because he argues that the dichotomy 124
between subjective and objective is false, ibid., p. xiii.
 ibid., p. 129.125
 ibid., p. xiii.126
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ways shared but they are not necessarily so from the outset. My use of the multi-way 
interaction is more specific. What happens when the work of my supposedly separate 
entities – my protagonists, or ‘agents’ as Davidson has it – reveal thematic, structural, 
linguistic, atmospheric or other forms of confluence? The fact that my bringing these 
entities into relation is far from arbitrary, despite initial appearances, is important. But 
neither are their interrelations easy or immediately identifiable from a position outside 
of the imaginary triangle of relations that I am setting up. What becomes clear, then, is 
that this model of research can only be implemented from within the triangle, and not, 
in the position of supposed objectivity, from without.  127
So as burred thought-lines between the feeling of objects, images and words are allowed 
to surface, beginning to interweave, I am distinctly aware of the effect of cross-
referencing these feelings or experiences or responses and recognising similarities 
between them. And as parallels emerge and intersect, the personal begins to hold its 
own. Our understanding is furthered by viewing encounters within the context of other, 
sometimes surprisingly analogous, creative activities. While the sentiment in the current 
paragraph resonates with my own approach, its all-important terminology does not 
always. Borrowing from scientific terms like ‘cross-reference’ and ‘triangulation’, it 
presents my study as measurable against scholarship that is premised on the kind of 
positivism propounded by Fredric Jameson in his cry to ‘Always historicize!’.  To 128
assess this thesis according to a measure of specific knowledge(s) is to lose some of its 
subtlety and complexity, as will become clear. Rather, this study is concerned with how 
thought emerges from experience and through its convergence with other images and 
words. It is about the difficulty of articulating this process and the effect of a particular 
network of analogies. It is about setting up an environment which enables confluences 
to run their course, and observing what happens. Observations, of course, can also be 
countered with a different observation. There is no obligation to accept them wholly.  
 Rifkin makes a similar claim in his study of Ingres claiming that: ‘Over the years critique from 127
‘without’ has come to be replaced by an engagement from within’, in Rifkin, Ingres, p. 16. Though my 
approach is markedly different from Rifkin’s who romanticises the archival work of art history as process 
in archaeological and poetic terms, and tends to relate back to questions about the artist and intentions.
 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as A Socially Symbolic Act (London and New 128
York: Routledge, 2002), p. iv.
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A:2 Pursuit of Intimations 
The other thread, in countering Rampley’s claim that poetic art histories are unarguable, 
is Oakeshott’s idea of ‘the pursuit of intimations’.  Though dissimilar in subject 129
matter, the spirit of Oakeshott’s argument finds affinity with mine. His core criticism is 
of abstract theoretical models being put into practice, imposed upon a political situation, 
without adapting to the needs or requirements of the real-world situations in which they 
find themselves. He argues that thinking is developed not by applying preexistent 
methodologies but by ‘the amendment of existing arrangements [...] exploring and 
pursuing what is intimated in them’.  Political thought, he believes, should be 130
adaptive, responsive and sensitive to its real-world environment, much as I argue that 
art-historical methodologies should not be imposed upon artworks but that particular 
approaches to, and means of writing about, them should be allowed to emerge from our 
encounters with them. Both Oakeshott’s political thought and my subjective art-
historical thought are characterised as ongoing practices rather than fixed, utopian 
ideals. Both are distinctive for their spirit of openness and exploration, where 
understanding (rather than concrete knowledge) is adaptive: variously absorbed, built 
upon or redirected by the meeting of one thought, expression, situation and another. In 
other words, thought, and writing are situated.  131
So, to return to Rampley, we need not depend only on definitions, models or methods of 
art-historical enquiry to define the knowledge accrued by art history, or develop 
alternative approaches to it. Instead, or rather, as well, we can look at the intimations to 
which extant art-historical discourses give rise. This thesis, and the understanding to 
which it gives rise, should therefore be perceived as a series of intimations which it is 
following up and which might simultaneously invite further speculation. Its ‘solid’ 
findings are secondary. What this thesis proposes is that we – scholars, art historians and 
 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Worcester and 129
London: Trinity Press, 1967), pp. 117–137.
 My emphases. ibid., p. 124.130
 See Jane Rendell, Site-Writing: The Architecture of Art Criticism (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 131
2010). Rendell sees ‘Site-Writing’ as a kind of ‘Situated Criticism’ ‘produced [...] according to the 
distinctive locations of interpretation and the varying distances and conditions of responsibility 
interpreters and performers have in relation to authors and audiences’, pp. 2–7. Rendell takes this the 
spatial terms of a situated criticism more literally because of her broader interest in architecture. For me 
the idea of subjective art history as a site-specific art-historical thought functions more metaphorically.
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art writers – might do well to loosen our grip on ways of seeing that we deem valuable 
or useful. Watch, this thesis says, as it sees things, and watches itself seeing things. An 
experience emerges which it at once enacts, reflects upon and tries to put into words. 
These words imperfectly equate and simultaneously feed into, add to, whittle away at, 
that experience. But in order to become useful they must become part of a larger 
conversation, rather than merely an idiosyncratic backstory to be later buried. Now, 
once we have shared insights, voiced observations – whether they diverge, run parallel 
or intersect, whether we agree or disagree with one another’s impressions (most likely a 
bit of both) – we will, I would wager, have seen a little more than before.  The truth 132
value of these insights, however that might be styled, are not my concern. But because 
these observations and associations have been thought, discussed at length, turned 
metaphorically over and situated within the context of a related discourse, they become 
valid, ‘objective’ (if we must), and of some universal interest. 
The claims that I make about either the texts or images that appear here do not, 
therefore, purport to be ground-breaking. They are in fact rather modest: ‘an amplified 
sort of noticing’.  Noticing is, of course, a very ordinary operation of experience, as 133
are many of the strategies that follow – analogy, understanding, even improvisation and 
so on  – but such structures are also, as Felski notes, ‘political, philosophical, and 134
aesthetic concepts fanning out into complex histories.’  Take, for example, the framing 135
of this thesis through hypothetical dialogues enacted and observed between materials, 
words and objects. It depends on a simultaneous awareness of observations as they are 
taking place and constant checking and rechecking in the light of how another party – 
either specific, general or hypothetical – might respond to each impression. This process 
 This method of creating consensus or disagreement based on a correlation of thoughts is further 132
developed in chapter 1 with reference to Donald Davidson’s concept of triangulation.
 I borrow this phrase from Wakefield who is concerned that Gentile’s idea of ‘absolute creativity’ be 133
‘demoted’ to ‘an amplified sort of noticing’. The phrasing lacks the kind of authority that is to Gentile’s 
tastes but suits me fine. Wakefield, Giovanni Gentile and the State of Contemporary Constructivism (PhD 
thesis: Cardiff University, 2013), p. 48. 
 See Gilbert Ryle writing on the everyday nature of improvisation as a (non?)system of thought. He 134
writes, I shall soon be reminding you of some of the familiar and unaugust sorts of improvisations which, 
just qua thinking beings, we all essay every day of the week, indeed in every hour of the waking day’, 
Glibert Ryle, “Improvisation,” Mind 85, no. 337 (1976), p. 69 and referenced in George E. Lewis and 
Benjamin Piekut, The Oxford Handbook of Critical Improvisation Studies Volume 1, First Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 5–6.
 Rita Felski, Uses of Literature (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 17.135
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leads, in turn, to a modification – an ‘amendment’ as Oakeshott would have it – of 
claims or observations.  This thesis does while watching things being done, or, to 136
return to Gentile, it evidences the unfurling of actual, present thinking: pensiero 
pensante as opposed to pensiero pensato. That is, thought thinking in the present 
continuous, rather than thought-that-has-already-been-thought in the closed past.  137
Returning to Rampley’s critique of the four poetic examples whose findings he deems 
impossible to substantiate, the character of discourses like that just outlined is eminently 
arguable for and against. Whether such observations can be confirmed or denied 
depends on how convincingly this writing conveys the proposed constellations of 
relationships. Are the pairings sympathetic to you? Do they coalesce in my writing of 
them or do you find them uncoupling? How do the pairings spark other clusters of 
relationships? Where do these pairings or your own pairings take you? I have no doubt 
that the answer to these will be neither straightforward nor constant. Either way they 
become propositions that are available to be pushed against, resisted or allowed to 
unfold further than I have, further than I, alone, could. These pairings are open 
invitations, meant to be followed up, pursued, by your own intuitions.  
B:1 Followable Anomalies 
Can a text like this really provide a methodology for others to implement, though? Is it 
‘followable’?  Fundamentally it sees itself as something of a catalyst for other 138
possible impressions, other clusters of relations and encounters. But it is not followable 
in the sense that it does not offer a systematic methodology to be deployed in another 
context, since, as explained in A:2 above, my approach is site-specific, generated by the 
 Again, here I make oblique reference to Davidson’s ‘triangulation’, in Subjective, Intersubjective, 136
Objective, pp. 128–130.
 Wakefield, Giovanni Gentile, p. 33.137
 For the term ‘followable’ I am indebted to philosopher Onora O’Neill’s term ‘followability,’ see Onora 138
O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 2–4. Not all of O’Neill’s theories on constructivist reasoning are 
relevant, however. Her claim, for example, that we can only agree if we we take as a starting point a 
common organisational system of thought or shared authority is at cross purposes with my project. If, she 
writes, our starting points appeal to or rest on ‘arbitrary’ claims, no useful reasoning can take place. But 
what follows reveals that the arbitrary is not such a sticking point. See Melissa Barry, ‘Constructivist 
practical reasoning and objectivity’, in Reading Onora O’Neill, David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil 
Manson, and Daniel Weinstock eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 18–20 for an excellent 
discussion of O’Neill. 
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particular elements and artworks that appear here. But its spirit is, I would argue, 
eminently ‘followable’: You begin with your encounter with, and between, two artworks 
and take it from there. 
As already touched on, the elements that appear here could be accused of being ‘merely’ 
arbitrary, in which case what constitutes arbitrary needs more careful consideration. It 
might at first appear that the pairings around which this project grows – Zurbarán and 
Sontag, Doig and Pater, Stein and Simpson – are subject to whim. But as my readers I 
ask you to suspend, momentarily, your mistrust of the pairings and allow their 
connections to come in to focus through my discussion of them. A short return to 
Davidson’s theory of triangulation might usefully stave off further charges of 
arbitrariness. To recap, Davidson claims that when sharing personal responses about a 
shared environment vectors are drawn between players. We could call these vectors 
beliefs or experiences. Davidson holds that these beliefs, however subjective, 
intersubjective or objective, are worth articulating, ‘independent of their being believed 
to be true’.  By a committed probing of these beliefs in the following chapters I will 139
note the ways in which they coalesce or diverge, and as these vectors accrue, becoming 
networks expanding their imaginative reach – whether verbal or visual, whether direct 
or poetic, whether causal or consequential – their rigour likewise builds.  
In characterising poetic art-histories as ‘anomalies’ perhaps the mistake Rampley has 
made is in not looking in the right places for examples of their legacy. Hayden White’s 
idea of ‘Metahistory’, for example, discusses ‘Poetic Histories’ and also ‘Lyric’ or 
‘Lyrical’ histories (after Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind), although Gavin Parkinson 
has argued that White’s impact on art history remains regrettably limited.  As my 140
section on ‘Subjectivity through Art History’ has suggested, the roots of poetically 
inflected art histories run deep, through ekphrasis for example.  It is also true to say, 141
 Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, p. xiii.139
 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: 140
John Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. 88. And see Parkinson’s discussion of White’s impact in ‘(Blind 
Summit) Art Writing Narrative, Middle Voice’, p. 285. And Stephen Bann also alludes to this in 
‘Response: Reasons to be cheerful’, The Art Bulletin, 89 (2007), 34–9 p. 38.
 Elsner includes ekphrastic excerpts from a series of deceased art historians that include Alois Reigl, 141
Han Sedlmaeyr, Edgar Wind, J. D. Beazley, E. H. Gombrich, Michael Baxandall, and Michael Camille, 
pp. 14–15.
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as Elsner does that ekphrasis in art history is employed ‘for the purpose of making an 
argument’; it is a jumping off point rather than a means of communication and research 
output in its own right.  But more explicitly subjective or poetically suffused examples 142
do exist, though currently only at the peripheries with disciplines like art writing and 
creative criticism. So perhaps it is a problem of viewing art history in terms that are too 
restrictive. If, as I do, we take art history to encompass art criticism and art writing as 
well, then our search for writing on art in terms that are concurrent with Rampley’s 
examples yields greater results.  Unlike the fields of creative criticism explored 143
earlier, there is a lack of explicitly art-historical scholarly texts that collate relevant 
examples, rendering subjective art histories too dispersed to register fully on the art-
historical consciousness. But this lacuna may also be due to the way that texts like these 
emerge non-methodologically; they take shape not systematically but sporadically and 
sometimes haphazardly – qualities that could well describe the handling of this chapter 
– the contours and contexts of their appearance not clearly defined, signposted or 
logged as explicitly poetic or subjective. 
B:2 On Method 
Does the current thesis present a methodology that someone else can unpack, make use 
of, or apply, in another context? Yes and no. The approach employed here – comparing 
two things, an image and a text, that are historically and geographically disparate – can 
be followed.  It is a technique I often use with students through writing workshops 144
 Elsner, ‘Art History as Ekphrasis’, p. 11. 142
 See section entitled ‘Art Writing / Creative Criticism /Art Criticism / Art History’ below. Further 143
examples might include: Jean Cocteau’s ‘Indirect Criticism’; Francis Ponge’s writing on art which 
entwines poetry and philosophy in L’Atelier contemporain (Paris: Gallimard, 1977); Jan Zwicky’s Lyric 
Philosophy (Alberta: Brush Education, 2014) which reads as part-philosophy, part-poem, part-artwork; 
Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley 
trans. (London and New York: Continuum, 2008) which sits somewhere between prose-poetry, 
philosophy and science. Catherine Grant references a range of creatively art-historical texts that are also 
relevant in ‘A narrative of what wishes what it wishes it to be’, in ‘Creative Writing and Art 
History’ (2011). These include Yve Lomax, Writing the Image: An Adventure with Art and Theory 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Gavin Butt ed., After Criticism: New Responses to Art and Performance 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); and Della Pollock, ‘Performing writing’, in The Ends of Performance, Peggy 
Phelan and Jill Lane eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
 I am claiming no originality in this basic method of compare and contrast but as will become apparent 144
the way in which the pairings emerge and then coalesce with my own writing and approach is distinctive. 
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devised to help hone approaches to writing about art beyond the explicative.  Pairings 145
bring into focus visual and verbal encounters, opening up ways of seeing, absorbing and 
processing artworks. How you might go about making these pairings is, however, 
another matter, given that the pairings themselves arise out of an intuitive process 
whereby an image and a text seem, to the researcher, to be in sympathy. To that extent, 
the following thesis is unfollowable and therefore could not be ‘applied’ in an orthodox 
methodological sense.  146
But does this constitute a lack of methodology (connoted negatively) or a non-
methodology (a positive choice)? Methodology, alongside theory, as T. J. Clark and 
many others have noted, has tended to become instrumentalised and as a result diluted. 
Benson and Connors, in their collaboratively written introduction to Creative Criticism, 
lament the application of methodology ‘willy-nilly to what you read or look at’. To do 
so, they provocatively insist, is to miss ‘what is best about it, namely the fact that it 
eschews the fatuously formulaic or the mindlessly methodological’, signalling the 
‘mechanising of criticism’.  Methods for thinking and writing about art should arise, 147
instead, in tandem with the experience of the work itself.  
C:1 On Knowledge 
What of Rampley’s accusation of ‘the language of representation blot[ting] out the 
object of discourse’? But poetic art histories represent the experience of the objects and 
not the objects themselves. Experience cannot be said to ‘blot out’ the object, just as it 
does not constitute a blotting out of the subject either, but a bleeding together of the 
two. Paying close attention to the sensibility of encounter between self and objects does 
not result in the replacement of the object but a capacious expansion of it. Indeed, when 
Rampley claims that the work of his exemplars ‘is less an exercise in art-historical 
investigation and rather more the attempt to objectify their own aesthetic response to 
varying types of artwork’, he lends a finality to the text in which closure is not the 
 In seminars as Associate Lecturer for Art and Visual Culture and Fine Art undergraduates at University 145
of the West of England as well as through writing workshops at: Plymouth Arts Centre; KARST gallery; 
Index, The Swedish Contemporary Art Foundation; and Hauser and Wirth, Somerset.
 Karen Lang and Stephen Bann, ‘The Sense of the Past and the Writing of History: Stephen Bann in 146
Conversation with Karen Lang’, The Art Bulletin, 95(4) (2013), p. 552.
 Benson and Connors, Creative Criticism, p. 33.147
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intention.  Longhi, Stokes, Bal, and Didi-Huberman’s responses cannot be objectified 148
in this way because their particular ways of seeing and articulating thought are 
presented as ongoing. 
Rampley’s argument seems to depend, then, on a particular idea about what constitutes 
‘historical investigation’ and relates back to my earlier discussion of knowledge(s) in 
relation to practice-led PhDs. Investigation should reveal quantifiable truths, useful 
insights and new objective knowledge that can be put back to use in the art-historical 
system. How can art history capitalise on knowledge that these poetic meanderings 
unearth? Rampley appears to ask. This is one reason for my preferring the term 
understanding over knowledge. By understanding I mean the implementation of abstract 
thought in becoming familiar with a person, thing, or relation rather than its ‘correct’ 
interpretation or comprehension (connaître rather than savoir). The demeanour of 
understanding is more expansive and inclusive than ‘knowledge’ which feels enclosed 
in too binary an idea of intellectual activity, positing knowledge against ignorance. 
Understanding requires a sensitivity to material and also to its own articulation which I 
find intellectually fruitful. It is far less easy to capitalise on (own, profit from, exploit) 
understanding.  Instead we might speak of types of understandings being metabolised 149
(processed, absorbed) into the discipline. The latter requires a more open and critically 
engaged thought that, I would argue, has the potential to change the way that we think 
about art historically. 
C:2 On Art Writing  
The matter turns on the purpose of writing about or investigating art. Maria Fusco, a 
catalyst for developments in art writing, wrote that its purpose is to ‘illicit; to unlock; to 
induce essential obscurity with essential obscurity’.  On this Didi-Huberman would 150
agree: writing about art should preserve art’s essential ‘dissimulation’, preserving the 
 Rampley, ‘Poetics’, p. 25.148
 This may well be the result of a widespread problem with the professionalisation of scholarship in the 149
humanities to which Paul Barolsky and others allude; see Barolsky, ‘Writing Art History’, p. 398.
 Maria Fusco, ‘Say who I am: Or a Broad Private Wink’, in Judgement and Contemporary Art 150
Criticism, Jeff Khonsary and Melanie O’Brian eds. (Vancouver: Fillip/Artspeak, 2010).
!54
spirit of art’s holding back.  Such approaches attempt to form verbal equivalents to the 151
mood or mode of the artworks they address. At the other end of the spectrum, a more 
conventional purpose of writing about art tends to model art-historical investigation that 
is inherently explicative, intent on revealing previously undiscovered knowledge about 
art and its contexts.  Neither definition quite fits the writing of this thesis, however, 152
which is caught and catalysed by encounters between paintings, texts and critical 
responses to both. It registers the repercussions of these encounters with artworks, their 
conjoining and morphing association as, in itself, a critical practice.  
But does writing like this, as Rampley fears, end up replacing (‘blotting out’) the 
objects of interest? Does it amount to a playing hard and fast with truths, a distortion or 
fiction? The idea that the words we place alongside artworks should be appropriate, at 
all times leaving the artwork intact, is well entrenched.  It is as if our words should 153
only float atop the surface of artwork, circumnavigating it perhaps, instead of absorbing 
the artwork as the artwork absorbs our words. That term, intact, derives from the Latin 
tactus or touch, but when we use it in relation to art we tend to see it as a barricade, a 
warning not to get too close, or interfere, as if to do so might alter the work to which it 
refers. Subjectivity is often blamed for such impositions. In fact, Pater, in chapter 3, is 
regularly accused of overstepping such boundaries. In a manner reminiscent of 
Rampley’s ‘blotting out’ Cairns Craig sees Pater’s overt subjectivity as causing a 
‘displacement of the work of art’ which in turn leads his particular brand of criticism to 
‘assiduously impose [..] itself upon the original object’.  I suggest otherwise, that 154
Pater’s words (among others) act in expansive confluence with, rather than effacement 
of, the topic of this thesis.  
 Didi-Huberman, Devant l’image, p. 273. English translation taken from Didi-Huberman, ‘The Art of 151
Not Describing: Vermeer – the Details and the Patch’, History of the Human Sciences, 2(2) (1989), p. 
135.
 Holly, ‘Mourning and Method’, p. 165. 152
 On the ethics of proximity and tact in literary criticism see Jacques Derrida, On Touching Jean-Luc 153
Nancy, Christine Irizzary ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Lisa McNally, Reading 
Theories in Contemporary Criticism (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); and Valentine 
Cunningham’s emphasis on close reading characterised through ‘gentle touch, caring touch, loving touch; 
appropriate handling, unmanipulative reading’, Reading After Theory, (Oxford and Massachusetts, 
Blackwell, 2002), pp. 157–158. Isobel Armstrong, ‘Textual Harassment: The Ideology of Close Reading, 
or How Close is Close?’, Textual Practice, 9(3) 1995); and Sarah Jackson, Tactile Poetics: Touch and 
Contemporary Writing (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).
 Craig, Associationism, p. 249. 154
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Art Writing/Creative Criticism/Art Criticism/Art History 
Perhaps we could set out the purpose of writing about art in different terms. If we ask 
ourselves how and to what end, we write the understandings – rather that solid findings 
and/or knowledge – of encounters with art, art history, and literature, then the 
constraints of art writing shift. As discussed, the, albeit amorphous, field of art writing, 
or its sister field of creative criticism in literature, offers an alternative (non-)model 
since both fields consider the language used to write about artworks (broadly 
understood) as simultaneously a carrier of mood, interpretation, understanding, as well 
as information.  These fields, though not new, have been more self-consciously 155
developed as distinct fields in the past four decades, and stress the contiguities between 
what words say and what words do.  They challenge, among other things, the 156
prepositional relationships suggested by the phrases ‘writing about’ or ‘writing on’ a 
subject which they see as further entrenching the long-standing separation between 
writing and art. These prepositional relationships suggest that writing can step back 
from art and offer an objective appraisal of it, thereby preserving the oppositional 
relationship: Art and Writing, Word and Image. They sometimes go further to suggest a 
valuative hierarchisation: writing mastering art, subject against object, words over 
images.  All of these spatial conceptual configurations imply a sense of distance 157
between the genres. It is here that the impact of Enlightenment claims of the possibility 
 This discussion is also partly borne out of, and informed by, a renewed interest in the essay genre as 155
discussed above in the section entitled, ‘Form: The Essay’. 
 See Austin, How to do things with Words on ‘“performative utterances” leading to ‘‘illocutionary acts’ 156
i.e. performance of an act in saying something’ which ‘indicates the issuing of an utterance is the 
performing of an action’ pp. 32, 99, and 6. He contrasts this with ‘statements’ which he terms ‘constative 
utterances’ and function to ‘just say[...] something’, p. 6–7.
 See Irit Rogoff on prepositions in ‘Studying Visual Culture’, in The Visual Culture Reader, Nicholas 157
Mirzoeff ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 28. And also Rendell on the significance of spatial 
prepositions in relation to art criticism in Site Writing, p. 6.
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that we can be objective outsiders endures.  Psychoanalytic theory is just one mode of 158
twentieth-century thinking which reveals the impossibility of such a proposition.  We 159
are no longer aware of, or admit to, believing in these Enlightenment values but the 
Enlightenment habit dies hard and continues in positivist attitudes harboured 
unwittingly by scholars who would consider themselves not to be so inclined.  160
Instead, after Susan Howe, this project aims ‘to meet the work with writing’ or better 
the works, since the works my words meet are not viewed in isolation but caught up in 
meetings of their own.  Jane Rendell has, in a similar vein, described favouring a 161
prepositional relation conveyed by the phrase ‘writing as the object’ which attempts to 
‘invent a writing that is somehow “like” the artwork’.  But what does all this have to 162
do with art history?  
Over the past twenty or so years increasing numbers of art historians have recognised, 
as Rampley does, the often cumbersome nature of the language of art-historical 
discourses and the limits that it sets on the scope and ambition of the discipline.  The 163
writing of art history has been described, at various times as ‘dry and emotionally 
 Benson and Connors, Creative Criticism, pp. 18 – 22. And Bernardo Ortiz Campo ‘Criticism and 158
Experience’ E-flux Journal #13 - February 2010 http://www.e-flux.com/journal/13/61322/criticism-and-
experience/ [accessed May 1 2015]: ‘One can say that there is writing about art, above art, across art, 
after art, against art, along art, alongside art, amid art, among art, around art, as art, atop art, barring art, 
before art, behind art, below art, beneath art, beside art, besides art, between art, beyond art, by art, 
concerning art, despite art, except art, excluding art, failing art, following art, for art, from art, in art, 
including art, inside art, into art, like art, minus art, near art, next to art, notwithstanding art, of art, off art, 
on art, onto art, opposite art, out of art, outside art, over art, pace art, past art, per art, qua art, regarding 
art, since art, through art, throughout art, to art, towards art, under art, underneath art, unlike art, until art, 
upon art, versus art, via art, with art, within art and without art (and vice-versa). I assume that the act of 
writing allows one to understand things that can only be understood when written, just as there are things 
that can only be understood in the presence of art. The relationship between writing about art and 
experiencing art do not exclude each other. But at the same time, neither can be completely subsumed by 
the other. And both contaminate one another.’
 Other such disciplines include Gender Studies, Queer Theory, and Memory Studies.159
 Prettejohn accuses de Bolla of ‘drawing on positivistic data to justify the aesthetic experience’ in her 160
review ‘Art Writing Now by T.J. Clark and Peter de Bolla’, Art History, 30(5) (2007), p. 772 in response 
to de Bolla’s Art Matters. See further discussion in Lloyd, ‘Conclusion: An After-Image’, in Picturing 
Subjective Art Histories.
 Susan Howe, My Emily Dickinson (New York: New Directions, 2007), p. 158.161
 Rendell, Site Writing, p. 7.162
 In particular, see Grant and Rubin eds. ‘Creative Writing and Art History’; Elkins, Our Beautiful, Dry 163
and Distant Texts and ‘Writing with Images’ James Elkins (2013) <http://305737.blogspot.co.uk> 
[accessed 9 May 2013]; Clark, The Sight of Death; Bal, Louise Bourgeois’s Spider; Elsner, ‘Art History as 
Ekphrasis’; Barolsky, ‘Writing Art History’, p. 398; Carrier, ‘Erwin Panofsky, Leo Steinberg, David 
Carrier’; Carrier, ‘Artcriticism–writing, Arthistory–writing, Artwriting’, pp. 401–403.
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distant’ (James Elkins) or narrow and inflexible (Gavin Parkinson).  Paul Barolsky 164
unleashed a scathing attack on it in 1996 when he wrote: 
Art-historical writing is for the most part clotted with jargon and 
larded with cliché, impenetrable in its density, analytic and 
contentious to a fault, and worst of all, utterly predictable. Too often 
lugubrious, the industrialised prose of art history is a sorry affair. This 
fact is well known to some art historians and even one editor of this 
journal [The Art Bulletin] recently asked, if somewhat perfunctorily, 
where had “the poetry” gone from such writing?  
Foregrounding the writing of art history gives ‘the impression of unseriousness, even 
frivolousness, that their prose be mistaken for “belletrism” or “appreciation”’.  165
Research which gives primacy to the method of its writing appears, in short, weak, a 
value judgment that evidences, according to Rita Felski, a broader ‘legitimation crisis 
that is affecting all of the humanities’.  It is no coincidence, then, that similarly value-166
laden phrasing echoes through fictocriticism, a discipline which Helen Flavell attempts 
to define as allowing ‘moments of weakness, failure and doubt’ to show through its 
material of research rather than hiding behind ‘the objective and pseudo-scientific 
language of academic discourse’.  I will come to discuss the idea of weakness in 167
scholarship at greater length in chapter 3 in relation to Wai Chee Dimock.  
What follows is perhaps one answer to Barolsky’s dream of an art history that, at least 
sometimes, describes ‘works of art vividly, indeed beautifully’, that is ‘learned, 
imaginative, sensible, theoretically sophisticated, well wrought, and thus worthy of the 
very art it celebrates’, that is ‘artful, [and] a pleasure to read’.  I make no claims for 168
this being always the case; I can but try. My primary concern, however, is not the grace, 
beauty or lack thereof, of art history writing. Rather I am trying to gauge what a 
responsive art history – by which I mean an approach to art history that develops its 
character, sensitivity, style, and means of understanding through a responsive 
 Elkins, Our Beautiful, Dry and Distant Texts, p. xx; Gavin Parkinson, ‘The Delvaux Mystery: Painting 164
the Nouveau Roman and Art History’, Nottingham French Studies, 51(3) (2012), p. 299.
 Barolsky, ‘Writing Art History’, p. 398.165
 Felski, Uses of Literature, p. 21.166
 Flavell, ‘Writing-Between’, p. 23.167
 Barolsky, ‘Writing Art History’, p. 400.168
!58
relationship with its referents, that is aware of, even thrives on, its position as creator 
and mediator of experience – can bring to the table of scholarship at large. 
But does that not make this thesis art criticism rather than art history? Though it is 
beyond my scope to dwell on this distinction it is worth alluding to some of the ways in 
which scholars characterise or situate writing that does not sit wholly comfortably in 
one or other camp. Michael Baxandall, for example, uses the terms ‘art history’ and ‘art 
criticism’ interchangeably.  Richard Wollheim attacks art history precisely because its 169
emphasis on historicising has led to an erosion of criticality.  For Michael Ann Holly 170
writers like Pater and Ruskin are ‘branded aesthetes or mere critics’ and ‘dismissed 
from the cannon of serious art historians’; critics and criticism, by implication, become 
lesser than historians and history.  Ivan Gaskell, in an article combatively entitled, 171
‘Writing (and) Art History: Against Writing’, distinguishes criticism and art history 
claiming that the critical belongs in museums as a form of interpretation.  More useful 172
for my purposes is Elsner’s argument for the descriptive foundations of art history. He 
concedes that while ‘not everything that results from ekphrasis is art history’, 
‘interpretative description, which attempts to make a coherent argument on broadly 
historical or philosophical lines, is definitely art history’.  While mindful of the 173
dangers of interpretation, as chapter 2 discusses, much of what follows is an attempt to 
articulate – often through expanded descriptions – the feeling of encounters with and 
between art and text. I have partially addressed the question of whether this thesis 
constitutes ‘a coherent argument’. I have framed this thesis, after Oakeshott, as 
primarily a conversation rather than an argument so I will allow myself to recast the 
question: is what follows a coherent conversation? The matter of coherence will 
resurface at various intervals in this thesis but to have too close an eye on it from the 
 Michael Baxandall, ‘The Language of Art History’, New Literary History, 10(3) (1979), p. 455.169
 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), p. 9.170
 Michael Ann Holly, The Melancholy Art (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013). 171
She puts this dismissal down to Pater and Ruskin’s ‘reception of the sublime, almost threatening the 
power of the past that their detractors fear’, p. 64. 
 Ivan Gaskell, in ‘Writing (and) Art History: Against Writing’, in ‘Writing (and) the History of Art’, 172
The Art Bulletin, 78(3) (1996). See also Richard Shiff, ‘Flexible Time: The Subject in/of Art History’, The 
Art Bulletin, 76(4) (1994); Carrier, ‘Artcriticism–writing, Arthistory–writing, Artwriting’; Elkins and 
Newman eds., The State of Art Criticism.
 Elsner, ‘Art History as Ekphrasis’, p. 11.173
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start, errs on the side of caution, and risks limiting our thinking, closing down its 




‘Stray Associations’ and Interpretation:  
Francisco de Zurbarán’s, Still Life with Four Vessels 
and Susan Sontag  
An idea which is a distortion may have a greater intellectual thrust than the truth; it may 
serve the needs of the spirit, which vary. The truth is balance, but the opposite of truth, 
which is unbalance, may not be a lie.  1
Susan Sontag
 Susan Sontag, ‘Simone Weil’, Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 2001), p. 50.1
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Introduction 
In the cavernous heart of Tate Modern a group of people press as though driven by some 
urgent impulse. They throng, diverge and reconverge in a melée, individuals peeling off, 
sporadically, pursuing conversations with passersby. Their energy is concentrated by 
their mass. Expansive and restless, they experiment with various ways to probe the 
space around them through movement and stillness: they jog up and down in dispersed 
waves; they swirl scattering and weaving; they stand, sit or lie contemplatively; they 
dance or march backwards in unison. They court the space around them for three 
months, filling its cavity with their breathing, their footsteps, their voice, their song. 
They are like some volatile substance, constantly reacting and interacting with the 
space, light, and architecture of the building, as well as with each other, with the gallery 
audience and, at a remove, with Tino Sehgal, the artist who set off this strange train of 
non-events.  
It is at yet another remove that I relate these goings-on, as Sehgal forbade any 
recording, visual or written of the artwork. I did not see any of the performance and rely 
on illicit YouTube recordings of the events, personal written accounts from participants 
in the artwork and critical reviews. It is a game of Chinese whispers; only partially 
recorded for posterity, imperfectly chronicled, fragmented and reimagined through 
snippets of blurred video recordings, courtroom sketches, and by word of mouth or 
paper or screen. The myth of These associations (Tate Modern, London, 2012) (fig. 2) is 
allowed free reign by reflection, unconstrained by historical or critical veracity, built up 
of partial impressions.  
Sehgal’s team was made up of well-rehearsed non-professional actors, one of whom 
described the group as ‘only the human clay [Sehgal] worked with’.  His ‘constructed 2
situations’, though closely managed by the artist, make space for arrangements of 
movement, speech and practised instruction to act as a framework within which further 
 Agnieszka Gratza, ‘Conversation Pieces’, Frieze, 152 (Jan–Feb 2013) <http://www.frieze.com/issue/2
article/conversation-pieces/> [accessed 1 June 2013] (para. 9 of 9).
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spontaneous activity plays out.  It is a spectacle in which the audience is invited to 3
immerse itself. It is at once theatrical, rehearsed and worldly, such as when the lights of 
the turbine hall are all turned off and then back on again in time with a choral 
performance. But it is also mundane, spontaneous and personal, like the quieter 
interactions that take place between individuals as they break away from the flock. The 
piece is supple, it is uncertain, present and responsive as its performance permeates, by 
degrees, the life of the Turbine Hall.    
The underlying sentiment for the form and content of this chapter, and the project more 
widely, is akin to the uncertainties of These associations. Both share a singularity of 
focus, the Turbine Hall for Sehgal, Francisco de Zurbarán’s Still Life with Four Vessels 
(fig. 1) for me, though neither solicit the coherence of a single interpretation or end 
point.  Instead they rove around their subject matters by staging points of contact, 4
offering up the meeting of disparate bodies and artworks to interrogation, sustained over 
time. A series of ‘constructed situations’ follow which choreograph various 
interpretations of Zurbarán’s Four Vessels.  
Section 1 roams in and around this single painting. It takes as its starting point the 
painting’s wonder and lure, or as Barthes would call it, its punctum, that ‘element which 
rises from the scene, shoots like an arrow, and pierces me’.  I focus on the materiality of 5
the painting. I probe its magnetism, its capacity to stimulate and its ambiguities as they 
arise through my sustained contact with it. I begin with an enactment of the drama that 
takes place when ‘free’ viewing is sculpted by its articulation in the form of a written 
response, before opening up the floor to other Zurbarán scholars and later to Susan 
Sontag in order to explore the extra interpretative layers that the written word lends to 
the shape, tone and imagery of response. 
 The term ‘constructed situations’ is referred to by Matthew Engelke in ‘Matthew Engelke on Tino 3
Sehgal, Frieze Blog (4 September 2013) <http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/blogs/matthew-
engelke-on-tino-sehgal> [accessed 6 September 2013] (paras. 1 and 2 of 12).
 I shall continue to refer to this still life as Four Vessels. The attribution of this painting to Francisco de 4
Zurbarán is contested with some scholars like César Pemán believing it to be by Juán de Zurbarán, and 
Paul Guinard believing it to be a collaboration as discussed by Julián Gállego, Francisco de Zurbarán, 
1598-1664, biography and analysis Julián Gállego; catalogue of works José Guidol, Kenneth Lyons 
trans. (London: Secker and Warburg, 1977), p. 50.
 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, Richard Howard trans. (London: Vintage, 2000), p. 27.5
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Section 2 looks at how this kind of ‘free’ affective response connects to and departs 
from other responses to Zurbarán’s still life. I set the stage for some examples of art-
historical and critical approaches to the painting: one symbolist, one historicist, one 
connoisseurial and the other marxist. I draw out what the distinct methodologies bring 
to the table asking what each adds or takes away.  6
   
When none of these accounts wholly satisfy, I look, in section 3, to an exterior figure, at 
a remove from this particular still life yet whose polemic about the limitations of 
interpretations suggest another way of working with it. Sontag never wrote on Zurbarán 
but her way of writing about art enables me to approach his work with fresh eyes, in the 
same way that, for example, Prettejohn’s practice of moving around an artwork brings 
fresh perspective.  Though Prettejohn makes her point about sculpture, my study of a 7
single painting also moves constantly through and around it. So instead of 
contextualising it as Spanish, as still life, as interior, as a Zurbarán, as seventeenth-
century I introduce a hypothetical Sontaghian angle to probe the character and function 
of interpretation and allow me to see and think both Zurbarán’s painting and Sontag’s 
writing anew.  
The chapter imagines what Sontag would have made of Four Vessels and what her 
hypothetical interpretation might add to the limited scholarship on this painting. That 
interpretation comes about, of course, through me, and my reading of Sontag, recasting 
her criticism in ways that relate to Zurbarán’s paintings, but which, as with all 
scholarship, comes about in my own words. My role is something like a ventriloquist, 
 Francisco Calvo Serraller and Mirian Alzuri, El Bodegón Español de Zurbarán a Picasso (Bilbao: 6
Museo de Bellas Artes Bilbao, 1999); Gállego, Francisco de Zurbarán (1977), p. 50; Mathew Abbot, ‘All 
that is Solid Melts into Air’, (First Draft Gallery: Sydney, 2012) <http://firstdraftgallery.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Mathew_Abbott_Text_Pages_A5.pdf> [accessed 14 January 2013], pp. 5–6; 
Jonathan Brown, Francisco de Zurbarán (London: Thames and Hudson, 1991), p. 19.
 In Prettejohn’s recent study of the relationship between Greek sculpture and modern art she advises that 7
‘every time we think we are getting the measure of the object of study, we should move around it to see 
what another view will bring’, see Prettejohn, The Modernity of Ancient Sculpture, p. 251.
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activating and redirecting Sontag’s modernist criticism towards this seventeenth-century 
still life painting.   8
What follows takes place through the assumption of voices by disassociated bodies. 
Think of this text as, in part, a ‘vocalic body’, then. Steven Connor describes how 
‘voices are produced by bodies: but can also themselves produce bodies.’ A vocalic 
body of text, in this case, can assume the form ‘of a surrogate or secondary body, a 
projection of a new way of having or being a body, formed and sustained out of the 
autonomous operations of the voice’.  This chapter seeks to hear anew the voices of 9
those who inhabit it through a body of text, my body of text, as it unfolds. Here, two 
interrelated surrogate bodies meet through, what David Goldblatt – in reference, 
incidentally, to Gertrude Stein – calls an ‘awareness that overflow[s] the self’. It 
involves, he continues, ‘being two selves simultaneously, […] being conscious of 
oneself and beside oneself as well’.  This metaphor serves to demonstrate the way in 10
which multiple voices fill the cavity of their secondary bodies, ‘not just to enter or 
suffuse it, but to produce it’ in practice. Through this practice, my voice fills a body, a 
cavity that is formed when bringing a painting and text into some kind of contingent 
relation and experiencing, and attempting to convey, its affects. What results is an 
‘imaginary body in the course of being found and formed’ and what is being found and 
formed here is the enactment of research through the emergence of thought.  11
This ventriloquism works through the potentially awkward association of Sontag’s 
writing and Zurbarán’s painting: drawing the two into orbit expounds on both and, as an 
approach, is a further instance of my efforts to free the constraints of seeing art history 
as a puzzle to be put back together in the ‘right’ places. The historical and causal 
disconnect between these two protagonists allows room to explore what is at stake for 
the writer and thinker of art histories: what role does the art historian play in dwelling 
 For scholarship on ventriloquism see: Steven Connor, Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism 8
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David Goldblatt, Art and Ventriloquism (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006); Valentine Vox, I Can See Your Lips Moving: The History and Art of 
Ventriloquism (North Hollywood CA: Plato Publishing, 1993).
 Connor, Dumbstruck, p. 35. 9
 Goldblatt, Art and Ventriloquism, p. 39.10
 Connor, Dumbstruck, p. 36.11
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on Sontag’s aesthetics through Zurbarán’s painting, my encounter with Zurbarán’s 
painting, and examples of art history’s encounters with the painting? At the nub of this 
discussion are the intersections between these elements.   12
The chapter would be unthinkable without Aby Warburg’s concept of Nachleben and the 
survival and unfolding of an artwork beyond itself, and a single moment. It also owes 
much to Gaston Bachelard’s notion that ‘the onset of the image in an individual 
consciousness can help us to restore the subjectivity of images and to measure their 
fullness, their strength and their transsubjectivity’.  It registers responses to artworks as 13
a buildup of impressions around Four Vessels – my own, those of Zurbarán scholars and 
Sontag’s – not to resolve them, but to allow them to gestate, to prove, to go beyond 
themselves. I am interested in what happens when we seek to grasp such fleeting 
associations – something Sehgal sought not to allow – concretising, fixing them in 
words and ideas which intersect on the critical stage, coalescing in the form of writing 
around the painting. It is, as Didi-Huberman put it, ‘to proceed dialectically. Beyond 
knowledge itself, to commit ourselves to the paradoxical ordeal not to know [...] but to 
think the element of not-knowledge that dazzles us whenever we pose our gaze to an art 
image’.   14
Section 1: Thinking Still Life with Four Vessels 
Zurbarán’s Four Vessels is disarming. Its structure, six vessels arranged in a row along a 
shelf, is simple; its forms, stark; its colour palette, pared down yet emphatic; its 
rendering, crisp but with subtle, visible brush strokes describing the various curvatures 
and the light and shadows that fall and hug each vessel in turn. Yet its seeming 
simplicity belies its ambiguity: its lighting is dramatic though its subject matter 
mundane; it is uncompromisingly choreographed, in line, deliberate and precise, 
 Wolfgang Iser, ‘The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach’, New Literary History, 3(2) 12
(1972).
 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. xiv.13
 Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, p. 7.14
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complete with shelf as stage and deep black backdrop for contrast. As a whole it is 
characterised by its forceful reticence.  
Its initial impact is forthright. With its single perspective it appears to offer a Cartesian 
unified view of the world, contained, ordered and classifiable. But there are two aspects 
of the painting that invite an alternative to the combative straight-on view of six vessels 
aligned: light and shade. As the eye shifts, lead by the strength of the light that issues 
from beyond the left side of the image, the absence of shadows are, oddly, brought into 
relief. Although all of the painted containers are sculpted through a mimetic use of 
chiaroscuro it is revealing that, apart from the bronze goblet on the left hand side, the 
vessels cast shadow only on the shelf below them and not on each successive vessel.  15
The vessels themselves have an uncertain relationship to the light. On the one hand they 
appear reliant on the exterior beam to cast localised shadow. On the other, the absence 
of whole cast shadows lends them a near abstracted glow. The relationship between 
light, shadows and objects is entirely separated from the background which appears 
hermetically sealed.  
The force of this painting pivots on its uncompromising poise, its absolute stillness. 
Unlike Willem Kalf’s Still Life with Drinking-Horn (National Gallery, London, 1653) or 
Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin’s The Skate (The Louvre, Paris, 1725–6) which, in their 
different ways, bristle with life and action. Choreographed but in a naturalistic, faux-
casual way their cloths are thrown nonchalantly over the table, Kalf’s lemon peel is on 
the point of falling to the floor, Chardin’s kitten is about to make short work of those 
oysters. Zurbarán, however, pulls back and slows down. Rather than being frozen, on 
the brink of further activity, his still life conveys a focused, meditative poise.  He 16
declares the ordinary reality of the unreality of his subject matter and celebrates it. Here 
are some pots, he declares. Here. Are. Some. Pots. They are not used as architectural 
underpinning for other more meaningful objects to hang around. There is no ostentation, 
no great colour, tonal or textual variation to cushion our viewing. Its composition of six 
 Museo Nacional del Prado, <http://www.museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/online-gallery/on-line-15
gallery/obra/still-life/ accessed 14/09/12> [accessed September 2012] (para. 2 of 4).
 A characteristic also identified by Amanda Robins in ‘Slow Art: Meditative Process in Painting and 16
Drawing’ (University of New South Wales: PhD dissertation, 2006), p. 79, (published Saarbrücken: VDM 
Verlag, 2009).
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domestic objects is uncompromising. The only thing he offers to help carry the eye from 
one object to the next is the partial shadow cast by each object in turn. The vessels 
themselves appear almost empty, lifeless and, largely, plain. But Zurbarán lines them 
along an even plainer dead-brown shelf, before an unctuous, black background. And so, 
in the spotlight of the signature mannerist light source the unassuming pots hum.  
The painting’s simplicity is subsumed by its lingering abstracted and aestheticized 
naturalism. Mimetic naturalism matters less than Zurbarán’s stripping back of details by 
the beam that alights onto pots devoid of natural shadow. His combinations of colour, 
form and unfathomable tension feel both instinctive and artful.  Naturalism makes way 17
for a rigorous meditation on forms whose emotional and intellectual reach unfolds 
beyond the confines of the specific with which we could be mistaken for thinking this 
painting to be concerned. What stands out is as much what is not there as what is: the 
absence of those mutually grounding shadows, the near empty vessels (containers that, 
mostly, do not contain) and the limited inclusion of readable context, save for the 
wooden shelf or table. The vessels exude a discomfiting warm glow: approachable in 
their modesty and the overall earthy tones and yet cold in their bare, near regimented, 
unnatural alignment. To the eye they feel like rounded, tactile objects, yet the shadows 
that would substantiate their solidity are absent. They are objects of use and yet that use 
has been almost eliminated. They lie in wait. There is no food on the plates, no flowers 
in the vases, just a subtle waterline suspended in the rightmost white urn. The vessels 
are frozen, even illuminated, in their inutility.  
Four Vessels recalls Damien Hirst’s Isolated Elements Swimming in the Same Direction 
for the Purpose of Understanding (Left) (Prada Collection, Milan, 1991) (fig. 3) which 
consists of a cabinet of fish preserved in separate cuboids, all facing left. Hirst’s 
elements are frozen in formaldehyde, Zurbarán’s pots, in oil paint. The works share the 
linear repetition of forms that belong to the same family but are also different. In both, 
the viewpoint is ambiguous. They achieve a straight re-presentation of forms without 
the distraction of further context. Zurbarán’s pots are placed on an unremarkable 
 I am aware of the formalist leanings of this sentence. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to tackle the 17
issue of formalism at length but the matter is broadly referenced in my first chapter. 
!68
wooden shelf, Hirst’s fish in a utilitarian white cabinet with riveted shelving system. 
Compare the way that this sense of detachment is undermined by the light that suffuses 
Zurbarán’s painting, and by Hirst’s presentation of once living beings in glass coffins. 
Of course there are differences in size and media, and the overall brightness of Hirst’s 
cabinet compared to Zurbarán’s painting is striking. Yet the artists’ presentation of 
forms all but devoid of one of their principle functions – fish to swim and vessels to 
contain – builds up a sense of dismal uselessness: useless matter shelved. In both 
artworks, this underlying bleakness belies the beauty of their execution and they 
become ethereal after-still-lifes. 
Drawing on Hirst to develop a critical appraisal of Zurbarán might seem an 
anachronistic step too far. Yet, rather than quell these associations or, as Richard 
Wollheim put it, wait for ‘the stray associations and motivated misconceptions to settle 
down’, I wonder at the understanding we might derive from these so-called strays.  The 18
discussion of Hirst in this context would be considered by Wollheim to be one such 
stray, brought about through efforts to communicate the effect of Zurbarán’s image on 
or through or with me. Might such strays work in a similar way to Stephen Bann’s 
detours? ‘One never gets to the heart of a problem’, Bann tells us, ‘without taking 
detours’.  Admittedly, he was not referring to such subjective associations, but I might, 19
perhaps, borrow the sentiment?  
My ‘stray associations’ are obvious to begin with. Zurbarán’s still life calls to mind 
Giorgio Morandi and his innumerable collections of pots arranged and rearranged in 
various conglomerations, engaged in various visual conversations, abstracted though 
indomitably mundane and earthly. Is it just the shared subject matter that links the two? 
Compare, for example, Morandi’s rough painterly handling to Zurbarán’s smooth; or 
Morandi’s often flat (or at any rate washed out), compared to Zurbarán’s dramatic, use 
of lighting; or Morandi’s obsession with the repetition of vessels compared to 
Zurbarán’s infrequent (though no less intense) iterations. No, what brings the two artists 
together in my mind is their approach to composition in which formal arrangements of 
 Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 8.18
 Stephen Bann, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation of the Past (Manchester and 19
New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 10.
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pots are presented, often (though not exclusively for Morandi) in lines. The sculptural 
objects depicted are, in both cases, compressed in space, de-characterised through their 
strict choreography.  
From here the mind wanders, side stepping to Giorgio de Chirico and his dramatic use 
of light sources, his stark forms, his emotional detachment, his selection of found (often 
familiar) objects made strange by their recontextualization in new and alien landscapes 
and his love of combining natural colours – whites, creams, browns and blacks –with a 
hit of bright colour, a bunch of yellow bananas or an oversized burnt sienna glove. 
These associations come about not only because of their visual likenesses. To link two 
pieces of otherwise seemingly incomparable artworks based merely on their visual 
properties might appear problematic. Considered facile, arbitrary and formalist, how 
could the comparison of artworks be put to useful art-historical work without the 
imposition of an overarching theme, purpose or method? What might we learn from 
them? What happens when the links between one artwork and another are distant 
‘reverberations’, in the sense that Bachelard has used the term, as distant a-
chronological traces and historically incoherent and irrational impressions or analogies? 
By exploring the possible interest elicited by the evocation of shared feelings about 
artworks that are historically, thematically and formally separate, I hope to prize apart 
the echoes that issue forth from one artwork to touch on another and discuss their 
impact one by one.  
It is important to emphasise that I am not suggesting that any of my ‘strays’ are 
necessarily intentionally ‘there’ in the painting. I do not consider them concrete 
references deliberately placed (by the artist) that preexist my observations but as loose 
serendipitous post factum analogies drawn out from viewer response. I am interested in 
the process that has been referred to as ‘the onset’ of the artworks’ bodily, not just 
visual, effect on the viewer as not only a personal but intellectual pursuit. I see this as a 
mode of intercommunication, a sharing and developing of embodied understanding of 
artworks in relation to each other, to ourselves, and to art histories. In this context 
understanding might better be described as active assimilation conveying the 
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subconscious, fragmentary and necessarily subjective way with which external stimuli 
permeate our view of the world. 
To return to Four Vessels, then, the overwhelming solidity with which Zurbarán imbues 
his vessels is striking, despite the incomplete cast shadows. Boldly set forward from the 
rich black background one senses the vessels roundness, their textured smoothness and 
their relative isolation in unidentified space. The limpid rendering of their forms is 
humanly imperfect and gently naturalistic. Despite the warm yellow unearthly light, the 
coldness of those metal plates abides: the imaginary sharp clang of metal against metal, 
plate against goblet, a tone soon absorbed by the solidity of the wooden shelf. The shelf 
functions as a crucial grounding in colour and density. The shiny glaze of the two cream 
white vessels also compares to the dull surface of the burnt sienna vase. I can anticipate 
the feeling of running my hand over these vases. The orange one, dry, offering a dusty 
resistance compared to the cooler effect of my skin slipping off the glaze of the cream-
white urn.  
However ambiguous its overall effect its composition is unwrought yet it elicits a calm, 
contemplative, and visceral reception. One senses the brush strokes, the gentle coaxing 
of forms from pigment, the embracing of their rounded curvatures in the hand. Its 
forthright definition lends gravity to what is unmistakably, a painting of six simple 
vessels in a row. It is partly the vessels’ decommissioning that allows for our 
imaginative re-commissioning of them, they demand contemplative access beyond a 
predetermined hermeneutic outcome. As such the painting functions like an open-work 
which is partly why it has induced so many stray associations here.  
This method of viewing ‘touchingly’ also relates to the familiarity with which Zurbarán 
depicts his objects.  They appear mundane (the brass goblet with seahorses for handles 20
perhaps notwithstanding) though in their current configuration, their utility redundant, 
 On a modes of synaesthetic and embodied viewing and theorising see: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 20
Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy and Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Peter 
Osborne ed., From an Aesthetic Point of View: Philosophy, Art and the Senses (London: Serpent’s Tail, 
2001); Peter Dent ed., Sculpture and Touch (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014); Francesca Bacci and 
David Melcher eds., Art and the Senses (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jennifer 
Fisher, ‘Relational sense: towards a haptic aesthetics’, Parachute: Contemporary Art Magazine, 87 
(1997).
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their standing has somehow surpassed their original function. Like a Wolfgang Tillmans 
photograph where unremarkable black socks are piled to dry on an unremarkable white 
radiator, the ordinary appears momentous (fig. 4). Free from their original purposes, 
either to protect feet or contain flowers, intensified by the close focus upon them, 
abstracted from their whole story, these objects are encouraged to metamorphose before 
you. The intimacy of the view allows the spectator more of a grasp, or at least the 
possible partial assimilation, of the objects. This is not just about an overturning of the 
hierarchy of art’s subject matter either. In the case of Tillmans and Zurbarán their 
objects are at once themselves and something else. Tillmans’s socks seem less overtly 
choreographed, found rather than placed, as Zurbarán’s clearly are. Of course 
photographs, however unpremeditated in appearance, are always framed by the eye and 
the lens but Tillmans saves his ‘high composition’ for the installation of his works en 
masse through exhibitions where his works are thoroughly ordered, arranged to spark 
interrelations between themselves, as Zurbarán’s vases do within the confines of a 
single painting. And Tillmans’s light may be less dramatic, less theatrical than that 
which bathes Zurbarán’s vessels; he favours a bland, uniform white light which is less 
laden with narrative overtones, but it is the analogy between Tillmans’s and Zurbarán’s 
transformation from the functional mundane to the beautifully abstract that brings them 
together.  
That sounds as if the mundane cannot be abstract or the functional not beautiful. 
Perhaps what is remarkable about these artists’ handling of their subject matters is their 
expansive approach. My being able to point to, through and beyond Zurbarán’s still life 
is brought about through sustained dwelling on and around the painting. It does not stop 
at this individual painting, and certainly does not foreclose it by presuming to identify a 
particular meaning. The sense of dwelling on suggests an unfolding or witnessing of the 
effect of the artwork in its state of constant becoming. Responding to artwork is highly 
sensitive: it is receptive, actively industrious and often subconscious, which is why 
writing through responses helps to prize apart, as well as to reconstruct. It is sensitive to 
time as well as physical, intellectual and emotional environment. Being mindful of these 
factors and allowing them to play out, instead of stifling them into submission, enables 
the artwork’s rigorous assimilation within both a private and a public art-historical 
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narrative. In this constellation it acts as a trigger to, and ongoing mediator of, the 
discussion of other works. Just as my discussion in this chapter is not just about the 
response to a single painting but stretches beyond itself, so Tillmans and Zurbarán have 
produced art of objects where objects are represented in a way that augments the 
objects’ qualities beyond themselves, rather than constraining them in their objecthood. 
For Roland Barthes, ‘the pleasure of the text is that moment when [his] body pursues its 
own ideas’.  Subjective associations are similarly expansive. Might such strays point 21
towards qualities and ideas within and beyond the artwork, not in the intentionalist vein 
that Wollheim would insist on, but as pictorial and critical serendipities, thematic 
threads sewn not just by and through the artist but by and through the art historian too?  
Section 2: Enter writing around Zurbarán  
This is one of a myriad ways of being with Four Vessels but what can other approaches 
bring to the painting? The following section presents four different approaches to its 
interpretation: symbolist, historicist, connoisseurial, and marxist. The examples are 
taken from a variety of contexts – a catalogue entry, an essay to accompany a 
contemporary exhibition or as incidental asides – and are, therefore, not like for like but 
their coming together here functions to illustrate what extant approaches to the painting 
contribute and also leave out.  
The catalogue entry in Spanish Painting from El Greco to Picasso (2006) situates Four 
Vessels within its geographic, temporal and cultural context. It touches only summarily 
on the vessels’ appearance describing them as ‘like a frieze, on a board parallel to the 
frontal plane’ and ‘according to a Caravaggesque tradition’. The omission of the vessels’ 
cast shadows is seen as a ‘slight incongruence’ evidence of Zurbarán’s process, studying 
the objects separately and then combining them to achieve ‘a perfectly balanced 
composition’.    22
 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, Richard Miller trans. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), p. 17.21
 Carmen Giménez and Francisco Calvo Serraller eds., Spanish Painting from El Greco to Picasso: Time, 22
Truth and History, exhib. cat. (November 2006–Spring 2007) (SEACEX / Solomon R. Guggenheim, 
2006), unspecified catalogue entry author, p. 102 and Felix Scheffler, Das spanische Stilleben des 17. 
Jahrhunderts. Theorie, Genese und Entfaltung einer Bildgattung (Frankfurt: Vervuert, 2000), p. 341.
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The entry’s principal focus is on Four Vessels as a celebration of Sevillian cultural 
identity. Referencing Felix Scheffler’s research it sees Zurbarán as ‘paying homage to 
the city, which was famous for its pottery manufacturing’. He identifies each pot: ‘The 
two white jars were made locally, and were known as alcarrazas, or eggshell, for their 
thin white clay. The alcarrazas flank a wide-bellied bottle with a long neck, made from 
red Portuguese or South American clay.’ Its interest in the painting lies predominantly in 
the ways that the vessels are ‘symbols of Seville, they identify its economic welfare and 
form part of the hagiography of its patrons, Saints Justa and Rufina’.  Justa and Rufina 23
became martyrs after they were tortured, imprisoned and killed for refusing to sell their 
earthenware pottery to locals for use in pagan festivals. Accordingly, though Scheffler 
does not fully draw it out, Four Vessels, appears to reveal its socio-historic lineage with 
pious Counter Reformation sentiment and symbolism. Scheffler’s approach reveals a 
belief in the almost pre-determined nature of the form, content, and interpretation of the 
artwork. The painting’s original socio-historical context is taken as a means of 
explanation; it accounts, not only for what the painting depicts, but how that depiction 
appears on the canvas. The painting is considered not on its own terms but as an 
illustration of its biographic, geographic and cultural emergence.  
Mathew Abbot resituates Four Vessels within a rather different cultural and theoretical 
framework. In a slim 2012 exhibition catalogue for First Draft Gallery in Sydney he 
compares it with Giorgio Morandi’s Still life (Museum für Gegenwartskunst, Siegen, 
1962).  In contrast to the Giménez and Serraller catalogue entry, Abbot understands 24
Zurbarán’s omission of cast shadows onto the pots themselves, not as incongruous but 
as evidencing each vessel’s ‘solidity, clarity, and distinctness, indeed as radiantly 
unique’. Compare this, Abbot tells us, to Morandi’s objects which are ‘blandly 
anonymous, flattened, and washed out’. Here is a further comparison: ‘The objects in 
the Zurbarán catch the light dramatically, and each glows out from the background; the 
objects in the Morandi are huddled together sheepishly, seeming about to fade into each 
 Giménez and Serraller eds., Spanish Painting from El Greco to Picasso, p. 102. This reading relies 23
heavily on Scheffler to whom I shall refer when referencing this particular reading from here on in, see 
Scheffler, Das spanische Stilleben, p. 341.
 Abbot, ‘All that is Solid Melts into Air’.24
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other (notice how some of them share outlines) and threatening to merge amorphously 
with the background.’  Though Abbot’s comparisons between historically disparate 25
artworks have interesting potential the discussion culminates in something of a dead 
end. In a sense his argument is an extension of Scheffler’s, which sees Zurbarán’s still 
life as a study of real objects put to everyday use in seventeenth-century Seville and 
depicted in all their integrity.  
The purpose of his trans-historical comparison soon becomes clear: 
[It] indicates what capitalist modernity does to things. As it produces 
and distributes them in historically unprecedented quantities, it 
makes them more ephemeral. For the flatness in Morandi is not only 
the result of an experiment with perspective or an acknowledgment 
of the two-dimensionality of the canvas: this flatness, this sense that 
things have lost their depth and distinctness, is one of the 
experiential features of the modern as we know it.   26
Abbot uses Four Vessels to draw out his overarching, marxist inflected, point. His 
juxtaposition of Zurbarán and Morandi function as an illustrative metaphor whereby, 
paradoxically, the uniqueness of their work becomes secondary. The paintings become 
as ‘ephemeral’ as the effect of the ‘capitalist modernity’ against which Abbot rails, and 
onto which his broader argument is hung. The paintings’ presence, rendering, detail and 
feeling – what Abbot calls their ‘depth and distinctness’ – have been flattened out, 
subsumed by Abbot’s own personal, political and theoretical propensities. This example 
serves as a reminder of what is lost in the use (or misuse) of art, through the temptation 
to deploy art like a weapon on the ruthless field of argumentation and persuasion by 
treating it interchangeably as document or artefact without scrutiny of its subtle formal 
components and emotional or intellectual effects.   
Another comparative reading, this time by Julián Gállego, sees a move away from 
symbolism. Though, following Roberto Longhi, Gállego is convinced of the highly 
symbolic significance of a related painting by Zurbarán, Still Life with Lemons, Oranges 
 Abbot, ‘All that is Solid Melts into Air’ p. 5.25
 ibid., p. 6.26
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and a Cup of Water (Norton Simon Museum, 1633) (fig. 5).  Longhi reads the 27
presentation of objects in Still Life with Lemons as configured in the manner of an altar, 
a kind of litany to the Virgin Mary. And Gállego cites the citrus fruit and flower, the 
rose and the water as symbolising chastity, love and purity respectively as evidence of 
the painting’s homage.  On the matter of Four Vessels, however, Gállego’s approach 28
diverges. Here he attempts no such prescriptively symbolic reading and instead 
anthropomorphises Zurbarán’s vessels. They ‘have the presence of living characters’, he 
writes, just as ‘Zurbarán’s characters have the presence of earthen pots’. He goes on to 
refer to the general nature and style of all of Zurbarán’s still lifes, as if they were 
somehow interchangeable. In this respect Gállego’s handling of the still life is 
comparable with Abbot’s, rendering his analysis likewise guilty of flattening out the 
painting’s particularities.  
What is interesting about Gállego’s analysis, however, is that, surprisingly, given his 
straightforward breakdown of the Still Life with Lemons, he is one of the few art 
historians to recognise the way in which Zurbarán’s still lives affect a current viewer. In 
order to account for their broad appeal to an ‘art lover now’ – in the 1970s – Gállego 
identifies ‘objects, divorced from their context in a deliberate abnormality’, as well as 
the ‘sober, monumental style’ and the ‘“implacable objectivity of Zurbarán’s objects”’ 
as being key attractions to the modern psyche. He argues that such qualities are 
comparable with those found in Cézanne, Cubism, or ‘Surrealist, magic-realist and 
Hyper-realist objects’. In revisioning Zurbarán’s paintings of plates and pots in a 
relationship of closeness with a contemporary audience his anthropomorphising 
monumentalises the still lifes, raising them to a level of essentialism: ‘It is only when 
we see one of these still lives’, he says, ‘that we realize that being a fruit, a cup, a 
napkin, a plate or an earthen pot is something almost as essential as being a man.’   29
 Roberto Longhi ‘De Zurbarán’, in Los antiguos pintores españoles de la colección Contini Bonacossi 27
Augusto L. Mayer ed., (Milan: Bestetti e Tumminelli, 1930), pp. 39–40. Henceforth I will abbreviate Still 
Life with Lemons, Oranges and a Cup of Water to Still Life with Lemons.
 William B. Jordan and Sarah Schroth eds., Spanish Still Life in the Golden Age, 1600-1650 (Fort 28
Worth: Kimbell Art Museum and Toledo Museum of Art, 1985), p. 20. 
 Gállego, Francisco de Zurbarán, p. 50.29
!76
By contrast, Jonathan Brown takes a part-historicist, part-connoisseurial approach.  He 30
frequently refers to the way in which Zurbarán’s work is reflective of the artist’s time 
and place. He describes the narrative of the artist’s life as one of ‘humble beginnings 
[which rose ...] to exalted heights, and then drifted slowly down to a melancholy end’ 
and where taste and patronage ‘help to explain the trajectory and character and 
evolution of his religious art’.  With regard to his still lifes, however, Brown has 31
something quite other to say. He expressly rejects any symbolic reading of these works 
(such as Gállego’s of Still Life with Lemons). For Brown the still lifes (and he is 
referring to them in general terms) are, rather, ‘examples of intensive artistic 
concentration’. But by the same hand, their value is also demoted to studies for 
Zurbarán’s principle religious oeuvres in which ‘still life elements were meant to assist 
the illusion of commonplace reality, but the strong emphasis given them elevated the 
simple objects to almost equal stature with the figures, so that even non-symbolic 
accessories seem charged with meanings’.  Brown is clear that any symbolic reading is 32
at most illusory, a mistake on the part of the viewer.  
In the catalogue entry for Four Vessels in Baticle’s exhibition catalogue the painting is 
briefly described in comparison to Still-life with Lemons and its ‘frieze-like disposition 
of the objects, [with] the same attention to the rendering of volume and the same way in 
which the objects are brilliantly lighted against a dark background’. There is no search 
for hidden meaning, social or historical contextualisation, rather the entry is written in 
the manner of a connoisseur focussing primarily on its attribution and dating.  From it, 33
then, we learn very little about the painting itself, its materiality or affect. In fact 
 In his essay in Jeannine Baticle, Zurbarán, exhib. cat. (September–December 1987) (New York:  30
Metropolitan Museum of Art 1987) Brown calls Four Vessels, Still Life with Pottery and Cup, referring to 
the Museu d’Art de Catalunya version. It is not ideal that he does not refer to the exact painting that is the 
focus of my study, though Brown calls the paintings ‘identical’ and claims that the differences between 
the images are ‘negligible’ his discussion remains pertinent to my overall discussion to overlook this 
discrepancy, pp. 246–247. His approach in this essay is largely historicist. 
In his book Francisco de Zurbarán (London: Thames and Hudson, 1991), in a catalogue entry, he refers 
to the The Prado version of Four Vessels as Still Life with Jars. This entry is almost entirely 
connoisseurial focussing largely on the attribution of the still life and coming to the conclusion it was 
probably ‘done by Zurbarán at a level slightly below his best’ (praise indeed!), p. 88. 
 Jonathan Brown, ‘Patronage and Piety: Religious Imagery in the Art of Francisco de Zurbarán’, in 31
Zurbarán, Baticle ed., pp. 1–2, my emphasis.
 Brown, Zurbarán, p. 78.32
 Catalogue entry in Baticle, Zurbarán, pp. 246–247. 33
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reference to the painting gets lost in a puzzle of detection about the true identity of its 
author, as if its biographic provenance holds the key to its interpretation. Its dating and 
attribution are presented as the endpoint of the discussion rather than a beginning, or 
even an aside. This is the kind of approach that Michael Ann Holly refers to, as 
‘Whodunnit? Or whatisit?’ scholarship.  34
Section 3: Enter Susan Sontag 
I would suggest that missing from the interpretations above is an attentive reading of the 
surface and form of Four Vessels. This shortfall renders these accounts sensuously arid, 
lacking visceral, emotive or aesthetic registers. All this despite the painting itself being 
generally considered emotionally attuned and of a ‘transcendent and mystical 
character’.  To put it another way, it is the ‘erotics’ of Four Vessels, as Susan Sontag 35
would have it, that is lacking. The presence of an outsider to the conversation might 
pave the way for alternative critical possibilities and observations.  
And so to Sontag, a further stray, entering stage left. She is, in some respects, an 
unlikely figure to introduce into a chapter on Zurbarán, about whom she never herself 
wrote. The value of a connection like this, that at first sight appears arbitrary, picks up 
on Sontag’s own approach to writing: ‘Everything that I write is fiction’ she proclaims, 
it is like going ‘on an adventure for the next sentence’.  Sontag’s spirit accords with the 36
sense in which I am suggesting that art histories might be not a writing-up of research 
but a generation of research through the act of writing.  
There are several other reasons to suppose that Sontag’s voice might be valuable in this 
discussion too. First, this chapter is not just about Four Vessels, but about interpretation 
 Holly, ‘Mourning and Method’, p. 165.34
 Brown, Zurbarán, p. 246. Norman Bryson also emphasises its ‘texture and tactility’, Looking at the 35
Overlooked (London: Reaktion Books, 2001), p. 76. Amanda Robbins emphasises its tendency to point 
towards ‘transcendence in the everyday’, in Robbins, ‘Slow Art’, p. 83. And Robert Harvard notes that in 
Zurbarán’s paintings ‘naturalism and mysticism hold joint sovereignty, lucidity generating an exact 
representation of the humblest objects, otherworldliness (‘fuga’: flight) rendering them sublime and 
forlorn’, The Spanish Eye (Woodbridge: Tamesis Books, 2007), p. xiii.
 Susan Sontag in Jair Rattner, ‘Sontag diz que ha uma superpopulacao de escritores’, Folha De S. Paulo 36
(28 May 1988), cited by Sohnya Sayres, ‘Susan Sontag and the Practice of Modernism’, American 
Literary History, 1 (1989), p. 610.
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more broadly: what represents good (useful, expansive, imaginative) interpretation and 
what bad (prosaic, predictable, restrictive)? Sontag’s rebuttal of historicist and symbolic 
readings of artworks offers a counterbalance to the approaches to Four Vessels 
considered in Section 2. Secondly, Sontag’s self-conscious acknowledgment and 
navigation of herself as a medium for viewing, thinking and writing contribute to my 
broader theme of subjectivity because her personhood both activates and impedes her 
critical writing. Thirdly, through my ventriloquising of Sontag, her appearance adds an 
extra fictional layer to the discussion of the practice of interpretation. It enacts a 
hypothetical discussion with the critic around an image to which I think she would have 
been drawn. 
Sontag’s writing, like Zurbarán’s still life, is intractable and perplexing. Both resonate 
with a strong sense of personal voice, which in both cases is highly ambiguous. They 
have a forthright address that is assertive and self deprecating, a tone that is acutely felt 
and intellectualised, an expressive quality that is at once rich and austere. Zurbarán is 
viewed by art history as, on the one hand, ‘one of the three greatest masters of 
seventeenth-century Spanish painting’ and, on the other, belonging to a ‘lower class’.  37
Sontag is viewed as ‘a popularist and obscurantist’ in the same breath.  She is in turns 38
lauded by some and criticised by others for being: a sensualist, a formalist, an anti-
aestheticist, an artist critic, a publicist. Her contributions have been aligned at once with 
the Frankfurt School, ‘The new Sensibility’, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Oscar Wilde, 
 Baticle, Zurbarán, p. xiii and John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, Vol. 2, (Salt Lake City, UT.:The 37
Project Gutenberg ebook, 2009), p. 188 <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/30755/30755-h/30755-h.htm> 
[accessed 6 October 2013].
 Phillip Lopate, Notes on Sontag (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 18.38
!79
Roland Barthes, Mary McCarthy and Clement Greenberg.  Her characterisation of the 39
relationship between form and content has been accused at once of being ‘sophomoric’ 
and ‘self defeating’.  Such variation in her reception has contributed to the erratic way 40
in which her work has been assimilated by art history. 
Since both Zurbarán and Sontag have been treated as to some degree outside the art-
historical canon, as I will shortly discuss, my treatment of them functions to suggest 
modes of writing and interpretation that have, and remain, similarly undervalued in art 
history because of their supposed subjectivity. In order to gauge the reasons for this, as I 
do in Section 2 with Zurbarán, I need to build up a picture of Sontag’s academic 
reception that focuses on her critical methodology. When elements of her criticism, for 
example, are repeatedly praised or dismissed, misunderstood or exaggerated, we can 
start to think in specific terms about what subjectivity in art writing and interpretation 
has to offer. What are its shortcomings and values?  
Though unfashionable, reinstalling some disciplinary boundaries reveals that despite 
being frequently included in art history textbooks, direct responses to Sontag’s oeuvre in 
the context of art history, criticism and philosophy have been largely unattributed or 
 On Sontag as a sensualist see Robert Boyers, ‘On Susan Sontag and the New Sensibility’, Salmagundi, 39
1( 3) (1966), p. 30 and Alice Kaplan, Dreaming in French (London and Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012), p. 224. On Sontag as a formalist see Thomas McEvilley, Capacity: History, the World, and 
the Self in Contemporary Art and Criticism, Roger G. Denson commentary (Amsterdam: OPA, 1996). On 
Sontag as anti-aestheticist see Michael Kelly, A Hunger for Aesthetics: Enacting the Demands of Art 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 18. For Sontag as Artist-Critic see Sohnya Sayres who 
argues that Sontag casts herself as ‘a formalist and an artist’, in ‘Susan Sontag and the Practice of 
Modernism’, p. 611. On Sontag as publicist see Irving Howe who described Sontag as a ‘brilliant 
publicist who makes brilliant quilts from Grandmother’s patches’, in ‘The New York Intellectuals’ (1990), 
p. 275 cited in James Penner, ‘Gendering Susan Sontag’s Criticism in the 1960s: The New York 
Intellectuals, the CounterCulture, and the Kulturkampf over “The New Sensibility”’, Women’s Studies, 37 
(2008), p. 926. On Sontag in relation to the Frankfurt School see Fred Rush, ‘Appreciating Susan 
Sontag’, Philosophy and Literature, 33 (2009), p. 38. On Sontag and ‘The New Sensibility’ see Penner, 
‘Gendering Susan Sontag’s Criticism’, p. 933. On Sontag in relation to Oscar Wilde see Jay Parini, 
‘Review: Reading the Readers: Barthes and Sontag’, The Hudson Review, 36 (1983), p. 415; On Sontag 
in relation to Roland Barthes see Llewellyn Negrin, ‘Art and Philosophy: Rivals or partners?’, in 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31(7) (2005), p. 818. On Sontag and Mary McCarthy see Norman 
Podhoretz who characterises Sontag as the ‘Dark Lady of American Letters, a position that had originally 
been carved out by Mary McCarthy in the thirties and forties.’, in Podhoretz, Making It (New York: 
Random House, 1967), p. 155 as cited in Penner, ‘Gendering Susan Sontag’s Criticism’, p.921. Boyers, 
though, finds the analogy between Sontag and McCarthy ‘absurd’, in Boyers, ‘On Susan Sontag and the 
New Sensibility’, p. 29. On Sontag and Clement Greenberg see McEvilley, Capacity, pp. 22–24.
 Parini, ‘Review: Reading the Readers’, p. 415 and McEvilley, Capacity, p. 34.40
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undervalued, though her influence is widely diffused.  She is accepted as setting the 41
table for the study of photography over the past thirty years, yet we should remind 
ourselves that for Sontag ‘all art aspires to the condition of photography’ and, therefore, 
much of what she says about photography applies to art more generally also.  In the 42
fields of English, Comparative Literature, French Studies and especially, in the newer 
disciplines of American Studies, Gender Studies and Women’s Studies her contribution 
has been appraised more fully.  The disciplinary imbalance of her reception is 43
regrettable because, although she was known for only rarely lingering on the 
particularities of artworks – On Photography, as Cary Nelson points out, contains very 
few images and very little discussion of specific images  – her work dwells on the 44
larger issues regarding what we do or should do with artworks; how they should be 
handled and negotiated by the critic; and the responsibility the critic has to them.   45
Sontag’s call for an ‘erotics of art’ appeared in 1967, six years earlier than Barthes’ 
discussion of ‘jouissance’ and ‘erotics of the text’ in The Pleasure of the Text (1973 and 
 Her essay ‘Against Interpretation’ for example is reproduced in Art History and its Methods: A Critical 41
Anthology (London and New York: Phaidon Press, 2006). But, on the undervaluing of Sontag, see Peggy 
Zeglin Brand and Mary Devereaux, ‘Introduction: Feminism and Aesthetics’, Hypatia, 18(4) (2003), p. 
xviii. And Boyers notes that ‘It has almost become the fashion to take swipes at [Sontag’s] critical 
strictures without ever mentioning her by name, or doing reasonable justice to her ideas’, in Boyers, ‘On 
Susan Sontag and the New Sensibility’, p. 30. 
For an art-historical account of Sontag see Jae Emerling, Photography: History and Theory (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2012); Leslie Luebbers, ‘A Way of Feeling is a Way of Seeing: Sontag and the 
Visual Arts’, in The Scandal of Susan Sontag, Barbara Ching and Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor eds. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009); McEvilley, Capacity; Kelly, A Hunger for Aesthetics; Rush, 
‘Appreciating Susan Sontag’.
 Susan Sontag, On Photography (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 149. This is surely a play on Walter 42
Pater’s claim that ‘All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music’, in ‘The School of 
Giorgione’, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
p. 135. 
 See Sayres, ‘Susan Sontag and the Practice of Modernism’; Penner, ‘Gendering Susan Sontag’s 43
Criticism’; Annalisa Zox-Weaver, ‘Introduction: Susan Sontag: an Act of Self-Creation’, Women’s 
Studies, 37 (2008); Angela McRobbie, ‘The Modernist Style of Susan Sontag’, Feminist Review, 38 
(1991); G. F. Mitrano, ‘Sontag and the Europeans 1’, Women’s Studies, 37 (2008); and Kaplan, Dreaming 
in French.
 Cary Nelson, ‘Soliciting Self-Knowledge: The Rhetoric of Susan Sontag’s Criticism’, Critical Inquiry, 44
6 (1980), p. 715.
An interesting gauge of Sontag’s influence on art history is through anthologies of the discipline. Chris 45
Murray’s collection does contain an entry on Sontag. Others like Eric Fernie’s Art History and Its 
Methods (London: Phaidon Press, 1995) include a brief introduction to Sontag’s ‘Against Interpretation’ 
with little sustained analysis. But her writing does not appear in either Robert S. Nelson and Richard 
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1975 in English translation). Given the deeply embodied perspective implied by the 
term ‘erotics’, which taps into a current of recent scholarship that advocates a model of 
embodied study and to which I shall return, it is a wonder that art historians have not 
made more use of Sontag and her approach to interpretation. 
There are various reasons why her body of work may not have been given due scholarly 
consideration by art historians. Sontag was a thoroughly interdisciplinary and 
historically wide-ranging reader, viewer, thinker and writer. Her intellectual reach 
should be considered intrinsic to her oeuvre, but it has often been mistaken for, at best, 
rhetoric, at worst, wilful obscurantism and exhibitionism.  Furthermore, her life acts as 46
an abiding framework on which her writing is permanently hung.  Her biography, for 47
example, looms large over Ching and Wagner-Lawlor’s 2009 collection which is 
teeming with references to her personhood and personal life: her magnetism, 
haughtiness, family life, celebrity, friends, lovers, predilections and illnesses.  
In a thesis that explores the role of subjectivity in art history, one might wonder what 
the problem is here. She is the author of her work and therefore who she is must be as 
important as what she writes. But the subject of this thesis is the nature of a subject 
looking, thinking and writing about works of art rather than confessional subjectivities, 
as my chapter 1 made plain. My interest lies less in what feelings, tastes and opinions 
are generated by an encounter with artwork, and more on how those responses are 
manifested through writing; in where else those responses lead us; in the alteration that 
takes place during the reception and transmission of images, sensory stimuli, ideas and 
words. The study of the role of subjectivity is not borne of a researcher’s need to make 
sense of or justify her personal choices. Of greater interest is the subtle omnipresence of 
a subject that weaves its way through viewing and writing, that oscillates between 
 Nelson, ‘Soliciting Self-Knowledge’, p. 720; Parini, ‘Review: Reading the Readers’, pp. 415–416.46
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of an Icon (New York: W. W. Nortion Press, 2000); Ching and Wagner-Lawlor, The Scandal of Susan 
Sontag (2009); Sigrid Nunez, Sempre Susan: A Memoir of Susan Sontag (London: Atlas, 2011). 
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conscious deployment and unconscious unraveling, between selflessness and self-
exploration or even self-fulfilment, between rhetoric and intrinsic compulsion.   48
Section 3.1: Sontag’s Formalism and Sensualism 
It is revealing from the start that few scholars take seriously the philosophical 
implications of Sontag’s art criticism.  Such scholarship that does exist centres on her 49
perceived formalism and sensualism. Her formalism is the source of intense frustration 
for Thomas McEvilley who concentrates, almost entirely, on the distinction he takes her 
to be making between form and content where content is ‘absorbed’ by the sensuous 
aspects of form. For McEvilley, Sontag’s solution to absorb content into form is ‘self-
defeating’ because ‘form can only exist as the form of a content, and content as the 
content of a form. The terms are distinguishable, though logically dependent on one 
another’. McEvilley’s conception of formalism is crucial to his argument wherein form 
is characterised as sensory, aesthetic, optical (disembodied) and autonomous; content as 
conceptual, analytical, non-optical (embodied) and worldly. He accuses Sheldon 
Nodelman, for example, of presenting ‘the birth of the art experience [as] a kind of 
virgin birth, bypassing both the body and the conceptual mind, and whispering its 
message directly into the ear of the critic’s soul, like the angel of the Annunciation’.  50
He accuses formalists (Sontag included) of ‘excluding non-optical elements from the 
work of art’, which is ‘not a real principle’. Interpretation, he insists, ‘must be 
compromised and, given the associative habit of the human mind, is always 
compromised’.   51
In an argument that follows on from McEvilley’s, Llewellyn Negrin values Sontag’s 
impact on the robust study of the onset and lingering effect of artworks, but she also 
 The distinction between subjective, auto-biographic and confessional writings is crucial and is set out 48
more fully in chapter 1.
 Kelly, A Hunger for Aesthetics; Rush, ‘Appreciating Susan Sontag’; and Negrin, ‘Art and Philosophy: 49
Rivals or partners?’.
 McEvilley, Capacity, p. 31.50
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warns that Sontag overplays the particular (sensuous experience of art) to the detriment 
of the universal (theoretical or philosophical). The charge of elitism, frequently directed 
at Barthes and Sontag, becomes the inevitable consequence as Negrin challenges 
formalists’ apparently blinkered focus on the sensuous aspects of the artwork to the 
exclusion of ‘the cultural codes presupposed in the appreciation of art’. For Negrin, they 
‘unwittingly perpetuate the maintenance of art as an exclusive preserve accessible only 
to the anointed few’ and that ‘though the sensuous elements of art are irreducible to 
philosophical concepts, neither are they totally impenetrable to interpretation’.  A 52
series of problems arise from these critiques, however, not least the way that formalism 
and sensualism are collapsed, made almost indistinguishable. 
Is the casting of Sontag as just a sensualist wholly justified? And can her writing be 
described as at once optical, disembodied and sensualist? After all she is also steadfast 
in her call for the audience’s ‘reflection’ as opposed to a solely emotional involvement. 
The two modes, reflective art (appealing to ‘feelings through the route of intelligence’) 
and emotional art (‘arousing feelings’ and ‘empathy’) are not mutually exclusive: ‘Great 
reflective art’, Sontag reminds us, ‘is not frigid’.  Her sensualist tendencies, in fact, 53
coexist with a mutually cerebral address between viewer and artwork; they are not 
defined against the universal aspects of intellectualism. Great art’s ‘emotional power is 
mediated. The pull toward emotional involvement is counterbalanced by elements of the 
work that promote distance, disinterestedness, impartiality’.  As Ching and Wagnor-54
Lawlor point out, Sontag demonstrates ‘a devotion to what she called “seriousness”, a 
quality linking the aesthetic, the ethical, and the political in an attentive person’s 
experience of the world.’  That sense of seriousness, of robustness, is an expansion of 55
the aesthetic, the embodiment or enactment of the aesthetic through and beyond the 
confines of the artwork.  It is testament to the ‘associative’ ‘worldly’ mind that 56
 Negrin, ‘Art and Philosophy: Rivals or partners?’, pp. 816 and 818.52
 Sontag, ‘Spiritual Style in the Films of Robert Bresson’, in Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 53
2001), p. 177.
 ibid., p. 177.54
 Ching and Wagner-Lawlor, The Scandal of Susan Sontag, p. 2.55
 I see subjectivity as functioning in a similarly concertina-like unfolding through and beyond the 56
artwork.
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McEvilley accused Sontag of lacking because of her formalist approach. It reveals 
instead her radical take on formalism, one that might be better termed 
phenomenological formalism or embodied formalism. 
     
In fact, the overtly bodily nature of Sontag’s criticism appears to be a key factor in the 
derailment of a thorough consideration of her impact on the art-historical and 
philosophical stage. Her sensory leanings manifest themselves in suspiciously 
incoherent argument causing many to bypass the work, if not the figure, of Sontag 
altogether. Justifying her place in the academic canon seems to require a defence of the 
centrality of the body and her critical self in her writing practice. We have seen how for 
McEvilley it amounts to a misdirected transcendental ‘extreme’ formalism.  While 57
Negrin considers that same materialist reading of art not in opposition to philosophical 
thinking but inextricably linked with it.  
Fred Rush gets further into the need for Sontag’s proposed ‘erotics of art’. He sees these 
erotics neither simply in opposition, nor inextricably linked but as in themselves 
theoretical. For him, Sontag’s conception of the ‘colonization of aesthetic and critical 
response by what she terms “theory”’ is key. He reminds us that ‘critical response is 
always, to some degree theoretical’ but it is the fundamentally sensuous nature of 
Sontag’s ‘erotics’ that is noteworthy, ‘After all an erotics was in the ancient world a 
genre of theoretical investigation, not erotic experience or even erotica.’  Rush does 58
not linger on this point, but it serves as further corroboration of Ching and Wagnor-
Lawlor’s point that Sontag’s conception of sensuality, of the erotics of art, is not only 
visceral or sexual but also and importantly cerebral. That is, feelings are felt but they are 
also dwelled on in thought and in writing, and within that loaded space of lingering 
feeling and robust thought, serious critical value accrues. Sohyna Sayres is at pains to 
point out that Sontag only used the precise phrase ‘an erotics’ once, and that it has been 
the cause of much ‘misreading’ of her work. Whether or not Sontag stuck with that 
 McEvilley, Capacity, p. 32.57
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particular provocative term is not really the point though. The spirit of the phrase 
undoubtedly underlies her general approach which is premised on, as Sayres puts it: ‘a 
kind of method’. ‘It means,’ Sayres continues, ‘being first inside the force of a work of 
art, seduced by, allowing it its power. Then, in its sway, the critic explains “that it is 
what it is”’.   59
Section 3.2: Making sense of Sontag 
A further stumbling block occurs in what is frequently deemed to be Sontag’s 
inconsistency and incoherence. Rush is compelled to trace three of her key essays in an 
attempt to render her argument clearer and more useful. However, following his 
examination, he concludes that her work remains fixed in its incoherence ‘if the 
criterion for coherence is the removal of the tension’. Those lingering tensions are 
between aesthetic ‘simplicity and reflexivity’, between ‘formalism and more engaged 
criticism’.  His final remarks about Sontag’s contribution are insipid, and rather undo 60
the valuable work he has, up to this point, drawn out. He writes: ‘her treatment of these 
issues is a vivid example of an agile literary mind attempting to come to grips with the 
marginalization of aesthetic value in modernity’. The unexpected sense of deflation 
conveyed by Rush’s final sentence is revealing. Up to this point, he has been at pains to 
illustrate the various ways in which ‘attempting to come to grips’ is not what Sontag 
does and in fact outright resists. Such a proposition would be far too domineering, too 
‘heroic’, to borrow Rush’s own phrase. He identifies Sontag’s resistance to making:  
 Sayres quotes this phrase as being ‘an erotics of criticism’ though in Sontag’s essay it appears as ‘an 59
erotics of art’. I have not yet ascertained whether or not ‘erotics of criticism’ appears in other instances of 
Sontag’s writing or whether Sayres has just accepted that for Sontag the distinction between art and 
criticism is so blurred that the distinction seems inconsequential. Sohnya Sayres, Susan Sontag: The 
Elegiac Modernist (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 20–21.
 Rush, ‘Appreciating Susan Sontag’, p. 48. Again, we see Sontag’s criticism tarnished by its formalist 60
label, in which formalism is considered less engaged that other forms of interpretation.
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The connection between understanding a thing and already 
understanding (other) things [which] requires tracking similarities 
between the two relevant domains: the understood and the to-be-
understood. The idea seems to be that the past leverages the 
present in such a way that what is idiosyncratic about the object as 
the object it is – its singularity or uniqueness – is submerged in favor 
of its belonging to a more or less undisturbed, presumed set of 
concepts, dispositions, or beliefs.  61
The tone of Rush’s sentence is revealing of a debilitating pressure to arrive at, or at least 
close to, a sense of resolution. It is a tendency that instead inhibits the kinds of 
questions we allow ourselves to ask of our subjects.   62
Making sense of Sontag’s writing appears to impede her assimilation in art-historical, 
critical and philosophical discourse too, which focuses on her assumed binaries between 
art and the world, form and content, aesthetic and non-aesthetic, artist and viewer. 
However, her immersion in the materiality and self-reflexivity of art is played out 
through her immersion within her own thought and writing. The two time frames: 
during and after; the two critical modes: experiencing and reflecting; the two modes of 
consciousness: being and responding to art, for Sontag, are inseparable. She seeks to 
retain an entanglement of interrelations and intersubjectivities that are at the heart of art 
viewing and criticism. In his attempts to clarify her early essays Rush discovers that she 
is consistent in her incoherence alone. Perhaps she realises that coherence is only ever 
hallucinatory, like the orderly image of four unremarkable vessels in a row, enlightened 
and on display, for nobody in particular. Art, criticism, history, life are not puzzles; they 
are never complete and any sense of resolution or truth is only ever a figment, a 
hallucination.  
Robert Boyers picks up on the importance of Sontag’s retaining ‘the sense of 
variousness and fragmentation which is inherent in her subject.’ He notes early on that 
‘understanding is achieved through immersion in the raw phenomena, carefully 
 Rush, ‘Appreciating Susan Sontag’, p. 38.61
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described, only tentatively categorized’.  It is crucial, then, that her writing should 63
encapsulate, indeed enact, the complexity, multiplicity, mutability and sometimes 
fragility of the intellectual and experiential self. Complete disentanglement or 
conclusion could lead only to an oversimplification at odds with the necessarily 
interconnected, overlapping, difficulty that an exacting critical process demands.  
Rush’s distillation of the essence of Sontag’s dispute with interpretation – that most 
elusive term and process – is a positive force for re-conceiving her contribution in more 
nuanced terms. His reading reveals that her primary objection in ‘Against Interpretation’ 
is less broad and polemical than at first appears. He identifies two aspects of her 
concern with critical accounts of art: A systematicity which he relates to criticism that 
tends towards ‘exclusion and reduction, destroying the particularity of individual 
works’; and ‘modes of interpretation that undercut the aesthetic nature of works’ by 
means of reducing the meaning of artworks to ‘determinative’ factors.  Rush points out 64
that hermeneutic interpretation, which Sontag sees as debasing through translation of 
the original art form, is a straw man. Though she suggests varieties of guilty 
hermeneutic approaches – psychoanalytic, historicist, Freudian, Marxist, Symbolic – 
such methodologies are forgiven in figures like Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. 
Her fight, he concludes, is not necessarily with particular methodological approaches to 
the arts per se but with interpretations that are ‘determinative’, that claim to explain 
away the structural aesthetic value of art.   65
Section 3.3: Sontag’s Aesthetic Hunger 
Sontag’s conception of art and interpretation, then, pivots on its indeterminacy and 
interconnectedness. But what of her conception of aesthetics per se? In Enacting the 
Demands of Art (2012), Michael Kelly contests the formalist, sensualist or aestheticist 
characterisation of Sontag’s commentary in the hands of people like Negrin and 
McEvilley, identifying instead an ‘anti-aesthetic’ slant on the basis of Sontag’s claim 
 Boyers, ‘On Susan Sontag and the New Sensibility’, p. 27.63
 Rush, ‘Appreciating Susan Sontag’, p. 37.64
 Mieke Bal coined the phrase ‘the narrative of anteriority’ which relates to interpreting works of art only 65
in relation to their makers, their original social, political or historic context or their iconography. See 
Louise Bourgeois’s Spider, p. 32.
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that: ‘To avoid interpretation, art may become parody. Or it may become abstract. Or it 
may become (“merely”) decorative. Or it may become non-art’.  For Sontag in the 66
1960s art cannot be grasped by the intellect; art critics should not be on the hunt for 
meaning in art. And if its raison d’être is to remain ungraspable, then art has, according 
to Kelly, been rendered powerless. It is the implied impotence of the aesthetic to effect 
any action in the world that Kelly rebuts as unsustainable. His use to our discussion here 
is limited by his referring almost exclusively to Sontag’s study of the representation of 
violence in photography. Art that depicts war, aggression and violence is clearly more 
likely to draw out moral and political engagement though Kelly does not fully test his 
argument since he does not address Sontag’s writing about art that is not explicitly 
socially or historically engaged or engaging. But in focusing on the representation of 
violence Kelly is able to identify Sontag as playing a major role in the ‘regeneration’ of 
a ‘recalibrated’ aesthetics in art criticism, theory and history.  In Regarding the Pain of 67
Others (2003), he argues, she repudiates her earlier anti-aesthetic, iconoclastic claim 
that photography cannot confer moral-political critique, in favour of a critique that 
inculcates a moral-political position in the art and the viewer via the medium of the 
aesthetic. Now Kelly’s reading of Sontag hinges on the power of photography as a 
duplication of and distance from reality. Like a hallucination, it is a ‘semblance’ that 
‘opens up new experiences, moral-political critique, new social commitments, and even 
knowledge’.  It is worth pausing here since we have come back round to the idea of 68
interpretation turning, at once, on non-reality as well as promising ‘new experiences’ 
and ‘even new knowledge’, further corroboration, therefore, of my framing of this 
thesis, as I did in chapter 1, as a form of practice as research. I should underline also 
that these new knowledges are made available to be potentially acted upon via the 
materiality of the artwork, its aesthetics. It chimes with my broader premise for the 
potential of art writing to guide art-historical inquiry as an indeterminate and inherently 
associative practice. 
 Sontag, ‘Against Interpretation’, p. 10 my emphasis. 66
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Crucial to Kelly’s reading of Sontag is his bringing into play John Dewey’s notion that 
art is apprehended through its sensuous aspects. In Kelly’s précis: ‘art as enactment 
combines the moral-political demand for the apprehension of our needs by others with 
the moral-political demand for the recognition and satisfaction of these needs by 
others.’  Art is powerful once it fulfils these criteria by means of its aesthetics. It is 69
driven by a need, which Dewey equates to hunger: ‘A painting satisfies because it meets 
the hunger for scenes having color and light more fully than most of the things with 
which we are ordinarily surrounded’.  When a need is not met ‘it denotes at least a 70
temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings’ and art that is successful 
must rectify that, to provide for us by recourse to aesthetics.  But whereas Dewey 71
conceives of the unbalance relayed by art as temporary and in need of resolution, 
Sontag is less concerned with shoring things up, since unbalance for her ‘may not be a 
lie’.  72
  
A problem emerges with Kelly’s reading of Sontag through the filter of Dewey, though: 
art is only effective, only has value, if it satiates our aesthetic hunger. This idea stems 
from the strong Darwinian influence of Dewey’s early thought.  Dewey’s deep-seated 73
interest in evolutionary theory leads him to conceptualise human needs, knowledge and 
morality as imperatives for survival. According to his adoption of the cyclical character 
of the Darwinian evolutionary paradigm, art is deemed to be ‘the culmination of 
nature’.  Therefore we might be hungry for an aesthetic effect and satiated by a 74
particular experience of art. It is essentially systemic, and yet Rush has already shown 
the degree to which Sontag resists systematicity in her writing.  What is more, such a 75
model for critical engagement suggests that art can provide a sense of resolution for us, 
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it can, and if it is good should, wholly satisfy us. It is this promise of and desire for 
possible closure that, like the determinant interpretations of the still life that we have 
thus far come across, limit interpretations rather than expand them, foreclosing 
experiences of art rather than allowing them to unfurl. To put it another way, they 
conceive of art viewers as operating within the physical and conceptual boundaries of 
their bodies and minds with fixed capacities, like Zurbarán’s vessels waiting to be filled. 
The danger, however, is that if our aesthetic hunger is fully satisfied by a piece of art, 
we will no longer need or even want it any more. So what next? 
Section 4: When Sontag meets Four Vessels  
The practical implication of Sontag’s ideas can only come to the fore if we include her 
directly in an imagined conversation about Four Vessels, which hypothetical encounter 
also bears on the larger questions about subjectivity that this thesis addresses. This will 
involve looking at Sontag both within and beyond her extant oeuvre by weaving 
together elements of her commentary on film, photography, dance and painting, and a 
speculative commentary on Zurbarán’s painting. But what is the impact of thinking 
about Zurbarán’s still life at a remove from the painting and its historical context, 
filtered through Sontag’s writing? Will we arrive, paradoxically, at a closer 
understanding of the material mechanics and the emotional effect of the painting? Or 
will the distance realised by the secondary mediatory figure lead to misrepresentation? 
Could such an event ever be construed as desirable, or at least not disastrous?  
There are a series of themes to which Sontag returns in her criticism including 
surrealism, photography, spiritualism, the form of the artwork and its address to the 
viewer, and the presence or absence of a psychological narrative. My discussion of 
these themes draws out repeated points of contact with three elements that this chapter 
has held in the balance: Four Vessels, Susan Sontag’s writing, and the roles of 
interpretation, association and subjectivity.  
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Section 4.1: ‘The truth is balance, but the opposite of truth, 
which is unbalance, may not be a lie’ 
Surrealism and photography are closely entwined in Sontag’s theories of art and 
interpretation. And Zurbarán’s still life has been described, here and elsewhere, as banal 
and ethereal, simple and beguiling, natural and choreographed, real and unreal. Such 
antithetical descriptors underlie my sense of its surrealist unfolding. But Sontag’s 
commentary on photography is propelled by a tension between the dualities of the 
camera as objective recorder of data and as the subjective record of a viewpoint, 
thereby, probing the relation between fiction and the documentary, truth and 
imagination, reality and appearance.  
Unlike Surrealist painting, of which she is scathing, photography, above all other 
genres, could seize the substance at the heart of the surrealist mission most fully, partly 
because it is ‘natively surreal’. ‘Surrealism’, Sontag says, ‘lies at the very heart of the 
photographic enterprise: in the very creation of a duplicate world, of a reality in the 
second degree, narrower but more dramatic than the one perceived by natural vision’.  76
Though Zurbarán’s duplicate conforms to this sense of heightened intellectual and 
psychological drama, it is certainly not ‘a trace, something directly stenciled off the 
real, like a footprint or a death mask’, as Sontag defines the photograph, it contains 
within it the index of reality. Painting, on the other hand, is ‘an interpretation of the 
real’.  By aligning photography with reality, she positions it as a carrier of truth, while 77
painting, as an interpretation, is a step away from truth, a fiction or distortion. Need this 
mediated character be construed negatively as Sontag does when comparing the 
indexicality of photography with the symbolic nature of painting? The question brings 
us back to subjective art histories and to criticism which might risk distancing itself 
from, or wilfully obscuring the truth or reality of an artwork and its original context. 
However, as Sontag in another context tells us: ‘An idea which is a distortion may have 
a greater intellectual thrust than the truth; it may serve the needs of the spirit, which 
 For Sontag surrealist paintings are ‘sleekly calculated, complacently well made, undialectical’, On 76
Photography, pp. 51–52. Kelly makes interesting use of Sontag’s discussion of the dialectics at the heart 
of photography and Theodor Adorno’s notion of semblance, Kelly, A Hunger for Aesthetics, pp. 59–65.
 Sontag, On Photography, p. 156.77
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vary.  The truth is balance, but the opposite of truth, which is unbalance, may not be a 
lie.’  78
Zurbarán’s inconsistent representation of shadows offers an interesting point of 
convergence given how closely enmeshed shadows are with the history of surrealism 
and photography. As I explored in the first section of this chapter, shadows are not 
where they should be in this painting. Shadow should be cast, for example, where the 
central white vase interrupts the light rays as they strike the neighbouring orange vase. 
But it is not. Shadows are thrown below and between the pots not on or behind them. 
They at once link the pots, like shadow-bunting, and separate them so that the glow of 
each vessel is alienated and disconnected. Like subtle connections these shadows guide 
the eye but stop, abruptly, just short of the outline of the next pot; they create at once 
unity and detachment, flow and staccato, depth and flatness, substance and suggestion. 
The balance of the near-symmetrical composition is also breached by the interjection of 
a small section of shadow at the left hand, rear corner of the wooden shelf, next to the 
goblet. What object draws this shadow is unclear but together with the strong cast light, 
it is evidence of a referent outside of the image, perhaps nodding towards the row of 
vessels continuing beyond the frame. It also unfixes the viewer from what might 
initially appear to be a centred unitary position. The painting, then, is not entirely static 
nor hermetically sealed – which for Sontag represented a major drawback of the 
medium – but suggests the existence of a world beyond itself. Similarly the surreality of 
a photograph is premised on our knowledge that it represents a momentary fragment of 
a world, on its incompletion and interjection into and suspension of sequential time. 
The simultaneous attachment and detachment made available through Four Vessels 
brings me back to two analogies I made earlier. One of my ‘stray associations’ was 
between Zurbarán’s painting and the self-proclaimed ‘metaphysical’ paintings by de 
Chirico. The metaphysical aspects of de Chirico’s work also loops back to the surrealist 
compulsion to juxtapose through light and shadow, through texture, colour and trans-
 Sontag, ‘Simone Weil’, p. 50.78
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temporal, trans-cultural, trans-geographical objects.  In The Uncertainty of the Poet 79
(Tate, London, 1913), for example, a high-brow classical Greek sculpture meets a bunch 
of (non-European) bright yellow bananas before a post-industrial steam train racing 
away in the background. Further manifestations of the surreal occur, as discussed, 
through the estranging omission of shadows and when, in introducing Sontag into the 
discussion, I noted that the still life had a photographic quality that I hypothesised might 
have appealed to the critic.  
But the theme of surreality is also raised, from a different angle, by Robert Havard in 
relation to Zurbarán, whose work he contextualises within the Spanish Golden Age of 
art and literature. For Havard the surreal reality of Zurbarán’s work most encapsulates 
what he considers its essential Spanishness where ‘naturalism and mysticism hold joint 
sovereignty, lucidity generating an exact representation of the humblest objects, 
otherworldliness (‘fuga’: flight) rendering them sublime and forlorn’.  The word 80
‘forlorn’ is key here because it links also to the ‘irrefutable pathos’ which according to 
Sontag is a central characteristic of surrealist photography. For Sontag, on mid-
nineteenth century photography, that melancholy (‘Melancholy Objects’ is the name of 
her chapter on surrealism) hails through its ‘message from time past’; for Havard it is 
wholly ‘rooted in the aestheticism of counter-reformation Spain’. He goes beyond 
Brown’s claim that Zurbarán ‘heightens and then transforms the real into the super-real, 
thus expressing the dual nature of Christ’.  In Havard’s estimation ‘the cultivation of 81
this dualism [between the real and the super-real] as an artistic praxis owed much to the 
Jesuits, those influential patrons of art whose founder, St Ignatius Loyola, insisted in his 
spiritual exercise on the contemplation of real things - the nails, wood, thorns, spear and 
vinegar of Christ’s passion, for example - as a springboard to the divine’.  Havard’s 82
recourse to the theme of surreality is identified as historically founded.  
 Of Zurbarán’s still lifes Gállego has also pointed out that, ‘Their isolation, their lack of atmosphere and 79
the most obsessive swelling of their convex curves give them a wholly modern appeal, the appeal of 
surrealist, magic-realist, and Hyper-realist objects divorces from their context in a deliberate abnormality, 
which is, as we know one of the ways Surrealists attempt to surprise a new reality’, Francisco de 
Zurbarán, p. 50. 
 Havard, The Spanish Eye, p xiii.80
 ibid., p xiii.81
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I should point out that my references to the surreal are brought out through the 
materiality of the still life, rather than its history. Neither Havard’s nor Brown’s reading 
act as confirmation of the paintings’ surreality but they corroborate my initial sense that 
it might be read as such. This repeated eliciting of Four Vessels’ surreality is a key 
demonstration of intersubjective triangulation at work.  John Dewey’s notion of the 83
idiomatic use of the term ‘relation’ serves to further establish the purpose and impact of 
Havard’s observations to this thesis. I might say that Havard is ‘related’ to my project; 
his presence, ‘fixes attention upon the way things bear upon one another, their clashes 
and unitings, the way they fulfil and frustrate, promote and retard, excite and inhibit one 
another’.  The surreal overtones of the painting, that Havard stresses, appear to me, 84
however, limiting, inhibiting. It actually halts the painting’s surreality by fixing it so 
definitely, so seemingly pragmatically, to a specific and identifiable external reference.  
  
Section 4.2: ‘Expounded’ 
What else might Sontag make of Four Vessels’ straightforward structure: six pots 
displayed in a row? Her commentary on the twelve defined episodes of Vivre Sa Vie 
(1962) might come in useful. To borrow Sontag’s phrase, Zurbarán has not shown why 
these pots are placed together in this austere formation ‘he has, rather, expounded on it’. 
Unlike comparable still lifes taken from this period he does not shroud the message – 
(or more Sontagian) the content – of his painting in universally recognisable symbolism 
(a skull, an egg timer, etc.) or the search for a fitting narrative (as say a Vermeer 
painting has shown inexhaustibly to elicit). Rather one senses a visual and painterly 
probing of structure, contours, textures, colours, volumes and recesses. Serraller, of 
course, insists that in fact these pots do symbolise, they symbolise at once their local 
manufacturing industry and local saints. It is easy to confer on Serraller’s reading the 
authority to end the conversation about Four Vessels as if the art historian has managed 
to see through or beyond the facade of the painting, to clarify it, to break it down, as in: 
a = b + c or Four Vessels = local manufacturing + catholic saints. Yet such a reading, 
 See Donald Davidson on ‘triangulation’ discussed in chapter 1 under ‘On the Implication of Matthew 83
Rampley’s critique’.
 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Pedigree, 2005), p. 139.84
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what Sontag would term ‘translation’, also forecloses the discussion.  Rush would 85
argue with me on this point: ‘After all, translation is a subtle art that had better include 
amongst its core admissions that translation is not a univocal enterprise – i.e., one 
translation does not foreclose others and deciding which is best, at least within a scope 
of the better ones, may be impossible.’  And I would agree, translation is certainly a 86
much more open and creative process than Sontag’s characterisation would have it. But 
formulaic conclusions such as Serraller’s are mutually exclusive, that is, they render all 
other (non-historically contextualised) readings, by implication, further from the ‘truth’. 
They leave us with a feeling that they have provided all the answers we need to 
understand this image; ‘Look no further!’ they imply; the pictorial code is cracked. But 
as Sontag shows, readings that emerge through the assimilation of artworks via 
experience, thought, and writing provide unforeseen intellectual fodder.  
Section 4.3: ‘Soul’ 
The drama that Four Vessels enacts is heightened by its internalised alienation and 
inactivity in a way analogous to Sontag’s description of Vivre Sa Vie as a probing of 
freedom and psychological interiority. ‘The soul’, she says, ‘is something to be found 
not upon but after stripping away the “inside”’.  Four Vessels shows minimal life: 87
light, inanimate objects and the mere hint of a water line. In contrast, Zurbarán’s other 
still lifes always contain something solid, something graspable: a wicker basket piled 
high with oranges or bread, a pewter plate holding plump citrons or quinces, a rose 
resting on a plate, a vase bursting with an arrangement of flowers. In Four Vessels any 
superfluous matter has been stripped away baring the figure of each vessel in its raw 
form, destined to contain only air, water or another vessel. Under the spotlight of 
Zurbarán’s Caravaggesque light essentials are exposed. The materials themselves are 
brought into question: light and dark; substance and shadow; solids, liquids and gases. 
The objects are presented in line, at the forefront of the image rendered with visible 
clarity but conceptual equivocality. They appear, through proximity and definition, 
 Rush, ‘Appreciating Susan Sontag’, pp. 39–40.85
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physically graspable and by their simple alignment, intellectually graspable.  It is a 88
simple, stripped-down choreography of simple, stripped-down objects. Sontag would 
call this effect Bressonian, when, ‘what satisfies is that the form is perfectly appropriate 
to the theme’.  It creates a feeling of rational ‘balance’, and therefore ‘truth’. But much 89
of Four Vessels’ affect is also achieved, in the manner by which Sontag describes 
Brecht’s work, ‘when the material and the form are at cross purposes [...] placing a hot 
subject in a cold frame’.  In other words when the material and the form are unstable or 90
unbalanced.  
The ‘unbalance’ – which, remember ‘may not be a lie’ – in Four Vessels is crucial, 
reeling us in and manifesting in a number of ways.  Zurbarán heightens our experience 91
of the humble elements by contrasting their modesty with dramatic lighting. His precise 
alignment of objects is awkward and unnatural, pointing to a systemising thought 
process, objects on display or under study. The character and angle of Zurbarán’s light 
contributes to the sense of his expounding on and challenging of these pots. They are in 
the spotlight, examined, tested, probed. Yet the warm yellow of the light as it strikes 
each object draw out a softer edge, as do the gentle curvatures of the objects and the 
pots’ warm mid-range colour tones. Each object taken in isolation is reserved but 
intrinsically easy and inviting. In combination, though, their presentation to the world 
outside the painting is stilted and off-balance. The idea they present is a subtle 
‘distortion’ whose effect challenges rather than soothes.  
Section 4.4: ‘How it is what it is, even that it is what it is’ 
To double back to Vivre Sa Vie, Sontag concludes that it is an illustration of a ‘radical 
spiritual doctrine’ which transposes ‘the values of sanctity and martyrdom [...] to a 
totally secular plane’ and which presents us with ‘something akin to the mood and 
intensity of Bressonian spirituality but without Catholicism’.  So what are we to make 92
 Although, as Norman Bryson showed, the objects’ graspability and our invitation into the scene is 88
illusory see Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked, p. 74.
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of Zurbarán’s ‘spiritual doctrine’? We could compare it to Juan Sánchez Cotán (1560–
1627) who has been described as one of Zurbarán’s greatest influences. Both artists 
sometimes depict choreographed alignments of objects, mannerist lighting, simplicity of 
focus on the objects on a shallow plane with black background lending an overall effect 
of concentrated gravitas. Cotán, however, concentrates almost entirely on depicting 
food whereas Zurbarán finds intrigue in containers. We might identify a sense of 
comparative earthliness and naturalism in Zurbarán which runs counter to Cotán’s 
almost hyper-realist and dramatic concept and execution. The painterly style of each 
also reveals both affinities and differences. Cotán’s execution tends to be stylised, 
polished with stark definition and luminous colour and texture while Zurbarán has two 
distinctive painterly modes. In Still Life with Lemons his touch is crisp, smooth, his 
colour luminous, his forms tight and strongly reminiscent of Cotán; it lends a supra 
human air to the scene. Four Vessels, on the other hand, reveals a more relaxed 
execution, its brushwork is visible and looser, less ostentatious, more fallibly human. 
The line and volume of the pots is less refined, revealing imperfections, where the pots 
seem less strongly rooted on the shelf than the vessels that appear in his more honed 
paintings. Its colour palette is pared down, assertive but not flamboyant. But after all, 
we are looking here at six pots whose raison d’être is humble utility over sophisticated 
technical and aesthetic form. Sontag might be driven to praise the way in which 
Zurbarán’s form, his means of expression (through brushwork, colour and structural 
simplicity) and content all converge. Form and content become less easily detached 
when writing about artwork: ‘The function of criticism should be to show how it is what 
it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means.’   93
If we take Sontag’s point on the distinction between form and content being illusory, 
where does that claim stand in relation to Zurbarán’s pots? Sontag would argue that how 
he paints and presents these containers is far more interesting than either what these 
pots might be (whether they are locally made Seville pots or mere studies for principle 
works etc.) or what they might symbolise (purity, the specific economic conditions of 
seventeenth-century Spain, the simple nobility of true souls, Seville, St Regina and St 
Justa etc.). And to return to Sontag’s attempts to establish the spiritual character that lies 
 Sontag, ‘Against Interpretation’, p. 14.93
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through Godard’s film, this still life’s spirituality might then be described as revealing 
abstemious, devout Counter Reformation fervour. But then what? As a twenty-first 
century atheist viewer what more is there to add? Such a reading still excludes, or at 
least usurps, any other critical voice by its authoritative currency.  
Section 4.5: Learning ‘to see more, to hear more, to feel 
more’ 
In section 2, we saw Abbot note that each pot remains isolated in Four Vessels, only the 
plates physically touching other vessels.  Due to the separation enforced by the 94
idiosyncratic cast-shadows there is a sense in which each pot exists only in relation to 
the light source. They all look to the light for their sustenance: to grant them distinct 
identities through colour, volume, depth. There is an intensity to this blinkered 
relationship; the pots ignore their neighbours except when an interaction is forced by the 
weight of a goblet or vase on top of a plate. The viewer is held back from this 
communication; the vessels are all shifted at angles away from us. As Sontag would put 
it, our ‘reflection’ is invited, our ‘emotional participation [...] postponed’.  The 95
exclusivity of this directed line of communication is reminiscent of Zurbarán’s Saint 
Francis in Meditation (The National Gallery, London, 1635-39): still, solid and sombre, 
Saint Francis is illuminated by the same warm angled light, with eyes directed not 
towards us but up, to a world beyond our own.  
So Gállego was right to observe that the objects in Zurbarán’s still lifes ‘so carefully and 
austerely depicted, have the presence of living characters’, and that they reveal that 
‘being a fruit, a cup, a napkin, a plate or an earthen pot is something almost as essential 
as being a man.’  The pots are monks then? No, as Nana in Vivre Sa Vie put it: ‘A plate 96
is a plate. A man is a man. Life is...life’.  A monk is a monk. A pot is a pot. The 97
reflective attitude that Zurbarán’s painting elicits should not bring about a substitution 
of forms with meaning; the pots are still pots even when they are arranged and painted 
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in such a way as might recall other things simultaneously. Sontag’s interest lies in how 
precisely a film or artwork induces contemplation, how ‘emotional power is mediated’ 
by the artwork, where emotional or sensual involvement is neither blinding nor limiting 
nor so relative as to become inconsequential. She is also at pains to ascertain the 
peculiar character of the type of contemplation elicited.  Rather than interpret, which 98
she says ‘excavates, destroys; it digs “behind” the text, to find a sub-text,’ she intends to 
‘recover our senses. We must’, she declares, ‘learn to see more, to hear more, to feel 
more’, all of which pivots on conveying the form and structure of the film or artwork.   99
One senses a similar appeal in Four Vessels. Its modest simplicity, its terseness of 
means, its mediatory colours and rhythms, its soothing brushwork and forthright 
strength all build up a feeling of something substantial, something of universal 
significance. They are just pots, but give them time and focus. The very structure of the 
work, its form and materiality, invites us, compels us, ‘to see more, to hear more, to feel 
more’ through its holding back and lack of didactic or narrative content.  Does 100
Zurbarán’s painting enact a model of viewership that Sontag too enacts through her 
criticism? His rendering of the still life may not lead to the apprehension of a political 
idea, but rather urges us towards a way of viewing that might enlarge our capacity to be 
receptive. If we understand being receptive as a state that does not only passively absorb 
but also assimilates and re-transmits, then it becomes a faculty that is in itself valuable 
and sustaining, a yearning with moral implications.   101
But how does an artwork transmit and how do we receive its core idea(s) in the absence 
of narrative action? Sontag bestows high praise on Godard’s Vivre Sa Vie for its ability 
to make available, via its structure, the overarching idea with which it is concerned. For 
 Interestingly Sontag tells us in ‘Against Interpretation’ when writing in paradigmatic terms: ‘What we 98
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intellectually–extremely complex’, see Sontag, ‘Godard’s Vivre Sa Vie’ (2001), p. 196. In the instance of 
Zurbarán’s still life, both the intellectual and sensuous impulses come to the fore.
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her the film ‘is an exhibit, a demonstration. It shows that something happened, not why 
it happened’.  She calls this approach proving and contrasts it to analyzing. The latter 102
method would draw out the psychological drama playing out in the minds of the 
protagonists due to the unfolding events, it would be concerned with how a character 
might feel after a certain event and why. Sontag uses the character of Nana as her 
example. Nana turns to prostitution when her attempts to become an actress falter but 
Godard never portrays her character by revealing ‘her motives except at a distance, by 
inference’.  The forces of overt emotional and mental states, often deployed in film to 103
guide the viewer and make sense of narrative (‘analyzing’), are cast off by Godard in 
favour of a less didactic setting forth of events on screen. This detached and 
uncompromising presentation of events or objects (as visual events) works analogously 
to Zurbarán’s painting. He exhibits his subject matter, sets it out in an almost 
symmetrical configuration but then steps back from the objects to allow the viewer 
space and time to reflect and make connections. He offers a distillation of forms, 
detached from any naturalising, useful or directed domestic context. The result is a 
psychological drama with non-dramatic narrative consequences. This lack of direction 
demonstrates an unwillingness to show us how to look, what to look for or even why to 
look; it activates the viewer sensually, intellectually and perhaps, for Sontag or a 
seventeenth-century viewer, spiritually.  
Section 5: In Focus: Sontag’s Art Writing 
My ventriloquising of Sontag’s hypothetical response to Four Vessels has no standing, 
however, if I look only at what she says. How she writes is also what she writes and 
both what and how need to be considered in tandem. Let us not fall for the ‘illusion’ that 
form and content are separate.  Sontag herself is intrigued by the form and mechanics 104
of critical writing as a performance of ideas and of self. She is interested in its rhetoric, 
its voice, its ambiguous and unstable relation to both author and object. Her essay on 
Barthes in Where the Stress Falls (2001), is particularly insightful. She admires the 
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ways in which he merges the boundaries between writing criticism, philosophy and 
fiction. She writes:  
Barthes offers classifications to keep matters open – to reserve a 
place for the uncodified, the enchanted, the intractable, the histrionic 
[he] is drawn to hyperbole [and] enlists ideas in a drama, often a 
sensual melodrama or a faintly Gothic one. He speaks of the quiver, 
thrill, or shudder of meaning, of meanings that themselves vibrate, 
separate, that exert pressure, crack, rupture, are pulverized.  105
Similarly, Sontag contrasts Cocteau’s work, which she says is premised on a ‘total 
sensuous whole’, with Godard’s. For her the beauty of Godard’s work depends on his 
use of ‘techniques that would fragment, dissociate, alienate, break up. Example: the 
famous staccato editing (jump cuts et al.)’.  Here, she moves from whole sentences to 106
a staccato technique of her own, making the reader feel its effect, see it (in words and 
shapes on the page), hear it and imagine it in film (in our minds). It is effective, not just 
as rhetorical underpinning but as a merging of criticism with art.  
Sontag’s experimental and playful tendencies exist in the larger structure of her writing 
too, which is often highly receptive to both the form and content to which it responds. 
As Rush showed us in Section 3 of this chapter, she avoids resolutions, preserving 
instead the sense of a work-in-process, even at the expense of coherence. In some 
essays, for example, the traditional narrative arc of a critical essay – introduction, 
middle and end – dissolves. ‘Notes on Camp’ (1964) is made up of 58 ‘tentative and 
nimble’ ‘jottings’ capturing the ‘fugitive sensibility’ of camp.  In ‘A lexicon for 107
Available Light’ (1983) words and ideas are introduced and arranged A-Z, with 
explanations of varying lengths (between a single sentence to a page). In contrast, ‘The 
Aesthetics of Silence’ (1967) is dense and highly wrought. It is verbose and sometimes 
impenetrable apparently running counter to its subject matter which deals in reduction 
and nothingness, though it is also a recognition of the intimidating fullness of silence. 
Though split into twenty sections, the essay sees Sontag ensconcing herself in a word-
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heavy world of labyrinthine conceptual complexity and cross-disciplinary historical 
referencing. One senses her ambivalence as to whether her readers can keep up. 
According to Cary Nelson, the essay ‘produce[s] a kind of fractured collage, a series of 
related passes at an impossible subject’.  Her outlook appears bleak. Foretelling that 108
neither she nor her reader will reach any real enlightenment, whether objective or 
mimetic, she favours instead a rigorous obscurity built up of a series of twenty attacks 
upon, and then retreats from, her subject at different angles. The essay comes to reveal 
itself as a cubist collage comprising elements of generally recognisable motifs, 
references and ideas configured in such a way as to make its audience sweat. It is 
another example of Sontag’s low regard for writing as a medium which communicates 
lucid thought, lucid thought being in her view a debasement and oversimplification of 
thought. It is as if less ordered content and structure, sometimes described as her 
incoherence, is in fact integral to her meaning. While her writing is sometimes accused 
of being contrived, it actually attempts to retain the reality of the critical process as 
something spontaneous, present and interconnected, and which also has to navigate the 
restlessness of the internal rhetorical voice. Her writing thus has an unfixed integrity 
more attuned to the practice and experience of art. It does not draw to a close after the 
experience is over but is in a state of constant becoming. It functions as a 
phenomenological enactment of the physical and intellectual encounter with art and 
ideas. 
The convergence of art writing with art recalls a sentence I wrote in section 1 of this 
chapter where I found myself think-walking towards, in and around the still life. Long 
before I had any idea that Sontag might play a part in this chapter, I wrote: ‘Here. Are. 
Some. Pots.’  The phrasing was spontaneous but one which I later mulled over and 109
came close to deleting for fear that it sounded too self-conscious. Yet, as I re-read it the 
staccato rhythm of the phrasing felt right. It was something about the brevity of these 
four words and their sheer ordinariness. Even their visual appearance on the page, 
separated by four dark circles, like adjacent cast shadows, felt fitting. Was their power 
for me located simply in the echoing of the rhythm, form and presentation of the pots 
 Nelson, ‘Soliciting Self-Knowledge’, pp. 723–724.108
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themselves? The pots are separated by dark recesses, space and shadows; the words 
hang on the page, detached from each other against a white background, and further 
severed by the finality of four full stops. The painting does not suggest the usual 
characteristics of a kitchen shelf which should surely be a cobbling together of 
frequently used, washed, moved and replaced receptacles. Similarly my phrase is not 
merely a vehicle for art-historical information. It was an awkward phrase to physically 
type as well as read. Its jarring staccato disrupts, and runs counter, to the oft-desirable 
sentence flow.  
It recalls Sontag at the end of ‘Where the Stress Falls’ (2001):  
Nothing new except language, the ever found. Cauterizing the 
torment of personal relations with hot lexical choices, jumpy 
punctuation, mercurial sentence rhythms. Devising more subtle, 
more engorged ways of knowing, of sympathizing, of keeping at bay. 
It’s a matter of adjectives. It’s where the stress falls.   110
This was written in response to a passage in Elizabeth Hardwick’s Sleepless Nights 
(1979) in which the narrator reflects, as Hardwick puts it, on ‘The torment of personal 
relations. Nothing new there except in the disguise, and in the escape on the wings of 
adjectives. Sweet to be pierced by daggers at the end of paragraphs’.  Sontag’s 111
mirroring of phrases and sentence structures rings out as a courtship with the text, not a 
momentary encounter but the long drawn out process of being with a text. Her 
description and enactment of the process of writing and responding is at once sensual 
and intellectual. It is visceral, with sexual overtones (‘cauterizing’ and ‘engorged ways 
of knowing’). But it is also matter-of-fact and detached (‘devising’, ‘keeping at bay’, 
‘It’s a matter of adjectives’). The two modes, the sensorial and the intellectual, are 
neither conceived nor should be received as separate.  
The process of critical writing becomes an investigation into ‘devising more subtle, 
more engorged ways of knowing’ and feeling one’s way around an encounter. This 
sounds remarkably close to Elkins’s description of the function of practice-led PhDs, 
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2001), p. 29. 
 Sontag quoting Hardwick in ‘Where the Stress Falls’, p. 28.111
!104
discussed in chapter 1: ‘theorizing about research and the production of new 
knowledge’.  For Sontag, her coining of ‘more subtle’ modes of knowledge-making 112
often result in what Didi-Huberman would call ‘not-knowledge’.  They are swollen by 113
the emotional and intellectual subjectivity of their author; they are modes of knowledge 
that accrue through responses both to artworks and to one’s own writing about artworks. 
They are therefore distortions, but distortions, Sontag tells us, ‘may have a greater 
intellectual thrust than the truth’.  They are an expansion, an important complication 114
of a truth, caught in a state of unstable immanence. 
Subtle distortion leads to silent estrangement in both Zurbarán and Sontag’s work. 
Sontag sways between absorption and rejection of her subject matter, between a staging 
of and resistance to her writing and thinking self. Recall her reverie, ambiguously tinged 
with melancholy, that the new myth of art longs for ‘the cloud of unknowingness 
beyond knowledge and for the silence beyond speech [tending towards an] elimination 
of ‘the subject’ (the ‘object’, the ‘image’) [...] and the pursuit of silence’.  Then behold 115
once again Zurbarán’s row of ordinary vessels, mounted as physically, emotionally and 
intellectually at once close and distant, graspable but ineffable. Despite his naturalistic 
handling of the still life it is, as section 3 discusses, closer to a photographic 
hallucination than a mimetic representation. The pots say and do nothing; attempts to 
animate them directly through symbolic, connoisseurial, marxist or historicist reasoning 
turned out to be fallible.  
But what has become of interpretation in all this? Conceived as a meditation, the 
chapter bears witness to a probing of the ineffable aspects of experiencing, responding 
to, writing and thinking on, towards and around art and words. Rather than master the 
image by interpretation, it has instead sought, as Tom McCarthy would put it, ‘to help 
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attune’ one’s senses to the painting and the hypothetical encounter between the painting 
and Sontag. It puts subjectivity and association into art-historical practice as a method 
which takes seriously the facts of feeling in the process of enquiry. It contends that 
attuning ourselves to how we think and write art-historically, while thinking and writing 
art-historically, matters. Like McCarthy, it reveals no ‘hidden and decisive message’ and 
seeks no conclusion.  Instead it broaches a series of questions continued in the 116
following chapters also. What happens when we characterise interpretation – 
encompassing viewing, writing and thinking – as both a practice and performance? 
What happens when we sense resonances between artworks across historical 
boundaries? Or between media – between a text and a body of paintings – that on paper 
appear remote, but that through a sustained encounter appear to converge, as chapter 2 
now explores. 
 McCarthy, Transmission and the Individual Remix, E book.116
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Chapter 3 
Time and Confluence:  
Passing between Peter Doig and Walter Pater 
Water is the element of connection.  1
Tania Kovats 
 Tania Kovats, Drawing Water: Drawing as a Mechanism for Exploration (Edinburgh: The Fruitmarket 1
Gallery, 2014), p. 12.
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A red boat, put one way 
A red boat, the pulsing heart of Peter Doig’s Figures in Red Boat (Private Collection, 
New York, 2005–7) (fig. 6) is compressed and elongated, like two cupped hands 
conjoining to form a floating container, a mind’s eye, an eye’s mind. Its rim, engorged, 
is drenched in scarlet that speeds, headlong blood-line, to the vessel’s surface. On 
reaching full capacity its redness is disgorged, spilled from the bucket that has reached 
its limit, and merged with the liquid wash that keeps the vessel afloat. Buoyed, its 
surface skin erupts in rows of molten streaks and spray.   2
The hessian hue of the work’s base layer is, however, never far away. It pushes through 
the layers of subsequent paint intermittently, dissolving the clarity and vividness of 
colour, knocking it back. Various shades of midnight, sky, and air-force blues, of mauve 
and heather merge. The modulation between each shade, or their application on the 
canvas, bears little correspondence to the subject of the painting, whether land or water. 
At times expanses that we read to be water are rubbed, dryly, more akin to a desiccated 
weathered wall. At others they are a wash of drips. The lower third, below the boat, lets 
rip a motley of seeping waves in salmon, setting plaster, rose pink, lava red, sky and 
cerulean blue which appear to run down the canvas. Paint is caught between flow and 
stasis, then, like the boat itself, which is a vessel intended for movement but which, 
here, lies adrift. It is a reminder that this is just a painting made from viscous and semi-
viscous liquid on a semi-absorbent solid. 
As my eye is caught for a moment, itself adrift, the imaginary intermittent lick of calm 
water against the boat’s bruised underside comes to the fore, faintly sucking and 
slapping a-rhythmically against its slender bilge, offering an imaginary soundtrack to 
the inconclusive scene. The lapping melds into the sound of a loaded paint brush as it is 
unburdened against the linen canvas stretched taut, resounding as each daub slops and 
thrums as the wet kiss of paint couples and uncouples with the weave’s rough skin. 
 My deliberate inclusion of mixed metaphors demonstrates the emergence of thinking and the non-2
methodological, non-systematic attempts to capture thought in the act.
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Surfacing. An archipelago of faceless, gestureless, speechless white-shirted, figures 
without mouths and only dents for eyes release a silent scream. Each figure is pictured 
as if contained within an invisible blot, circumnavigated by a chasm of colour and shape 
that separates the you from the me and the him from the him (they are hes aren’t they?). 
Communication between these islands is arrested, or at least complicated, by their 
introversion, by their indeterminate masks. These are like words unhitched from 
syntactical or narrative expectations, whose straying floats purposelessly in the midst of 
a subject, of a space, of a painting, say:  
 as if      
 like       
 like this          
 like these then                  
 and them 
Like these (non-) sentences, Doig’s figures resemble words unfinished, that are wanting 
in crucial elements – eyes or mouth, letters, punctuation or action – and without which 
their arrangement appears to have gone astray. 
In the absence of a more explicit narrative, the soundtrack of the application of paint 
reemerges. This time, rather than the viscosity of the central red slit, its sound is 
ethereal. It is equivalent to the uncertainty of a wash, a sigh, uneven in spread, the way 
that breath condenses against a cold window, on the brink of a gas, now liquid, but only 
just. It is followed by a sluicing, pictured in the wave-like formations that slide down 
the painting’s uppermost edge. But rather than adding to the image, this gushing from 
on high lays bare the canvas, risking its effacement, mirroring the figures’ own 
defacement. It is a tease, Doig doing by undoing, undoing by doing, Doig; the action of 
attempted or potential erasure embodies the volatility of the image, this image, any 
image. 
Text like this finds itself adrift in a space that spreads across a sheet of paper, untied 
from a temporally grounding context, without the familiarity of a beginning, middle and 
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end or a fore, middle and background. Much in the way that Doig’s scene is tilted, 
stretched length ways, the roseate reflection of the boat and its figures, elongated; it 
causes all sense of depth to spill over and out and down. Unlike Zurbarán’s vessels 
which are set upon a definite stage (a table or shelf) Doig’s vessel is set upon an 
expanse of water (a lake, sea or lagoon). The boat melts as if liquefying under the force 
of its appearance on a surface, in paint. In the way that as a warm gas, like an idea or 
memory, hits a cold surface, or the weave of a canvas or the dried pulp of a page, it 
condenses momentarily and then runs.  
Doig’s lace-like shoreline, outlined roughly in white, fails to firm things up. 
Conventional foreground detail is all but absent. In its place is a wash, unbalanced by 
the more detailed delineation of fractured palms that peep out from the blue-grey 
curtain: a coquettish leg here, a flaccid arm there, a slender trunk just discernible. Or a 
quasi description of a red boat here, an imaginative expansion of it there, an analogy 
between it and some other vessel there.  
Like this… Like these 
Already a certain type of language, and – to return to Michael Oakeshott, who appeared 
in my chapter 1 – ‘poetic imagining’ has emerged from this acquaintance with Figures 
in Red Boat (fig. 6).  Not only have these words addressed its look and sound, the 3
painting has also come to elicit ‘a tactile mode of description’, as Shiff had it of 
Cézanne.  These words have tried to render the image, and the effect of the image, in 4
themselves. They amount to a sensorium of thought on and around and through and 
about the painting.  
Passing about the painting 
As it turns out, the language that felt most adequate in conveying the painting is 
characterised by actively metamorphic words like bleeding, condensing and melting, 
 See section on ‘Conversation’ and ‘Poetic Imagining’ in chapter 1 of this thesis.3
 Richard Shiff, ‘Cézanne’s Physicality: The Politics of Touch’, in The Language of Art History 4
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 167. 
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words that carry with them a sense of moving between two states.  Blood runs and then 5
coagulates as it comes into contact with air; condensation is the conversion from a gas 
to a liquid on a solid surface; melting is the process by which a solid turns into a liquid 
sometimes, only to re-solidify. Other words for this might be passage or transition.  
My acquaintance with this particular painting using these (among other) particular terms 
reveals two important qualities about research undertaken in this way. Firstly, these 
terms have suggested themselves to me over a long period of contact with the painting. 
That proximity, in turn, has elicited a confluence with the painting, between words I 
have thought most suitable to relate the form of the painting as well as the specific 
nature of the form of the painting as I see it now. The difference is subtle, but in the 
second, the process of perception becomes paramount, a process which is all 
importantly ongoing: much like Doig’s painting with its blank faces, bare canvas and 
roughly sketched shoreline, it appears as it is, either unfinished or barely begun. Put like 
this, the painting, as well as, I hope, my text conveys most fully a sense of the 
presentness of viewing, capturing the essence of the felt experience where two 
previously separate bodies make contact, pressing, giving, mixing, leaving traces in 
their wake.   
Traces are structurally uncertain, neither one thing nor the other, or both one thing and 
the other. Much of Figures in Red Boat (fig. 6) occupies a space of in-betweenness: it is 
not quite abstract, not quite landscape; not quite now, not quite then; not quite here, not 
quite there. Not quite. As if cast in the light of a freshly set sun, the image is charged 
with a sense of the potency of in-between times – a witching hour – its atmosphere 
loaded with potential, rather than with actual activity. Ghostly is, perhaps unfortunately, 
the word. Like the spirit of these words that are allowed to synthesise, not always 
explicitly, after the fact, after the time, around the figures; they float upon the water’s 
surface, to be absorbed, or rejected, by the saturated weave of canvas, and pixels on a 
screen, and fibres of a page. I am not sure if this amounts to ‘actual activity’, if this kind 
of ekphrastic drifting counts as either criticism or history but the spirit of this kind of 
treatment surely feels induced by the painting, my referent, itself. 
 This shifting between present and past tenses is deliberate for reasons that will become clear.5
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A red boat, put another way 
That is one way of being with Figures in Red Boat (fig. 6), of getting to know it, to feel 
one’s way around it. It is, as Gertrude Stein would call it, a beginning, there will be 
others, ‘beginning again’.  We will come back to her in a later beginning. But for now, 6
another beginning might go something like this:  
     
Fix upon it in one of its more exquisite intervals, the moment, for instance, of delicious 
recoil from the flood of water in summer heat. What is the whole physical life in that 
moment but a combination of natural elements to which science gives their names? But 
these elements, phosphorus and lime and delicate fibres, are present not in the human 
body alone: we detect them in places most remote from it. Our physical life is a 
perpetual motion of them – the passage of the blood, the wasting and repairing of the 
lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain by every ray of light and 
sound – processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary forces. Like 
the elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces extends beyond us; it 
rusts iron and ripens corn. Far out on every side of us these elements are broadcast, 
driven by many forces; and birth and gesture and death and the springing of violets from 
the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resulting combinations. That clear perpetual 
outline of face and limb is but an image of ours under which we group them – a design 
in a web, the actual threads of which pass out beyond it. This at least of flame-like our 
life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces 
parting sooner or later on their ways.            
  
Or if we begin with the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more 
rapid, the flame more eager and devouring. There it is no longer the gradual darkening 
of the eye and fading of colour from the wall, – the movement of the shore side, where 
the water flows down indeed, though in apparent rest, – but the race of the midstream, a 
drift of momentary acts of sight and passion and thought. At first sight experience seems 
to bury us under a flood of external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp importunate 
 Gertrude Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in A Stein Reader Ulla E. Dydo ed. (Evanston, Illinois: 6
Northwestern University Press, 1996), p. 499.
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reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action. But when reflection 
begins to act upon those objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive 
force is suspended like a trick of magic; each object is loosed into a group of 
impressions – colour, odour, texture – in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to 
dwell on this world, not of objects in the solidity with which language invests them, but 
of impressions unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with 
our consciousness of them, it contracts still further; the whole scope of observation is 
dwarfed to the narrow chamber of the individual mind. Experience, already reduced to a 
swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of 
personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us, to 
that which we can only conjecture to be without. Every one of those impressions is the 
impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its 
own dream of a world.  
      
Analysis goes a step further still, and tells us that those impressions of the individual to 
which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual flight; that each 
of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is 
infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try 
to apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that 
it is. To such a tremulous wisp constantly reforming itself on the stream, to a single 
sharp impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone 
by, what is real in our life fines itself down. It is with the movement, the passage and 
dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off – that continual 
vanishing away, that strange perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves.  
Not mine but 
This other way is, of course, not mine but Walter Pater’s.  The three paragraphs that 7
constitute the passage above – from ‘Fix upon’ to ‘unweaving of ourselves’ – is so 
familiar that I have taken the risk not introduce it in advance, not to set it apart from the 
rest of the text. It is deliberately formatted, 1.5 spaced, without indentation in order that 
 Walter Pater, ‘Conclusion’, in The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge 7
University Press, 2011), pp. 233–239. I will refer back to elements of this passage throughout the course 
of this chapter. 
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it not be distinguished from the flow of my surrounding text. I even go so far as 
delaying its footnote. ‘Risk’ and ‘going so far as’ seem hyperbolic in the greater scheme 
of things but in academia the accusation of plagiarism weighs heavily. This gesture 
recalls the work of Benjamin Friedlander whose essay ‘Gertrude Stein: A Retrospective 
Criticism’ copies, almost in its entirety, a piece of criticism by Edgar Allen Poe called 
‘Rufus Dawes: A Retrospective Criticism’. In it Friedlander extracts references to 
Dawes and replaces them with references to Stein.  Whereas Friedlander’s focus is on 8
the conceptual plagiaristic gesture of copying the text of others and re-framing it as his 
own, I am interested in the act of absorbing or metabolising or digesting the words of 
one, into the context of another. The point of my inclusion of Pater’s words, here, in this 
particular way, is to demonstrate – to show not tell, as the creative writing adage goes – 
its confluence, its continuum, with the words and images and thoughts that surround it.  
There are other reasons too. Rather than allude to text in fragments – as I did in Chapter 
2, which is peppered with Susan Sontag’s aphoristic voice – Pater’s words appear here 
in an unwieldy passage, a deluge spilled over the page. After much grappling I decided 
that to have treated Pater’s words as I did Sontag’s would risk misrepresenting them, at 
least in the first instance. Hers lend themselves to being cut, spliced and juxtaposed. His 
run together in swathes of long and meandering multi-clausal sentences as his thoughts 
gather, evolve, accrete. Instead of snatching at his words – ‘in the solidity with which 
language invests them’  – a looser, more slippery understanding of them comes into 9
being. 
My choice to focus on this particular short text hinges on my first encounter with it, 
writing a Master’s thesis on ‘Peter Doig and Embodied Art Histories’. The Conclusion’s 
impressionistic focus builds up the effect of a dwelling on experience, analogous, as 
will become clearer, to the types of encounters rendered in paint by Doig. Its tone 
suggests a eulogy to art and the bodily encounter with art and history. It concerns both 
 See Friedlander, ‘Poe’s Poetics and Selected Essays’, in Simulcast: Four Experiments in Criticism 8
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2014), pp. 145–158, an excerpt of which also appears, and is 
introduced, in Benson and Connors, Creative Criticism, pp. 160–175. See also – a text I came upon, after 
writing this chapter – Kenneth Goldsmith’s chapbook Gertrude Stein On Punctuation (Newton, NJ: 
Abaton Books, 1999) in which he reproduces wholesale Stein’s ‘Poetry and Grammar’ followed by the 
same text minus all but its commas.
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, p. 235.9
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the way in which the body as subject, and art and history as objects, come into contact, 
the way in which they interpenetrate.  The way they mutually permeate. It has the 10
melancholy tone of an ending but none of the neatly tied up threads; that it was written 
before the rest of the book in which it first appeared, and for a different purpose, 
partially accounts for this.  It is unspecific, referring to no artwork in particular, and in 11
fact does not even mention art until its penultimate page. Its structure is loose and 
exploratory, sometimes directionless, and thus enacts the sensation of viewing as a 
roaming around and drifting passage through art and thought, a sensation that relates 
closely to my own way of going about things. 
The point of my study is not only to draw out points of shared reference and approach in 
Pater and Doig, but also to acknowledge, and allow for the development of, their points 
of confluence with my own writing. The confluences are many, but perhaps the most 
important in this context is the way in which Doig and Pater acknowledge the 
precarious transience of viewing, a transience that is echoed and embroiled in my 
approach to the material for this chapter. I will show that observing, and acknowledging 
the difficulty of the overlap of images and words, even at a chronological and 
consequential remove, tell us a good deal about the internal workings of experience, 
ideas, thought, and creative processes that ebb and flow often, and not insignificantly, 
concurrently and unselfconsciously. 
In fact, the nature of Pater and Doig’s emergence on these pages is as important as why 
they appear. To be clear about how that might be the case necessitates a detour, and one 
to which I will return at various points. In Fragments of Union (2002) Susan Manning 
draws on ‘associative and analogical models of comparison initially derived from the 
 See my chapter 1 for examples of texts that enact this kind of permeation between subjects and objects 10
but particularly good is Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, Margaret 
Sankey and Peter Cowley trans. (London and New York: Continuum, 2008); David Abram, The Spell of 
the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996).
 Though originally published in 1868 in an article on ‘Poems by William Morris’ published in 11
Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, and later included in Studies of the History of the 
Renaissance (1873), it was notably omitted from subsequent editions of The Renaissance for fear that, in 
Pater’s own words, ‘it might possibly mislead’. Despite its brevity the text has become the most well 
known and oft cited of his oeuvre. In fact, although Pater developed the passage into the book length 
Marius the Epicurean (1885), the reading of this diminutive chapter has still come largely to determine 
his reception and characterisation in scholarship.
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structuring principles of […] Scottish and American texts’. She is specific about the 
nature of the comparisons she makes between writers and works, noting that they are 
characterised by ‘confluence rather than influence’. And is not concerned with 
‘demonstrable direct pressure’ of one writer on another but with ‘networks of 
relationships and analogies’ to which she alludes through the lens of Hume’s ‘Of the 
Association of Ideas’ in the form of ‘Resemblance, Contiguity and Causation’.  Key to 12
Manning’s argument is the distinction between individual thoughts and the way in 
which thoughts themselves might be linked in the process of being thought.   13
This convergence of a text by Pater and paintings by Doig is founded on the idea that 
these works are thoughts which I am in the process of thinking and/or writing into a 
relationship. This writing into a relationship sees visual images absorb written words as 
written words absorb visual images, observing how the pairing of a writer and painter 
enacts a confluence. The relationship is founded on a type of ‘reciprocity’ as Richard 
Shiff might term it.  This reciprocity is not, however, limited to a two-way process but 14
multiplies as the discussion unfolds. The various agents at play here, Doig, Pater, 
contemporary scholars – like Susan Manning and, shortly, Wai Chee Dimock – and me, 
should all be understood as comprising and manifesting a mutual, though inconsistent, 
porosity.  
Drawing out the nature of that confluence will, however, be hard-fought, ununified, 
unsystematic. Indeed, the process of partially wresting analogous strands present in 
Doig and Pater’s work allows another confluence to materialise, between the works 
discussed and the language of that discussion. In Manning’s study of the example of 
American unification, grammatical and syntactic structures are argued to embody both 
unity and fragmentation in the manner of a federation. Take heed, however; ‘federative 
 Susan Manning, Fragments of Union: Making Connections in Scottish and American Writing 12
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 4–5, referencing David Hume, An Enquiry into Human 
Understanding (1748) Tom L. Beauchamp ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 107. 
 Manning, Fragments of Union, p. 108.13
 Richard Shiff discusses the reciprocity of touch in order to avoid other more dualistic propositions such 14
as pitting the subjective (that is to say, deviant or figured) against the objective (that is to say, the 
normative or literal) in ‘Constructing Physicality’, Art Journal, 50(1) (1991), p. 43 after David Katz, Der 
Aufbau der Tastwelt (Leipzig: Barth, 1925).
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vision’, Manning points out, is ‘in the nature of things both risky and contingent’.  15
Though far from federative, the contingency upon which the language of this research 
rests is crucial. It is both the chapter’s subject and object, the method at once enacted 
and reflected upon in the process. 
The nature of the correspondences that build here and the ways in which they come to 
coalesce is processual. It emerges as associations are sparked, conjunctions bud and 
analogies grow. I choose my mixed metaphors deliberately in so doing conveying, I 
hope, a sense of the non-systematic ways in which these processes actually feel: rarely 
either unified or as carefully organised as a pure metaphor might imply. That is not to 
say that they are arbitrary though.  I take my cue from Manning and what she terms the 16
‘imaginative territory’ that lies in the gaps between the two bodies of work that are her 
focus.  The act of crossing divides that artificially separate culturally-constructed 17
categories – historical periods, nations, media and genres – is loaded with the potential 
for a certain kind of imaginative exploration. It is my intention, then, to dwell on the 
effects of certain structural echoes, tonal synchronicities, chromatic affinities and 
metaphorical resemblances between one form and another. My discussion turns on what 
it is in the structure and material of these works that registers as analogous and how 
associations that are drawn from a subjective being relate beyond the (supposed) 
confines of the self to suggest another way of going about research. To borrow, again, 
from Manning’s substantial leaning on grammatical analogy, my study takes its cue 
from connectives that are spatial and comparative rather than temporal, causal or 
sequential. Thus I will be thinking in terms of imaginative and potential relationships 
and passages between forms rather than absolute or culturally authenticated 
connections, witnessing, as a result, the conjunctions ‘as’ or ‘like’ as well as metaphors 
more broadly, being complicated by their use across historical periods, nations and 
media.  
 Manning, Fragments of Union, p. 287.15
 The idea of non-systematic thinking is explored further in chapter 1.16
 Manning, Fragments of Union, p. 2. 17
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Manning likewise draws out connections across geographical borders, based on the 
spirit of the texts that ‘resonate mutually in [...] texture’. Their underlying syntactic 
structures make possible these connections rather than their overt contents or origins. As 
a result tensions between union and fragmentation persist in the texts produced during 
the Enlightenment and Romantic periods of Scotland and America that Manning writes 
into a relation. She argues, after Hume, that this tension is a reflection of a particular 
structure of thought. It allows her to identify systems of classification and listing based 
on the ‘principles of connection that may join, or keep apart, the elements’. She writes: 
This is where the area of experience coheres - or fails to - where 
selves, and nations, may define themselves. The 'connective 
tissue' of grammar and syntax provides the cement to make 
sentences cohere internally; style determines the connectivity 
across sentences, of one with the next. But an avowed purpose 
of linking or joining (in collaboration, celebration, or lament) may 
also be betrayed by grammar and syntax that focuses attention 
on the nature of the spaces or interludes that frustrate the 
impulse to union and thereby preserve the fragments from 
incorporation in the whole.  Sentence structure itself may be at 
once eloquent and silent.  18
She goes on to reference Dugald Stewart who argues that it is ‘the transitions of 
language’ that constitute the means by which associations and their ‘degrees of 
intimacy’ converge or diverge, strongly or causally, slightly or capriciously, naturally or 
indissolubly.   19
The specificity of language, of turns of phrase, of particular and imagistic word 
choices is, therefore, key. Descriptors suggest themselves as I prod nouns into 
atypical relations. Words, closely followed by ideas, take form, their surfacing 
induced by the nature of the images and methods of research from which they stem 
and around which they come to coalesce. Sometimes the absorption of images and 
words (and the interface between the two) is not always immediately clear and takes 
time to unfold. At times like these, you will already have noticed, the narrative of 
this text appears to drift. As my foci shift my writing performs its own particular 
 ibid., pp. 12–13.18
 ibid., p. 29, reference to Dugald Stewart, ‘On the Beautiful. Part First’, in Philosophical Essays, The 19
Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, Sir William Hamilton ed., Vol. 5 (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable Co., 
1855), p. 202.
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convergence, only surfacing in this particular way, only taking on this particular 
character because of the nature of its subjects, objects and processes of research. W. 
J. T. Mitchell might call this ‘showing seeing’ that is to say, it is an ‘invitation […] to 
picture theory and perform theory as a visible, embodied, communal practice, not as 
the solitary introspection of a disembodied intelligence’.   20
Before Figures in Red Boat (fig. 6) could play any substantive role in the discussion, 
then, as with Zurbarán’s Four Vessels, I spent time enacting its play of colour, tone, 
texture, and substance in words, partly as a way of familiarising myself with it, partly as 
a way of allowing its role in this chapter to be activated, to be cast off.  This takes time 21
and focus, as well as intermittent interjection; it bears further explanation and 
contextualisation.  
The importance of focus and duration here is informed by the work of scholars like 
Mieke Bal or T. J. Clark whose writing about a single work or artist, over a substantial 
period, is recorded almost diaristically in order to retain the sense of the spontaneity of 
responses to artworks. In many ways, Bal’s 2001 book, subtitled The Architecture of Art 
Writing, is unconventional. With chunks of her diary presented, in its original note-
form, unedited, she walks us through a fragmented reading of her encounter with and 
through Louise Bourgeois’s Spider (Tate, London, 1994). It is telling that the text begins 
not with an introduction but an ‘Entrance’. Its title suggests that what is to come will be 
less a conventional laying out of the book’s aims and methods and more a subtle initial 
familiarisation with the writing and the art that will come to make contact. In fact it 
frequently uses quite straightforwardly introductory openers like: ‘In this essay I will 
consider [...]’, ‘I will discuss a number of issues [….]’, ‘I will argue that [...]’.  But 22
 W. J. T. Mitchell, ‘Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture’, in Visual Culture: Critical Concepts 20
in Visual and Cultural Studies, Joanne Morra and Marquard Smith eds. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 162.
 Peter de Bolla might term this ‘living through’ aesthetic experience as opposed to having or making an 21
aesthetic experience although I would disagree with him on the matter of where ‘art’ as the source of 
aesthetic experience is located. He claims that it is ‘uniquely a feature of an aesthetic experience and not 
something within the object; although the tools we need to locate and understand that experience may 
appear to the viewer to reside in the object, this appearance is an illusion produced by our affective 
response’. It is worth noting that in contrast to my approach, treating my pairings as to some degree 
interrelated, De Bolla’s treatment of his three case studies are kept entirely separate, as if to do otherwise 
would contaminate them. See de Bolla, Art Matters, p.15.
 Bal, Louise Bourgeois’s Spider, p. 4. 22
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Bal’s interest in reading Bourgeois’ work ‘as both object and subject of art-writing – of 
art history and art criticism’ has certainly indirectly impacted the approach I am taking 
here.   23
Clark’s The Sight of Death also uses a diaristic mode, this time edited. His two year 
(intermittent) diary account of viewing (and thinking about) two Poussin paintings feels 
like a self-conscious experiment, a challenge to and extension of moments of encounter 
with artwork. It combines an obsession with the minutiae of the viewing process – the 
context of the gallery, its light levels, other people’s presence, Clark’s state of mind – 
and microscopically close readings at, for example, the paintings’ iconographic details 
and paint handling. Crucially, he characterises this text as not writing about or writing 
on but ‘writing the image’ as if the writing itself were a textual equivalent of the 
paintings.  My focus in getting to know Doig’s painting is of a related, though slightly 24
different, order. Though it turns on the close observation of particular paintings, it does 
so with an awareness of the potential for focus to escape the confines of the canvas or 
gallery.  
Thus far, I have alluded to the ways in which Pater and Doig’s resemblances manifest 
but the question of how their affinities emerge is equally pressing. What do their 
resemblances feel like and what happens when we draw attention to them? For clarity’s 
sake a list of concrete terms or themes by which they coalesce might be useful but I am 
loathe to break their connections down in such a way, to systematise them into 
graspable subsections or what Pater might describe as ‘tragic dividing forces’.  To do 25
so would be at variance with the openness, hesitancy and irresolution that find kinship 
in their work. But it would also do a disservice to the way in which their convergence, 
 ibid., p. 3.23
 Interestingly, there are similarities between turns of phrases in both this chapter and Clark’s. See 24
phrases like Clark’s ‘the process of seeing again and again’ and ‘aspect after aspect of the picture seems 
to surface’, p. 5 and examples from the current chapter like: ‘In it ideas echo and swell invisibly in the 
depths of a painting and then roll and break the surface’ or, ‘single motifs appear again and again’. These 
similarities were not intentional but they are worth pointing out. And again there are crucial differences 
between my approach and Clark’s. For example, he claims that writing about art ‘should not flinch from 
making sense of the mute things it is looking at’ that, as we shall see, will not be a priority here, as the 
‘unsystematic’ nature (as I shall come to call it) of my close reading of Doig’s Figures in Red Boat will 
reveal. Clark, The Sight of Death, p. 216. See also MIT and Afterall series of books (2009–2016) that 
focus on a single artwork which are also exercises durational processes of viewing art critically.
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, p. 237.25
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and this chapter, emerged: falteringly, amorphously, uncertainly. Their resemblances do 
not result from clear points of precise contact, rather, they bleed in a more 
impressionistic, mercurial, way than a list would have us believe. Images and themes 
echo imperfectly, reverberations resound loosely and overlapping seepages present 
themselves.  
Clustering 
In Doig’s paintings single motifs appear again and again: a figure dressed as a bat, 
figures playing cricket on a beach, boats and canoes drifting. His 2013 exhibition ‘No 
Foreign Lands’ focussed on his propensity to work through clusters of imagery. It 
emphasised the way that his images appear to proliferate in vast numbers around a 
common theme, allowing an idea to run on. In each of their iterations these motifs are 
subjected to modulated differences of process, time, media, colour and material. These 
have been termed ‘variations’ by others but I am calling the groups of works that 
converge around a specific theme, clusters, a term more impromptu than the more self-
conscious and organised term ‘series’ implies.  Each cluster might include washed out 26
prints, pencil sketches, charcoal drawings, oil paint roughly brushed on paper or canvas, 
tempera and distemper washed loosely over linen, working collages, barely-there 
watercolours, stained photographs and damaged canvases. Taken together they behave 
like mental images. As if under the influence of the distorting effect of a mind turning 
over and over a thought, these impressions – images that are nestled in what Pater 
would call ‘the chamber of the individual mind’ – find visual analogue in Doig’s 
clusters.  
Adopting Paterian terminology we might call Doig’s propensity to work in series as 
exemplifying ‘group[s] of impressions’ that are ‘constantly reforming’. As they are 
dwelled upon, these images make manifest ‘the passage and dissolution of impressions’. 
 Beatrix Ruf uses the term ‘variation’ and ‘series’ in ‘Peter Doig’s NOW’, Parkett, 67 (2003), p. 81. 26
Doig has described them as ‘versions’. In an email to Ruf he writes: ‘I paint versions because I think that 
the best ones are never done – one desires to go back for more, like in lots of other areas of life….more. 
One wants to see more, hear more, experience more and also hope for the same sensations again in all of 
the above…’, email sent to Ruf on March 8, 2003, referenced in Ruf, ‘Peter Doig’s NOW’, p 83. These 
allusions to ‘sensations’ contribute to my drawing Pater and Doig’s work into relation. They also, 
incidentally, echo Susan Sontag’s desire for writing about art ‘to see more, to hear more, to feel more’ in 
‘Against Interpretation’, p. 14.
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Take the Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre cluster, in which two costumed figures look out 
from the centre of the image. The sketches associated with this series appear 
incomplete, half washed away, fragments, filaments, even, of the final image. They are 
in fact dated from between 2002 and 2004 and carried out no earlier than the tail end of 
the two years that it took Doig to produce the largest, and seemingly most complete, 
Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre (Collection of Nancy Lauter McDougal, 2000–2002) 
painting (fig. 7). The sketches – variously executed in oil, watercolour, pencil and ink – 
are like Pater’s ‘impressions’, ‘unstable, flickering, inconsistent’. Indeed, even the 
‘final’ image feels much less final, more like Pater’s ‘tremulous wisp’, displaying areas 
of dissolution or evanescence in the roadside trees and worn out sky. The sketches 
should not be construed as workings towards but as crucial elements of a whole idea. 
Perhaps they function more like ‘clauses’ in the context of a sentence.  
Pater’s rolling sentences are similarly thronging with distinct but connected elements: 
‘It is with this movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, 
sensations, that analysis leaves off – that continual vanishing away, that strange, 
perpetual, weaving and unweaving of ourselves’.  They appear as extended thought 27
processes in which further thoughts accrue as he sets them to paper. This is precisely 
why they are difficult to pluck from their broader context – leading me to present them 
here as a passage intact – strings of clauses nestled in a landscape of other clauses. Each 
word and phrase conducts a swelling of an idea or a feeling, intimately connected to 
those that surround it. To take a sentence out of context therefore renders it bereft. It is 
as if each phrase were part of what we could call Pater’s ecosystem of awareness a 
phrase that continues the strong links to the reception of Doig’s work, characterised by 
one scholar as a ‘dense ecosystem of images’ where one motif breeds many versions as 
prints, as details, or as fully formed new configurations.  28
Sometimes it is as if Pater were describing the way that Doig’s motifs appear and 
reappear in infinite variation, like reflections dissolving, or as if Doig were painting 
visual images of Pater’s mellifluous thought processes embodied through his accretive 
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, p. 236. 27
 Johanne Sloane, ‘Hallucinating Landscapes, Canadian-Style’, in Peter Doig, Scott Watson ed. 28
(Vancouver: Morris and Helen Belkin Art Gallery, 2001), p. 13. 
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writing style. Both build a sensation of amorphousness, bathing in their own fragility 
and serendipity, foregrounding networks of interconnected ideas that are in the ongoing 
process of being built, in practice, rather than cast in absolute or finished terms. 
Compare, for example, Pater’s attempts to encapsulate the process of viewing and the 
manner of viewing that Doig’s Figures in Red Boat induces. Picture Pater’s ‘unstable’ 
impressions before Doig’s melting reflection of the red boat. Or Pater’s image of the 
‘individual in his isolation’ alongside Doig’s silent, self-contained spectres. Or imagine 
Pater’s ‘dream of a world’ accompanying Doig’s scene which is largely rendered in 
dreamlike unspecificity (the ‘real’ world only impinging by degrees through fragments 
of recognisable figuration – palms, figures, boat). En masse, these effects build an effect 
of teetering instability. 
In fact, impermanence permeates both Pater and Doig’s work. Doig’s painting 
references the passing of time obliquely, accruing as unintended stains or splatters, or as 
coats of pigment are applied, dried, overpainted or wiped away. He allows that passing 
to crystallise on the canvas as each layer adheres to its surface at different rates, 
showing through or being absorbed, variously. It also manifests through his evocation of 
styles, motifs, compositions from the art-historical cannon, as the section below on 
‘Reflection across history’ will show.  
Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ dwells more explicitly on the feel of time passing or what he calls 
‘intervals’. He refers to it as a ‘passage and dissolution’ which becomes most obvious 
through his treatment of experience, tinged with melancholy. It is ‘its awful brevity’ 
which appears to pain Pater but it is the way in which he evokes the feeling of this 
interval that interests me.  He layers up his text with images or ‘pulses’ that expand the 29
experience of the text itself, as if the text were enacting a life lived. He moves from 
‘summer heat’, to ‘springing violets’ to rusting iron to ‘the movement of the shore-side’ 
to ‘a tremulous wisp’, to Novalis, to ‘some tone on the hills’, to ‘a gemlike flame’, to 
‘curious odours’, to ‘the microscope of thought’, to Rousseau’s Confessions, to Victor 
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, pp. 233, 236 and 237.29
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Hugo and ‘poetic passion’.  This textual accretion of processes, sensations, images, and 30
stimuli itself performs the feeling of time passing. 
Drift adrift 
As the Doig and Pater affinities begin to condense in words on this page, further 
affinities emerge from their respective treatment by scholars and critics. In Peter Doig: 
Works on Paper (2005), for example, Margaret Atwood’s poetically tinged preface, 
entitled ‘Images drift...’, has Paterian overtones. Take her:  
Images drift up from where they have been hiding [....] think of 
reflections on the surface, broken, reforming [...] think of a drowned 
thing, rising. [...] They come from the land of images, which is in this 
world and not in this world, which is in your mind and not in your 
mind.   31
Compare this to Pater’s rumination on the stages by which observation progresses, 
described as, ‘A drift of momentary acts of sight and passion and thought’ as if the 
images, feelings and thoughts emerge – ‘rising’, in Atwood’s words – from unknown 
depths. Pater goes on, ‘But when reflexion begins to play upon these objects they are 
dissipated under its influence’.  Though Atwood and Pater’s word choices are quite 32
different this time – Atwood’s more definite ‘broken’ to Pater’s softer edged ‘dissipated’ 
– their accounts still focus on the scattered nature of images, as well as reflections. For 
Pater, the disrupting surface ripples are set in motion by our own actions, by ‘reflexion’, 
which this time might also refer to thought.   33
Such dislocating bands of undulating reflection ring a number of figures whose bodies 
come into direct contact with water in Doig’s paintings: rings encircle the woman’s 
finger tips in Canoe Lake (Yageo Foundation Collection, Taiwan, 1997–8), they expand 
out from the cop pictured shouting across an expanse of water in Echo Lake (Tate, 
London,1998). And in Blotter (Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool,1993) (fig. 8), in which a 
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lone figure stands in the middle of a large thawing puddle looking at his feet while 
water creases outwards from him in roughly concentric circles. But the movement that 
Atwood and Pater evoke in their choice of words like ‘dissipate’ and ‘drift’ also calls to 
mind the character of pigment’s dispersal in Figures in Red Boat (fig. 6). Paint is only 
semi-directed, as if caught in the moment of seepage. Sometimes it appears to bleed into 
the weave of the canvas – fuzzing the boat’s motor – at others, its distribution is more 
hazy – in the lilac grey murk that bands the painting midway. At still others its flow 
downwards feels more urgent as if compelled by gravitational force – in red drips and 
pink waves.  
The result is that the wholesale apprehension of images is frustrated. Pater’s images 
dissolve into the less stable term: ‘impressions’. And through impressions ‘all that is 
actual in [time] being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it 
may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is’.  Even the structure 34
of the sentence itself seems to dissolve through double negatives here, raveling and 
unraveling as it goes. But if in the end, it ‘ceases to be than that it is’, then the image 
and our experience of the image (which for Pater is one and the same) are the focus. 
Any ‘theory, or idea, or system, which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this 
experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some 
abstract morality we have not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional, 
has no real claim upon us.’  This sentiment is doubled in Atwood’s introduction to 35
Doig too:  
‘If the images are messengers, what is the message they carry? We are what has been 
inscribed, they say. Inscribed on you. We are where you have been. We are where you 
are. 
Look at us. Look into us. Make of us what you can. 
Here you are.  36
In both cases the image’s hold on us depends upon a felt experience in which the image 
and the viewer become mutually absorbed: ‘We are where you are [...] Here you are’. 
 ibid., p. 209.34
 ibid., p. 211–212.35
 Atwood, ‘Images Drift’, p. 8, original italics.36
!125
Like this thesis, subjectively experienced thoughts and acts are at the helm but they do 
not impose an overarching or predetermined method. 
This is why in relation to Pater and Doig (and this thesis) it feels right to speak of 
emergence, to speak of not only images, but words, and sentences, ‘arriv[ing] without 
being summoned’.  Drifting is enacted by Doig’s materials as they spread across the 37
canvas – seeping, dripping, running. By the mental images and textures that his 
paintings, in turn, stir – mildew, mist, water. And by the innumerable single stray boats, 
always pictured alone, on still (or almost still) water, cast off but rarely with purpose or 
momentum, drifting.  
Drifting also comes to the fore through the presence of the characters who inhabit his 
paintings. In the vast majority Doig lingers on solitary figures and introverts. Among 
many other paintings and series these include: Jetty (Mima and César Reyes Collection, 
Puerto Rico, 1994), Echo Lake, Canoe Lake, Figure in Mountainscape (Pinchuk Art 
Centre, Kiev, 1997–8), Corn Cob (Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1994), Young 
Bean Farmer (Collection of Victoria and Warren Miro, London, 1991), Stag (Martin 
and Rebecca Eisenberg, 2002–5), Purple Jesus (Black Rainbow) (Monsoon Art 
Collection, 2006), Girl in White with Trees (Bonnefantenmuseum Maastricht, 2001–2), 
Lapeyrouse Wall (Private Collection, 2004) and 100 Years Ago (Collection of Beth 
Swofford, 2000) (fig. 9). The nineteenth-century French bohemian figure in 
Metropolitain (House of Pictures) (Pinakothek der Moderne, Munich, 2004) (fig. 14) 
resembles the central figure in Honoré Daumier’s painting The Print Collector (The Art 
Institute of Chicago, 1857–63). In Doig’s hands the figure is unleashed into the blue 
green expanse of a Caribbean backdrop. Elsewhere the trench-coated figure in House of 
Pictures (Private Collection, 2000–2) – sporting cowboy boots, trench coat and long 
flowing red hair – is pictured standing outside the gallery windows and looking in. 
Something about his attire suggests that he is in costume and so, out of place and out of 
time.  
 ibid., p. 7.37
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Melancholy, and sometimes foreboding, hangs around figures like these, their isolation 
even more pronounced, depicted often in silhouette or outline or shadow. Now recall 
Pater’s take on impressions seen as an ‘impression of the individual in his isolation, 
each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world’ where ‘the whole 
scope of observation is dwarfed to the narrow chamber of the individual mind.’  Or 38
view Pater’s ‘vanishing away’ alongside the faltering grey outline of the man in Doig’s 
Figure by a Pool (The collection of Helen and Charles Schwab, 2008–12) or the barely-
there drawn calves and pointed feet that poke out of the watery area of the same 
painting.  Or imagine the following words by Pater as a gallery caption: ‘While all 39
melts under our feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to 
knowledge that seems, by a lifted horizon, to set the spirit free for a moment’. With such 
hypothetical proximity Pater’s words might find unexpected sympathy with Doig’s 
paintings; in Blotter the figure’s reflection appears to liquefy or ‘melt’ or in 100 Years 
Ago in which an island appears to rise, even float upon, a ‘lifted horizon’.  40
Reflections go further 
We have already touched on rippled reflections but their prevalence in Doig’s imagery 
calls for further scrutiny, not least because reflections are such a trope in the history of 
art. Encompassing the idea of the double, the mirror image, the image and the painting, 
reflection connotes contemplation, impression, expression and revelation. Reflections, 
as images, have been caught up in complicated associations relating to ‘equivalence’ 
and ‘likeness’. But the type of reflection Doig plays with is not always literal, and never 
throws back a sharply rendered image. Doig’s reflections are usually partial, muddied, if 
not all-out obscured, casting back likenesses and unlikenesses. A similarly imperfect, 
incomplete, reflection on images and imagery is happening here too, as we speak. 
It is worth looking closely at another of the many images in which reflections figure 
large. Reflection (What does your soul look like) (Mima and César Reyes Collection, 
Puerto Rico, 1996) (fig. 10) is a portrait-format painting depicting an encounter with a 
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, p. 235.38
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partial figure, cut off at mid-calf. The figure’s reflection is pictured whole and is 
surrounded by further reflections of winter trees seen on the skin of a pond ringed by 
snow or ice. Water is represented through a lurid mustard green base with rusty red 
silhouetted reflections, its surface is further mottled by layers of variously coloured 
paint work. Black, cream and white marks wind their way across the surface like veins 
around the body. Sometimes their branch-like meandering leads into less figurative 
realms. At other times a painted mark begins abstractly only lapsing into figuration after 
a time, such as when reflections are born of random red drips that Doig has chased 
down the canvas and developed into something more representational, something more 
controlled.  
The placement of the figure in this painting is interesting, especially when referenced 
against the reflexivity of the painting’s title. It is pictured not looking down at its own 
reflection but facing away from it. What does your soul look like, we ask the 
anonymous figure’s double? What impressions can we glean from your swampy 
reflection? How much can we know of you, separated as we are at a slippery remove 
across an expanse of water and/or paint and available to us by means of a mere 
reflection, shadow, outline, representation, art?  
But why are reflections significant in the context of this thesis? The motif of reflections 
is part of some of the originary theories of representation. In the myth of Narcissus, 
reflections are treated as the loaded doubles of the reflected; Narcissus himself is 
deceived by his own reflection because of its close verisimilitude. And as Leon Battista 
Alberti noted in 1435 ‘What else can you call painting but a similar embracing with art 
of what is presented on the surface of the water in the fountain?’.  Whereas 41
traditionally in the history of art the clarity of reflections is seen as the closest 
counterpart to art’s mimetic potential, for Doig reflections’ are more akin to shadows, 
incomplete, overlapping with other reflections and obscured by the viscosity of paint as 
water or water as paint. Doig’s doubles, as reflections or shadows or repetitions, are 
both like and unlike the objects by which they are cast. Usually they are blurred, 
inconsistent approximations, impressions that merge with the rest of the canvas.  
 Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 64.41
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But reflection’s doubling effect features even more strongly through a more generalised 
multiplication and repetition. Anonymous figures appear and reappear: girl in a tree, 
man dragging a pelican, top-hatted flaneur. Scenes are revisited and repurposed: 
Canadian snow-capped mountains, a Kerala seaside shack, a particular patch of 
Trinidadian wall, and an island off the Port of Spain. Motifs are replicated and morphed: 
canoes, boats, palms, skiers, reflections, homes. And compositional techniques reused – 
horizon lines, obscuring veils, rectangular cutouts, windows or frames; in each iteration, 
the clusters are transformed. Sometimes these are plucked from recognisable characters 
in the art canon; at others they remain anonymous, cut out from newspaper articles, 
prized from family photographs, found postcards or dredged from memory. Johanne 
Sloan describes this method of image making as ecosystemic.  In it ideas echo and 42
swell invisibly in the depths of a painting and then roll and break the surface, sometimes 
loudly as an iconic gesture (like his canoe paintings), sometimes quietly as a mere 
pointer to something else – a particular painterly texture, ‘a lifted horizon’.    43
Is it too far to see in the spirit of this multiplicity Pater’s ‘variegated’ ‘impressions’? To 
see Doig’s paintings as the site where ‘vital forces unite’, where the ‘hard gem-like 
flame’ burns, inducing a ‘stirring of the senses’? Could we not pilfer Pater’s words like 
this, and direct them at just about any art that particularly took our fancy? I’m not sure 
we could, because the sensation of the terms in question shares so much of the sensation 
of, say, Doig’s Gasthof zur Muldentalsperre (fig. 7) with its suggestive colour palette of 
blues and greens and yellows, its bejewelled patchwork wall jetty, semi-grounded by 
beige and a touch of black, its motley accretions of wrought-through paint applied 
variously – globbily, and washily, and fuzzily – and star-studded with a surface mist of 
white. 
Reflection across history 
The consequence of this proliferation of repeated motifs, familiar gestures and 
compositional structures reveals the nature of Doig’s thinking about art that tracks 
 Sloan, ‘Hallucinating Landscapes’, p. 13.42
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across rather than through history. The particular character of a wash of paint, 
combination of hues, or a cluster of figures is subtly evocative of something we feel like 
we might have seen before. In a painting like Echo Lake Sloan sees ‘the spirits of 
Edvard Munch, Jackson Pollock and Tom Thomson’.  Scott Watson has noted affinities 44
between Doig and David Milne, giving the impression that Doig’s whole oeuvre acts as 
a mass reflection and refraction of a particular history of art.  45
In 100 Years Ago (Carrera) (Centre Pompidou, 2001) (fig. 11) Catherine Grenier, for 
example, sees ‘history [... as] the central theme’. She draws out the painting’s 
connection with a series of elements that are trans-historically sourced. The figure and 
the canoe derive from an album insert from the 1970s by the Allman brothers, the island 
in the background from Arnold Böcklin’s Die Toteninsel (Kunstmuseum Basel, 1880) 
(fig. 12) and the structural horizontal motifs from Henri Matisse’s Baigneuse à la Tortue 
(Art Museum, St Louis, 1908).  On this painting, Richard Shiff has specified Barnett 46
Newman’s zip paintings as being influential,  whereas Keith Hartley has most recently 47
named Matisse’s Window at Collioure (National Gallery of Art, Washington, 1914) as 
another ‘apposite’ ‘influence’.  48
Keith Hartley’s 2013 catalogue essay goes to great lengths to draw out the various 
threads of Doig’s indebtedness. The problem, however, lies in how we frame these 
kinds of visual resonances or, as Hartley terms them after Picasso, ‘visual assonances’.  49
He specifies Edvard Munch, Anselm Kiefer and Sigmar Polke but later builds visual 
narratives connecting, for example, Doig’s House of Pictures (Carrera) (Gayle and Paul 
Stoffel, 2004) (fig. 13) and Metropolitain (House of Pictures) (Pinakothek der Moderne, 
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Munich, 2004) (fig. 14) with Honoré Daumier’s The Print Collector and Édouard 
Manet’s The Absinthe Drinker (Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, 1859) (fig. 15). His conflation 
of this cluster of images turns, persuasively, on a discarded beer bottle and the 
dishevelled top-hatted figure. The trouble with Hartley’s analysis, however, is that it 
depends upon a biography of Doig, of his movements from one country to another and 
his seeing specific exhibitions, to verify that one artist or another had a measurable 
‘impact’ on his paintings.  ‘Something cannot come out of nothing,’ Hartley insists, 50
‘and ideas have to be born and nourished’.  Hartley’s reading of Doig’s painting is 51
founded on causal relationships in history, telling the story of beginnings and 
influences, developments, and impacts. Doig’s assimilation of history comes about, I 
rather argue, with more subtlety than this, a subtlety not lost on Catherine Grenier who 
emphasises how an image ‘takes its meaning not from its origin – what we know about 
it – but from the matter that constitutes it, from the making-evident, by means of paint, 
of its mystery’.  That is to say, by the specific quality and nature of its assimilation.  52
Doig uses historical images as material in their own right, bringing about their 
assimilation into the fabric of his paintings. They appear to grow out of his repeated 
turn to interconnected reflection on and around landscape, art, film, culture, advertising 
and music. The historical references alluded to in Doig’s images act as a visual 
counterpart to what Gavin Parkinson, after Hayden White, has termed a ‘Metafictional 
Historiography of Art’.  In relation to the history of art, such a historiography is formed 53
of ‘reflexive strategies’ which write ‘through, mirrors, echoes, and rebound[] off art’, 
much like Doig mirrors and reflects motifs over and over again.  It is an assimilation I 54
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am in some ways attempting here – assimilating art in writing, Pater in Doig, Doig in 
Pater and so on. 
History, doubled and reflected  
A complementary echoic reflection of historical reference appears in Pater too. Many 
have noted the epigraph to Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ which sets the tone of his relationship to 
and dependence on history. A quote from Heraclitus in the original Greek reads: Λέγει 
που Ἡράκλειτος ὃτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν µένει – ‘All things give way: nothing 
remaineth’.  According to Carolyn Williams this is Pater’s shorthand way of 55
identifying ‘“mythic” recapitulations in the history of thought’, as a reflection, a 
doubling of history. Common themes, she notes, are threaded through the ‘Conclusion’, 
introduced early on and then returned to. In their later iterations they are transformed, 
metamorphosed through the intervening text. She takes the example of the moment 
which is firstly predominantly characterised as fleeting – Pater’s in ‘perpetual motion’. 
When he returns to the moment, however, this impermanence is secondary, giving way 
to beauty and form: ‘Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face’. Williams 
notes the ‘extraordinary metaphorical doubleness and transformation’ where ‘all of the 
figures are [later] reworked and transvalued’.    56
Other critics like Billie Andrew Inman, Wolfgang Iser, and Paul Barolsky all articulate 
Pater’s conception of and relationship with history in slightly different ways. Inman 
excavates Pater’s texts, attempting to identify precisely their intertextuality and 
intellectual evolution. He sees traces of William Morris’s Earthly Paradise Parts I and II 
as well as speculating on the impact of specific scientific studies by George Henry 
Lewes, for example, or Herbert Spencer. At times these hypotheses stem from ‘verbal 
similarity’, at others they are based on a cross-referencing of books that Pater had 
borrowed from public libraries. He uses this research as proof of Pater’s intellectual 
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trajectory and indebtedness. At one point, for example, Inman claims that Pater ‘was 
careful to follow a principle enunciated by’ Hegel in Ästhetik, which he supports with 
evidence of Pater’s having borrowed the book between 28 April and 23 May 1863.  57
Inman’s archival research is painstaking and clearly evidences the multifariousness of 
Pater’s thinking. But in its attempts to account for every reference and identify every 
influence it does little to convey the nature of Pater’s intuitive, responsive thought, its 
flowing and eddying, its accumulation and freewheeling. 
Pater’s assimilation of history is more responsively addressed by Iser. The main thrust 
of Pater’s work, Iser argues, ‘is to break down all cognitive pigeon-holing’. In contrast 
to Inman, Iser sees ‘the historicist approach focussing on motives, parallels, and 
influences’ as lacking the ‘criteria that would enable us to assess Pater’s work 
comprehensively’.  For Iser, the Victorian’s understanding of the past is embodied in 58
the very form of his writing. Iser understands that ‘aestheticism is not an ordered 
phenomenon’ and therefore we should not submit aestheticist discussions to the same 
tests that we might a method of research that lends itself to a more ‘positivistic tradition’ 
of evidence appraisal.  This ‘aesthetic attitude’, as Iser terms it, is essential to Pater’s 59
thinking and is performed in his verbal expression and writing structure. Ideas 
‘preoccupied Pater simultaneously’, experiences are addressed in the way they are felt 
and so ‘remain amorphous’, and impressions imprecise.  This understanding, in turn, 60
allows Iser to address the ways in which Pater’s thought is ‘distilled out of […] 
fragments’ and formed ‘by the contingency of association’.  It will, at this point be 61
clear that this reading of Pater strongly evokes the spirit of this thesis too. 
Wai Chee Dimock, one of the most lithe contemporary thinkers, to whom this chapter 
returns at various points, might refer to this evanescent conception of experience and 
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understanding as a ‘variable morphology’.  Dimock’s particular ‘morphology’ is 62
enabled by her linking together of a novelist, dramatist, and poet: Henry James, Colm 
Tóibín, and W. B. Yeats. She characterises their roles in her article as being in a 
relationship of hosting and being hosted.  After Jacques Derrida, Dimock knows well 63
the tensions associated with hospitality – the roles of host and hosted are neither entirely 
clear cut, nor straightforwardly benign – which is precisely the point. She is interested 
in seeing what happens when one specific form or genre is read against the backdrop, or 
in the environment, of another. This recontextualisation of art forms does not come 
about through historicist research. Dimock is fascinated by the effect of reading 
artworks outside of the context in which they were initially conceived or produced, by 
how the terms of our engagement with the artwork morphs. To do so, she knows, rarely 
makes for a coherent critical narrative, however: what ‘appears primary in one locale 
can [...] lapse into secondariness in another’. It renders criticism, as she puts it, 
‘episodic’, ‘rangy’, ‘proliferating’, ‘scattered, chaotic, contextually vacillating, not 
easily generalizable’, qualities that feel quite at home here too.   64
Such a disinclination to historicise and an inclination, instead, to meet scholarship on its 
own terms, is also shared by Paul Barolsky. Barolsky comes clean early on, as if in 
apology to his academic readers, describing his book on Pater as an ‘essay’ and ‘a 
sympathetic response to the very suggestiveness of Pater’s prose’.  Despite his 65
attraction to Pater’s sensuous evocativeness, he still sometimes falls into the trap (or is it 
a habit?) of attempting to trace the poetic structures and analogies deployed by Pater 
back to their original sources and experiences an ‘overwhelming’ need for these ‘to be 
excavated’ (my emphasis). But Barolsky also recognises that the figures Pater echoes 
are not straightforward sources. Rather, they are ‘artistically “threaded through”’, 
intrinsic therefore to the matter of Pater’s expression, not merely its content.  In fact, 66
Barolsky goes on to describe how in Pater’s text ‘memory is continuously drawn into 
 Dimock, ‘Weak Theory’, p. 738.62
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play as it absorbs, one upon another, the sensations of history, condensing these into 
perfect moments, exquisite pauses in time’.  67
That turn of phrase loops figuratively back, once again, to Doig, in particular to 
Hartley’s description of his 100 Years Ago series as ‘a condensation of sensation’. We 
should note that Hartley does not perceive an excavation of sensation (in the manner of 
Inman, and even Barolsky). Instead he dwells on the feeling of the image’s 
condensation, the point at which it is transformed from one essential state to another. 
The transition is not fixed but is in a state of passing, precipitated by two states of 
matter of differing temperatures coming into contact. And so we pass between states of 
matter, as between genres. Morphing from one genre to another we see how the 
amorphousness of experience and thoughts (whether visual or verbal) metamorphose on 
contact with a surface (whether paper or canvas); we bear witness too to this 
metamorphosis. Hartley draws out how paintings from this period settle between 
‘condensation and stability’.  The overall effect of this blue banding is crucial, argues 68
Hartley. 
100 Years Ago (Carrera) (fig. 9) for example, is split horizontally flag-like into near-
thirds of blues. It is punctuated by a lush island that presses above the horizon and a 
rusty-orange canoe that stretches across the nearly three metre expanse of the canvas 
two-thirds of the way down. Each blue stripe increases slightly in depth: the top strip is 
the narrowest and also the deepest steely blue. It is marked by uneven downward 
washes like swathes of rain seen from a distance. They stop sharply at the horizon line. 
Below it lies the middle and lightest section. Here paint is laid on, not in a wash but in 
smaller pushier smudges; zones of icy blue merge into zones of green tinged cream. 
Though it reads as water, it in fact does little to echo the sensation of water, instead it 
almost feels coloured-in. Sandwiched between this middle band and the lowermost band 
comes the interruption of the canoe, a bold, elegant and contrastive belt of colour. It is 
the presence of the boat that establishes the sense of water; the reflection of the front 
end of the vessel and the man sitting in it melt the surface of blue away into short-lived 
 ibid., p. 27.67
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orange ripples. And finally, the colour of the lower band is set midway between the 
other blues. Here Doig continues to evoke a sense of wateriness, not through the 
horizontality or curvature of waves but through a more vertical rough wash. What is 
significant about this banding is that it provides a sense of structure, containment and 
comfort in its repetition; a morning, noon, and night, somehow recalling Pater’s 
‘dividing of forces on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening.’   69
  
And so, drawn back again ‘by a lifted horizon, to set the spirit free for a moment, or any 
stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange flowers, and curious odours’, the sensation 
of time appears variously to fly, hang and congeal; it is reflected in Doig’s paintings as 
much as Pater’s words.  The way that Doig allows his painting to become the site of 70
confluence of historical and visual references is significant. Thus, as mentioned above, 
100 Years ago (Carrera) has been prised apart in critical accounts for its visual 
references ranging from the Allman brothers to Arnold Böcklin, Matisse and Barnett 
Newman.  But to describe the range of references in such a way does little justice to 71
the specific nature of the amalgam in his painted surfaces. The accumulation of external 
visual references in 100 Years ago (Carrera) is not forced. They are not collaged, or cut 
and pasted in inverted commas, as, for example in, Friedrich Kunath’s Old Love 
(Location unknown, 2014) (fig. 16). Old Love is an explicit riff on George Caleb 
Bingham’s Fur Traders of the Missouri (Met Museum, New York, 1845) (fig. 17) in the 
same hazy atmosphere, the side-on canoe is complete with the same characters: a black 
cat and two men, one looking out at us melancholically, the other whose hat is replaced 
with an American-style trucker cap. Overlaid on this composition is a line drawing of a 
naked woman, whose attention is held behind her by a cartoon-like disembodied arm 
holding out a bottle of yellow liquid labeled ‘Old Love’. It appears like a 
transfiguration, as if the love-sick central figure’s fantasy hangs above his head. In 
contrast to the superimposition of contemporary line drawings, a Caspar David 
Friedrich-style landscape emerges from Bingham’s original landscape; a setting sun is 
raised above a receding river whose pinewood banks are picked out but in hazy 
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silhouette. Kunath appropriates, therefore, specific cultural matter, from German 
Romanticism to twentieth-century drawing and cartoon, while ensuring that its origins 
remain clearly distinguishable. These art-historical references, feel, however, in conflict, 
abutted rather than merged. 
In contrast, the nature and effect of Doig’s references is accretive; they swell as visual 
motifs and materials and techniques make contact with each other through an imagined 
history. To characterise these as a passage through visual memory rather than a trail 
picked between visual references helps to draw out the unpredictable, contingent 
sensation of their points of contact. Doig’s paintings tend to function as the site of 
visual, cultural and epiphenomenal confluences and allusions. Hartley characterises this 
tendency as manifesting Doig’s ‘visual intelligence’, his reading of Doig akin to the 
contingency of associations and historical synthesising that Iser and Barolsky see in 
Pater.  In dwelling on both Doig and Pater’s comparable handling of such historical 72
connections which appear to coagulate on the page and the canvas, I am simultaneously 
drawing allusions to the way that I envisage visual and lyrical experiences emerging 
through this thesis: forms of understanding, ways of perceiving the world are drawn out, 
evoking the sensation of thinking – and in the case of this thesis, writing – things into 
association.  73
As we have seen, Doig’s paintings resonate beyond themselves in various ways, 
sometimes as a specific visual echo, but at others, such as in Window Pane (Collection 
of Victoria and Warren Miro, 1993) (fig. 18), visual resonances are more obscured, less 
easy to identify. Uncharacteristically, Window Pane is unpeopled and contains few 
recognisable narrative motifs. It depicts reflections on what appears to be a partially 
frozen woodland pond, and is pictured in close-up with no horizon for reprieve. On its 
outermost surface the multi-layered canvas of beiges and ochres and mossy hues, are 
unevenly scattered flecks of white. Near-vertical brown streaks denote teased reflections 
of winter trees seen through a murky asymmetrical opening of water. They are 
 Hartley, ‘Visual Intelligence’, p. 52; Iser, The Aesthetic Moment, p. 37; Barolsky, Walter Pater’s 72
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surrounded by a more opaque mottling or stippling, suggestive of a clouded icy surface. 
Traces of those dark trunk-like smears are visible beneath the icy zones too, though 
here, partially obscured by subsequent layers of pigment, they turn green, merging, 
dissolving abstractly with the painting’s general surface colour and texture.  
Oscillating between wet splatters and dry sprays, smudgy entrails and lighter drips, 
translucent washes and thick daubs, it is the nature of Window Pane’s marks, as opposed 
to what they represent, that appears so expansive, its painterly feel referencing, or at 
least recalling, beyond itself. There is something of a damp wall in the quality of its 
paint, as if a bloom of mould threatens to engulf its surface, or of a limescale encrusted 
old enamel bath. This reference to natural phenomena recalls Pater’s turn to the 
‘delicious recoil from the flood of water’, ‘the fading of colour from the wall’ and the 
rusting of iron. Noting that ‘these elements, phosphorus and lime and delicate fibres, are 
present not in the human body alone’: we detect their resonances in places most remote 
from it too.  74
Here, back to Doig, through my recourse to comparisons to mould, mist, dirt and 
limescale, other resonances resound. There is something in Window Pane of the lower 
half of William Morris Hunt’s melancholic Reflections in the Water (Museum of Fine 
Arts, Boston, 1877), or the patchy patina of the mirror in Édouard Manet’s A Bar at the 
Folies-Bergère (The Courtauld Gallery, 1882) (fig. 19). Like Richard Diebenkorn’s 
Ocean Park Series (Various locations, 1967–88), the effect of the range of visual build-
up of paint on different planes, as layers and strata, makes manifest the process of 
constructing the painting, and therefore also the process of thinking through it. Doig 
often works like this, allowing a build-up of paint that also exposes vestiges of pigment 
past, pointing towards a painting’s visual ancestry, delighting in the accumulative value 
of painterly touch and absorbing and reforming phenomenal and artistic allusions.  
But what is the nature of this thinking through paint? Colour is built up in layers of 
patchy pigment, applied fitfully not uniformly. There is nothing consistent about it. Its 
surface appears abraded; weathered by time, air, water or the effect of another pigment 
next to it, or beneath it or above it. Doig’s touch feels insistent and insatiable as if he 
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, p. 233.74
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sways between coercion and succumbing, sailing and drifting, prodding the paint into 
place whilst also riding the wave of its natural propensity to drip, wash, soak, smudge, 
bleed and blur. In this multitude of touches it is as if we are privy to the drawn-out 
effect of time, passed and passing.  
Now, recall Pater’s words, whose sentences I have already described as ‘thronging’, 
running on, accruing, expanding with urgency, greedily folding you into them. ‘Our one 
chance,’ he writes, is in ‘getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time.’  75
These ‘pulsations’ are garnered as much from the ‘fresh writings of Voltaire’ as the 
‘work of the artist’s hands, or the face of one’s friend’.  Pater’s ‘pulsations’ themselves 76
pulse as they accumulate by ‘eager observation’ of a welter of experiences. Citations of 
Novalis segue into ‘some tone of the hills or sea’, and on to ‘strange dyes, strange 
flowers and curious odours’ and later still, ‘High passions give one this quickened sense 
of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, political or religious enthusiasm, or the “enthusiasm 
of humanity”.’  The spirit of this impressionistic interconnectedness conflates interests 77
in art, song, culture, life, history, philosophy, religion, science and nature (‘phosphorus 
and lime and delicate fibres’).  Pater’s expansiveness depends upon ‘a quickened, 78
multiplied consciousness’, that crosses genres and disciplines, people and historical 
periods.  As I have been doing here. 79
This kind of consciousness only comes when we are ‘for ever curiously testing new 
opinions and courting new impressions’, new sensations, new phenomena. It leads to a 
‘stirring in the senses’, the arousal of our sensory faculties breathlessly gathering 
ground in Pater’s essay, variously climaxing and relaxing, breaking wave-like on the 
page.  His ‘perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves’ is one such climax, after 80
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this his words loosen their grip momentarily, eddying around a Novalis quote: 
‘Philosophiren ist dephlegmatisiren, vivificiren’ and gaining traction again with the 
enumeration of observations which appear to swell – ‘Every moment some form grows 
perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or sea is choicer than the rest; some mood 
of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive for us, – 
for that moment only’. The drama of this sentence is stoked by the intermittent 
repetition of ‘every… some… or… some… or… some… or… or…’ giving the illusion 
of layering of open horizons and possibilities. The rhythm is quickly broken though, 
with the final ‘only’ tagged on the end, and left to hang, or drift.  81
Ulrike Stamm picks apart Pater’s configuration of the passage of time by isolating 
certain recurring visual motifs: the stream and the flame, the flow of water, the web, and 
the action of weaving. Stamm points to the ‘opposite concepts of temporality’ that Pater 
unleashes. On the one hand time is moving and in constant transformation; on the other, 
it is ‘constructive […] building larger and larger constructs and offering simultaneity 
instead of development’.  Stamm, following Williams, reads Pater’s final move as, 82
paradoxically, to combine the two: time becomes both spatial and temporal, both in 
stasis and moving, as both ‘process and structure’. Regarding Pater’s contradictory 
phrase, ‘to burn always with this hard gem-like flame’, Stamm argues, for example, 
that: ‘The inconsistency and instability of the flame represents the mobility of character, 
the opposite aspects of the unchanging, almost eternal stability of the jewel stand for the 
intensification and concentration of experience’.  The argument is especially striking 83
when viewed against the backdrop of Doig’s painting, particularly those produced 
during the first decade of this millennium. Hartley, you will remember, wrote of these as 
embodying a condensation where in 100 Years Ago (Carrera) (fig. 11) passages of 
fluidity and wash and drift of sky, sea and reflection are contained within a simple 
structural breakdown of the canvas into mindful horizontal bands, which then I referred 
to as the painting’s morning, noon and night, with episodic historical and cultural 
referencing simultaneously congealing on its surface.  
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Pater and Doig’s evocation of time is never systematic, and never chronological. 
Catherine Grenier has described Doig’s relation to modernism as ‘free’ yet ‘remaining 
part of a modern lineage.’  While Bloom describes Pater as ‘the heir of a tradition’, but 84
also refers to him as having ‘fathered the future’.  Beautiful though these turns of 85
phrase are, they are inadequate in conceptualising and evoking Doig and Pater’s 
handling of the past and the future. Bloom’s, and Grenier’s, metaphors are problematic 
because they do not take the a-chronological complexity of their work into account. 
Pater’s connection to the past and the future cannot be portrayed in such linear terms, 
rather it is a ‘concurrence, renewed from moment to moment’.  This ‘simultaneity’, as 86
Stamm terms it, characterises works of the past, in the language of both his present and 
this present.      87
Accident 
Doig and Pater’s embrace of chance is one way to avoid systematically linear 
conceptions of time. In Doig’s paintings chance manifests not only as traces of a 
thought process but also, perhaps more explicitly, in his materials. His paintings are 
built on a balance between intentional and accidental mark making, some of which I 
have discussed above in the repetition or echoes of motifs. But a less direct example of 
his embrace of serendipity occurs in the way that he works with drips. Sometimes he 
leaves these drawn out drips to their own devices, to be read as drips or abstract 
markings, a way of building visual texture. But sometimes they can be read as being 
representative of something more specific like a branch, a reflection or a waterfall. 
According to Shiff, ‘Doig consciously allows the qualities of paint to overrule the 
logical requirements of representation, indulging his curiosity as to what paints and 
 Catherine Grenier and Paula Van der Bosch, Charley’s Space, (Bonnefanten Museum, Maastricht, 84
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solvents can do’ where experiment, happenstance and ‘chance’ preside.  88
The physically worn and weathered surfaces of his canvas have a similar effect. They, in 
turn, are reminiscent of Pater’s ‘accidents of the mind’ and chance encounters between 
art and nature, the man-made and the elemental, or to his rusting iron and ripening corn. 
They result in the evocation of a patina of time. Doig has cited many anecdotes in which 
his work has been accidentally yet fortuitously ‘damaged’. Of Man Dressed as Bat 
( Private Collection, 2007) (fig. 20) he describes the long process by which this painting 
reached its current state. ‘A lot of the actual marks on it came from natural causes. Rain 
coming into my studio! Some of those marks were there before I started, and then I kind 
of allowed the painting to get wet during the making as well’, he says.  Described in 89
such a way the quality of the painted surface bears a resemblance to that of skin, ageing, 
scarred and wrinkled, as if the forces and experiences of time can be traced on the face 
of the canvas. 
Doig’s painterly quirks are what Shiff describes as ‘incidents’. In some instances they 
resemble incidental marks that take place through other image making processes from 
which Doig paints: lens flare in photographs, shadowy areas of a photocopy, uneven 
home printing. The visual quirks connect us both to the world and to other art by other 
artists. They are suggested in the particular character of a brush mark, the flick of loose 
pigment, but finally these resonances find traction only in the particularity of the mind 
of each viewer. The sky in Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre (fig. 7) displays a jostling of 
colour washes. They remind me of the traces of sea water ‘tides’ where salt residue 
remains on leather shoes after a walk on the beach, and range in colours from blue to 
lime green, white to purple tinges. There is a sense of the depiction of sky seen through 
or on another surface. It recalls, again, the mirror image in Manet’s A Bar at the Folies-
Bergère (fig. 19) where the crowds of the bar are represented through their reflection on 
the mirror behind the bar-girl. Manet’s painted surface looks worn away in parts, 
suggesting the patina of a mirror, the representation of a representation and a link I also 
made in relation to the skin of water in Doig’s Window Pane. 
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According to Iser, Pater’s work also turns on chance: ‘The aesthetic way of life is 
dependent on what emerges in the constant flux of time’ he writes, ‘and to shut oneself 
off from the working of chance is to shut oneself off from life itself. Thus the aesthetic 
attitude is opposed to any notion of a finalised reality – it thrives on possibilities’.  Iser, 90
however, also accuses Pater of exploiting ‘randomness of experience and the 
subjectivity of perception’ to increase ‘the diversified chain of impressions, the 
fashioning of which takes us further and further away from the picture itself, and deeper 
and deeper into Pater’s own imagination’.  The associations that Pater brings to art are 91
thus deemed extraneous.  
Wai Chee Dimock frames the potential problem of prioritising association – which is to 
some extent governed by chance in that associations are made according to particular 
experiences through life and scholarship – quite differently. In support of her study of 
James, Tóibín, and Yeats, who on the surface appear at odds, she describes networks 
that allow her to bring the writers into orbit. Her linking of Tóibín and James is 
described as ‘a multiple symptomatic field, a case of infectious hosting and being 
hosted’. Her linking of James and Yeats is, instead, founded on ‘a localized field 
energized by the altered dynamics among genres and by their reversed ordering’. We 
need not pick apart exactly what Dimock means by this but the point, as far as my study 
is concerned, is that by,  
attending to both these networks – as equal probabilities 
distributively scattered, not linearly entailed, and not hierarchically 
ranked either – literary history might be more easily conceived as a 
nonsovereign field, with site-specific input generating a variable 
morphology, a variable ordering principle, so that what appears 
primary in one locale can indeed lapse into secondariness in another. 
There are many host environments here, differently assembled, 
differently oriented, with different directional vectors at play. They are 
nontrivial mediators, and that is the point.  92
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Dimock’s lexicon in this extract turns on a host of indeterminate states, on terminology 
that relates to relationships of proximity and distance, interrelation and distribution that 
resonate with the concerns threaded throughout my thesis. She speaks not of purposeful 
or causal, or even coherent, historical and cultural connections but of ‘mediators’, a 
‘variable morphology’; of ‘scattered’ ‘probabilities’; of a ‘lapse’ and a ‘symptomatic 
field’.  
Elizabeth Prettejohn’s argument when drawing transhistorical links between Greek and 
Modernist sculpture also eschews teleological notions of influence or purpose. To do so 
Prettejohn draws on the metaphor, not of a chain but of the ‘‘chance encounter’ where 
‘chance’ does not imply inconsequentiality.  On the contrary it offers the possibility of a 
precision and rigour that would be unattainable at a higher level of generalisation’.  93
This thesis harnesses these similarly non-sovereign and non-generalisable qualities of 
serendipity, personal response, confluence and association. Since Doig and Pater, as we 
have seen, both employ chance as a mediating force for generating visual and verbal 
forms or ideas, their embrace of the non-causal, uncertain and disordered force of 
chance – hitherto largely presumed weak qualities in scholarship – goes some way to 
explaining why they appear here, in a thesis that turns on subjectivity, a research 
methodology that is, in effect, non-methodological. 
Pater and contemporary scholarship 
The Conclusion’s embrace of serendipity does not just come about because of its 
avowal of allegiance to aestheticism. This chapter also reads it as a transhistorical 
proposition – as Pater’s freeing of art critical and historical scholarship from ‘the 
narrative of anteriority’ as Bal would put it.  Many of the sentiments propounded in 94
Pater’s essay align closely with those of a growing number of contemporary scholars 
who are concerned with deep time, such as Dimock, Edouard Glissant and Siegfried 
Zielinski. Similar resonances also connect Pater’s work to tendencies to see time as 
non-teleological and, sometimes anachronistically, is used by scholars like Prettejohn, 
 Prettejohn, The Modernity of Ancient Sculpture, p. 36. 93
 Bal, Louise Bourgeois’s Spider, p. 32. As Charles Martindale also does in ‘Reception – A New 94
Humanism? Receptivity, Pedagogy, the Transhistorical’, Classical Receptions Journal, 5(2) (2013) 
available at https://doi-org.bris.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/crj/cls003 [accessed, 3 January 2018].
!144
Alexander Nagel, Christopher S. Wood and Amy Knight Powell, and Robert 
Zwijnenberg, who are intent on resuscitating non-chronological interconnections in the 
humanities.   95
The capacity for Pater’s writing to transcend the time-frame of its making has long been 
recognised. Prettejohn puts the growth of Paterian scholarship down to a 
‘‘postmodernist’ enthusiasm for intertextuality’.  And as early as 1974, Harold Bloom 96
explicitly described Pater as a ‘valued precursor of Post-Modernism’.  I want to focus 97
on the degrees to which Pater’s text might speak to or alongside these approaches, 
registering the effect of history, rather than thinking of him as anything like a precursor 
to contemporary scholarship. Even more pressing is the importance of Prettejohn’s 
commitment to reading Pater’s essays across media, as works of art in their own right; 
‘not only [as] explorations of the theory of Aestheticism’, she writes, ‘but also [as] 
examples of its practice, comparable in a rigorous way to the poems of Rossetti or 
Morris and the paintings of Whistler or Burne-Jones’.  Reading art criticism or history 98
in this way, as art practices in their own right, is, of course, one of the distinguishing 
features of this thesis. 
But Pater’s Conclusion can also be read against the backdrop of scholarship since the 
start of the millennium which foregrounded embodied and material, as opposed to 
cerebral and primarily optical, research methods.  This follows a relatively barren 99
period in which the role of the body was rarely taken into account in the work of art 
history. Scholarship that did address the body of the viewer or art historian was most 
notably evidenced by the work of Michael Fried, Richard Shiff and, at least in her early 
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work, Rosalind Krauss.  Since the turn of the century, however, the field has been far 100
more thoroughly explored by such varied scholars as Mieke Bal, Dana Arnold, Margaret 
Iversen, Claire Farago, Robert Zwijnenberg, Stephen Melville, Michael Ann Holly, 
Amanda Boetzkes, Margaretha Rossholm Lagerlöf and Dan Karlholm. These have all 
made concerted efforts to resuscitate the value of scholarship that challenges the 
dichotomy between the work of the sensing body and the thinking mind.  This 101
heightened interest in the bodily address informs the increase of interest in practice-
based research, too, as seen in the work of Michael Biggs and Henrik Karlsson, and 
James Elkins.  But it also learns from the examples and possibilities of arts that centre 102
on the body, performance and installation as theorised by scholars like Irit Rogoff, 
Peggy Phelan, Claire Bishop and Robert Hobbs.  But Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ too, written 103
at the end of the nineteenth century, is rendered in the kind of active and embodied 
language that directly relates to this recent turn in scholarship.  
As Pater compares the experiences of the inward (cerebral and emotional) and outer 
(physical) worlds, he does so not to highlight their separation but rather their connection 
to the world, the degree to which the remit of our sensing bodies is not limited to our 
physical forms but slips into the world around us. The physical world is referred to by 
Pater as active, rather than static and objectified; it is a series of ‘intervals’ in ‘perpetual 
 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); 100
Richard Shiff, ‘Constructing Physicality’, Art Journal, 50(1) (1991); Rosalind E. Krauss, ‘Richard Serra, 
a Translation’, in Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (Cambridge and London: 
The MIT Press, 1986). Phenomenology in the visual arts is discussed by Paul Crowther in 
Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (Even the Frame) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
 Bal, Louise Bourgeois’s Spider; Dana Arnold ed., Art History; Dana Arnold and Margaret Iversen eds. 101
Art and Thought (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008); Farago and Zwijnenberg, Compelling Visuality; 
Stephen Melville, The Lure of the Object (Williamstown Mass.: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 
2005); Michael Biggs and Henrik Karlsson, The Routledge Companion to Research in the Arts (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2011); Lagerlöf and Karlholm eds., Subjectivity and Methodology; Erin O’ 
Connor, ‘The Centripetal Force of Expression: Drawing Embodied Histories into Glassblowing’, 
Qualitative Sociology Review, 3(3) (2007).
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also Arnold ed., Contemporary Perspectives on Method (2010); and Holly and Smith eds., What Is 
Research in the Visual Arts? (2008).
 Irit Rogoff, ‘Looking Away: Participations in Visual Culture’, in After Criticism: New Responses to Art 103
and Performance, Gavin Butt ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Claire Bishop, Participation (London and 
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movement’, ‘the passage of blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of the eye, the 
modification of the tissues of the brain under every ray of light and sound’. But what 
stands out is that Pater sees these as the ‘action of [...] forces [that] extends beyond us’, 
that is ‘broadcast, driven by many currents’ in wide ranging ‘combinations’.  The way 104
in which we register and intuitively reorder our experiences of the physical world is just 
‘a design in a web, the actual threads of which pass out beyond it’ and the ‘concurrence, 
renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting’.  This is not just a question of 105
style. Pater is crucially connecting physical and cerebral assimilations of experience in 
ways that feel decidedly contemporary.  
Dimock’s writing chimes closely, and unconsciously I suspect, with Pater. In literary 
history and theory she explores the trails of ‘loosely strung-together relational threads 
that spread sideways, with spin-offs propagated horizontally, along associative planes, 
rather than through linear ordering or through vertical lines of entailment’. Likewise, 
Pater’s forces and threads extend ‘beyond’ and are ‘broadcast’. In another instance 
Dimock describes ‘networks’ – equivalent to Pater’s webs – of ‘equal probabilities 
distributively scattered’.  Her approach sets the scene for a consideration of the arts in 106
modes that are un-contained, non-hierarchical, non-causal, non-linear and off-centre in 
much the same way as I would contextualise my contribution. 
But that is not to say that Dimock and Pater’s (or my own) expression of an alternative 
is carried out in the negative. Quite the opposite. Their similarities grow as both 
thinkers play with the imagery of the elemental, of accrual that heightens and expands. 
Compare Dimock’s argument for a watery ‘leakiness’ in her theorising of literature, 
which results in something ‘scattered, chaotic, contextually vacillating’,  with the 107
effects of Paterian experience and ‘the race of the midstream, a drift of momentary 
acts’.  Both concentrate on the fluidity of thought over the solidity of an idea. They 108
 Pater, ‘Conclusion’, p. 234.104
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favour ‘blurriness’  and ‘a tremulous wisp’ or ‘impressions […] flickering’ over 109
clarity.  In both, thought is described as flowing and ‘live’ rather than still, stable or 110
past; as active and metamorphosing; as if in ‘passage’ for Pater or ‘unfolding’ for 
Dimock.  Pater speaks of ‘vital forces’,  Dimock, of ‘life forces’.  For one, these 111 112 113
are ‘inconsistent’, for the other they generate ‘variable morphology’.  114
It is not just their specific choice of words that convey the spirit of their scholarship, 
however. In Pater, it reveals itself as much in the rhythm and feel of whole sentences as 
in the content of singular words or phrases. Denis Donoghue sees evidence of the 
unfolding nature of Pater’s thought and writing ‘in every qualifying phrase,’ Pater 
‘postpones conclusion’ revealing ‘the labor that went into [his work’s] production’.  115
This stylistic tendency often obscures Pater’s primary concern, hijacking the forward 
momentum of argumentation. His many critics are certainly not agreed on the crux of 
his Conclusion. For Kate Hext it is a matter of individualism, and not of art. According 
to Lee McKay Johnson it is concerned with symbolism; for Barolsky it turns on 
evocation rather than description; whereas for Cairns Craig, it is a study in style and 
stream of consciousness.   116
Carolyn Williams provides perhaps the most analytical study of Pater, elements of 
which pertain to the overarching theme of this thesis too. For her, following Wollheim, 
the Conclusion is a performance of two parts.  Its highly figurative opening sees the 117
assimilation of ‘the most dangerous “modern thought” of [Pater’s] day’ – ‘relativism, 
 Dimock, ‘Weak Theory’, p. 751.109
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subjectivism, nihilism and hedonism’ – while the rest of the essay is a ‘disowning [of] 
the train of thought represented’ and in this way a staging of the ‘“passage and 
dissolution” of mind, body, soul, self, and text’.  This argument is at odds with the 118
majority of Pater scholarship, and open to challenge. The change of tone, for example, 
that Williams identifies after the first two paragraphs is less clearly defined than she 
suggests. Though certainly Pater’s writing style tends to cool after this point, the thread 
of its underlying sentiment continues. Indeed, the importance of the intuitive process of 
getting to know one’s subject matter through experience and writing continues: ‘With 
this sense of the splendour of our experience […] gathering all we are into one 
desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the 
things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be forever curiously testing new 
opinions and courting new impressions’.  Perhaps we might get further if we liken the 119
Conclusion in structure to the literary trope of opening a novel in medias res in which 
the sensation of a particular experience or event is painted so fully as to submerge the 
reader in it before she has a chance to get her bearings. With time, though, as the 
narrator stands back, the scene becomes clearer. A similar structure has governed each 
section of the current thesis too, opening as they do with sustained descriptions of the 
effect of particular paintings.  
For some scholars, regardless of the precise theoretical basis of the Conclusion, the 
incoherence of its philosophical discussion is deeply problematic. Even Hext, who is 
intent on taking Pater’s philosophy of individuality seriously, concedes that ‘the nature 
of his thought is idiosyncratic: shifting [...and...] apparently contradictory’.  How, for 120
example, can you separate the inner and outer world of experience? How can we ‘fix 
upon’ the external world and its ‘more exquisite intervals’ when every experience ‘is 
ringed around […] by a thick wall of personality through which no voice has ever 
pierced’? And even then experience is reduced to impressions which ‘are in perpetual 
 Williams, Transfigured World, pp. 12–13. Interestingly, in the context of this thesis, Williams calls this 118
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flight’. Pater’s argument just does not, as they say, hold water.  And yet critics are at 121
pains to identify a coherence in Pater’s work that according to Gabriel Roberts just does 
not exist. Interestingly Roberts turns to Sontag to argue this point. He writes: ‘The 
literariness of Pater’s writing (whether in its vast imaginative scope or its studied 
indeterminacy of phrasing) gets lost in the pursuit of meaning, system, and theory. The 
teleological pursuit of expressible meanings has resulted in unwarranted exegesis, 
critics too often guilty of what Sontag termed (in a remarkably Paterian essay) ‘the habit 
of approaching works of art in order to interpret them’’.  122
We saw a charge of incoherence levelled at Sontag in chapter 2 too. But a detour to 
Michel de Montaigne helps iron out the discomfort that Sontag and Pater’s 
inconsistencies might elicit. For Montaigne, ‘there is no constant existence’. Our 
understanding of things in the world is but ‘obscure appearance and shadow, a weak and 
uncertain opinion of itself: and if perhaps you fix your thought to apprehend its being; it 
would be but like grasping water’.  Pater’s inconsistencies might then be conceived as 123
demonstrations of the flux of existence; the existence of beings and objects, of selves 
and others, as not constant but always in the middle, in the midst, a confluence caught in 
the process. In this scenario, we can begin to see Pater’s text as embracing its own 
incoherence, offering us a version of experience that is closer to, even documents, the 
felt nature of experience itself.  At which point the text’s inherent uncertainties, often 124
characterised as Pater’s weakness, seem to abate.  Or rather, following Dimock, it 125
 I use this phrase about the argument holding water quite deliberately for reasons that will become 121
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allows us to recast ‘weakness’ in theory – in this case incoherence – as not lesser, but 
rather non-sovereign.  
Iser comes to a similar conclusion in his accounting for the presence of inconsistencies, 
or accidents as I presented them earlier, in Pater’s text. The ‘Conclusion’s driving 
force’, he writes, is to ‘capture the evanescence of the aesthetic’.  Given that 126
‘aestheticism is not an ordered phenomenon’, the passage represents a direct enactment 
of this, and sees Pater shunning those supposedly desirable qualities of art writing – 
coherence, consistency and lucidity. So rather than see Pater as ‘good at memorable 
nonsense’,  his work might more astutely be considered in line with Maria Fusco’s 127
call for a transformative art writing which ‘depicts resistance or perhaps more exactly a 
sly challenge to comprehension’, which highlights ‘the essential obscurity of the 
image’.  In other words, we might reframe the accusations of Pater’s incoherence, and 128
the purpose of his incoherence otherwise: its unsystematic structural quality enacts the 
difficulty of its research methods, a (non-) methodology that, in spirit at least, is close to 
my own. 
Closing with water 
Though not exactly incoherent, the narrative of Doig’s paintings is ambiguous and the 
quality and texture through the application of paint variable. As visual references are 
merged, rather than collaged, across his painted surface, they often converge across a 
span of water. Water as an evocation of the passage of time, as equivalent to the process 
of looking and thinking about the past and about painting, is shared by both Doig and 
Pater. In this chapter, the effect of water serves, simultaneously, as an active metaphor 
for the interconnected nature of art writing too. It is not just that water induces (and 
produces) reflection(s) but that the movement of water evokes the intuitive nature of 
thinking and writing. The analogy goes further, since the porous connections between 
bodies of water, between rivers and lakes, seas and oceans are – like creative practices – 
physically unbounded and constantly shifting. So to mirror water’s morphology in 
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words is to be buoyed by it and sometimes drowned by it and sometimes seemingly 
absorbed into it. It recalls the manner in which I opened this chapter, positing that 
‘visual images might absorb written words as written words might absorb visual 
images’ where the distinction between object and subject, writing and painting, thinking 
and feeling, past and present merge. Thus I have not treated Pater and Doig 
systematically, one after the other; instead my words and analogies float around them, 
surfacing and resurfacing: they are taken up one by one, carried for a time and then 
released; themes are picked up and then dropped and then folded back into the chapter, 
to return, at a later point, wave-like.  
The physical substance of water has been fundamental. Water’s transparency and its 
ability sometimes to appear to absorb, at others to throw light back, allows for the 
various modulations of reflection that I have been exploring in so doing, echoing the 
fluidity of Doig’s visual and Pater’s textual language. The sorts of imagery to which 
Pater refers in his Conclusion is, as we have seen, often natural and often water-based. 
He speaks of water flooding, flowing, whirling, pooling, racing or drifting. When 
referring to ‘the outer world’ he describes ‘the delicious recoil from the flood of water 
in summer heat’ and ‘the movement of the shore-side, where the water flows down 
indeed, though in apparent rest’.  When referring to ‘the inner world’, by contrast, he 129
speaks of ‘the race of the mid-stream, a drift of momentary acts of sight and passion and 
thought’ and of ‘experience [that] seems to bury us under a flood of external objects’ or 
‘a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream.’  But the rhythm of 130
Pater’s text also echoes the rhythm of a running stream, building momentum, echoing 
the sensation of accumulative experiences which are not clearly organised into self 
contained pithy sentences. They are nothing like Sontag’s or even Stein’s words to 
which I will soon turn. Pater’s words abound with commas, a fitting structural analogy 
to the interflow and interconnectedness of the experiences on which he dwells. His 
sentence (non-)structures evoke the ‘forces’ of ‘concurrence’ of which he speaks, which 
are ‘renewed from moment to moment […] parting sooner or later on their ways’.  131
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It is telling how often commentators on Doig’s work turn to images of water to recreate 
the sensation of his paintings in words. Hartley relates them to condensation.  Eva 132
Myer-Hermann sees Daytime Astronomy as, ‘like a close-up of a wet window-pane, a 
screen of reflective droplets that resolve the visible world into atoms, so that we cannot 
look through it for a motif. We see the glistening of the raindrops, the slow downward 
movement of the water.’  Water figures in Doig’s paintings variously in the form of a 133
still sea, lagoon, swamp, puddle or pond. It is sometimes frozen as snow and ice or, less 
frequently, it is depicted in flow as a river, waterfall or lapping tide. But it also figures 
through the medium of his painting itself that ranges from free-flowing liquidity to slow 
moving viscosity. It is worth reminding ourselves of Doig’s painting technique which is 
akin to picking a path between allowing paint to behave fluidly in washes and allowing 
it its tacky, malleable, and controllable consistency. His paintings, thus, embody the 
variation of rhythms of water’s movement and states, ranging from gushing waterfalls 
to trickling rivulets, from stagnant ponds to pearlescent expanses of snow and ice. 
Pelican (Stag) (Michael Werner Gallery, 2003) (fig. 21) and Pelican (Private Collection, 
2004) (fig. 22) exemplify the distinct, and sometimes contradictory, nature of water’s 
propulsion and containment. This is a modulated distinction which also lies at the heart 
of the analogy between Pater and Doig’s work. The pelican paintings are versions of the 
same scene and both depict water and paint as flowing and still.  Pelican, in which a 134
man stands at the still shores of an otherwise unpeopled tropical lagoon, appears to 
pulsate all over as if in the unsure process of becoming, either being exposed or washed 
away in a flood. It evokes the feeling of Pater’s ‘momentary drift’, as if the sensation of 
this strange moment in which the head of a dead pelican is dragged through the 
shallows were being forgotten even as it is recorded, ‘gone while we try to apprehend 
it’, Pater might say.  Pelican Stag, on the other hand, is far more assertive with its 135
deeper hues and well-defined outline of trees and figure. And yet the stasis bestowed by 
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the figurative representation is undermined by the blue waterfall that appears behind the 
figure, which in material terms references movement, running water. Hartley 
conjectures that, in Pelican (Stag), ‘having a piercingly realistic, photographically 
derived figure next to a passage of paint that is emphatically, materially real was not 
contradictory or antithetical. The two forms of realism could be mutually 
reinforcing’.  This mix of qualities and degrees of realism weaves between detailed 136
mimetic representation of a figure and abstraction of the drenched wash of pale blue. It 
can be read as analogous to the veering between form and content that is going on here, 
in my words, between the substance of water and its representation, between art writing 
as fictional and art writing as a means of documenting encounters. Taking the two 
pelican paintings together, and following Pater’s lead by separating (to a limited degree) 
inner and outer worlds, Doig sways between two seemingly contradictory modes: the 
combination of paint washing and flooding the canvas on the one hand and its precise 
control, on the other and therefore conveys the reality of the fictionalised landscape on 
the one hand and the reality of the site of paint on canvas on the other. 
‘Our place knows us no more’ 
It is this multiplicity of confluences, of realities and fictions, of phenomenal and artistic 
matter that allows for the emergence of a particular variety of bodily thought. The 
‘matter’ of thought has come up repeatedly through this chapter and it is important to 
make clear that my use of the term does not clash with my broader emphasis on the 
importance of the experience of encounters with words and images through research. 
Rather, it is my thesis that the probing of these intuitive experiential encounters gives 
rise to thought processes that offer a specific and subtle perceptual level of 
understanding, one that can otherwise get buried under the weight of more measurable 
research methodologies.  
So when referring to terms like association, concurrence, or the process of bringing 
work, considered separate, into correspondence across disciplines, I have attempted to 
crystallise the nature of that connection through my choice of words. The type of 
association I have been suggesting between Doig’s paintings and Pater’s words is a 
 Hartley,‘Visual Intelligence’, p. 122.136
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further step towards understanding what specific qualities of the works elicit particular 
confluences and also towards understanding how the study of that confluence might be 
productive. This is not a matter of following a chain of direct reactions nor is it meant to 
resemble a patchwork of disparate elements pieced and threaded together to form a 
whole. Rather this chapter should be considered a space in which the spectrum of types 
of association are flecked with nuance and necessary variation, to which the works 
under discussion themselves give rise. This is reflected in the build-up of impressions 
that pull my text in different directions resulting in a chapter that neither coheres in an 
absolute or systematic way, nor entirely loses sight of its wholeness.  
Iser characterises Pater’s work as ‘a meeting-place for poetic, critical, scientific and 
philosophic concepts which intermingle in defiance of the conventional ideas of genres 
and disciplines’.  Prettejohn takes this a step further, as if roused by Pater’s tendency 137
to create trans-historical art criticism. ‘Abandon our silos’ she calls to scholars, to 
historians of ancient and modern art, and to artists.  Rather than allow ourselves to be 138
limited by our learning, by the particular vocabulary and dominant ideologies of our 
disciplines, not least by the tendency to bind our consideration of art to the contexts in 
which it first appeared as new, Prettejohn proposes a shake up:  
In the absence of any theory for how artistic relationships might work 
vertically through history, common-sense chronology comes to the 
fore, and any later reference of an earlier art-form is bound to seem 
conservative, while any relationship of an earlier art-form to a later 
one will seem simply irrelevant to the earlier one.   139
In that vein this chapter has borne witness to my merging of Pater’s words with Doig’s 
images of water and drifting and doubles. In this scenario Pater’s words, Doig’s 
paintings and my research are not solid, ordered and separate. Neither are they entirely 
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dissolved, and certainly not resolved. But through my handling of them, their 
convergence is, I hope, fostered, even allowed to partially congeal, as they slide in and 
out of focus. This allows for a liquefaction of the distinction between the agents, 
between historical periods, and also between self and other, near and far, margin and 
centre, fiction and reality.  
My metabolising of Pater and Doig’s verbal and visual imagery is, therefore, intended to 
form something, like water, close to a ‘compound’. In compounds two or more atoms 
bond forming a distinct substance.  It has been associations that have allowed these 140
bonds to form between bodies, borrowing from the nature of associations that Cairns 
Craig characterises as an operation of the imagination allowing for ‘a chaos of strange 
attractors’.  Or further like Picasso’s relating of poetry and painting by assonance. 141
Gaston Bachelard’s distinction between resonance and reverberation also plays its part 
below the surface, through his emphasis on the fluidity of both terms. ‘In the 
resonance’, he writes, ‘we hear the poem, in the reverberation we speak it, it is our 
own’.  Or perhaps my identifying of a hitherto non existent relationship between Doig 142
and Pater might be more accurately described as what Martin Heidegger termed an 
‘attunement’, or Maurice Merleau Ponty’s ‘synchronization’ or ‘symbiosis’.  All of 143
these terms chime with a process with which I have been grappling, and all share – 
despite the disparateness of their origination – a sensitivity to, and acceptance of, the 
amorphousness of association. 
To that end this chapter has enacted a tracing of the imaginative points of contact 
revealed when aligning Doig’s paintings, Pater’s, Susan Manning’s and Wai Chee 
Dimock’s words and my speculations, in order to suggest a model of art writing and 
 See Craig, Associationism, p. 14 on the ‘chemical (not mechanical) metaphors’ employed by Hume in 140
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with it art thinking. Likewise, that the sensation of the perfect confluence of words, 
images and ideas has never quite been reached testifies to its status as in-progress. In the 
forming of thoughts others are unraveled, in the weaving of words others stray, in 
looking upon one image others pale. But rather than characterise these inevitable effects 
as a weakness, we might instead recognise these ‘hanging threads and out-of-focus 
blurriness [as] the life forces in a non-sovereign field’ as Dimock, again, put it.   144
Much of this chapter, and indeed thesis, has been an attempt to form a variable verbal 
equivalence to the physical sensation of apprehending imagery and text in time. This 
sensation appears in various modes, which might sometimes appear either stylistically 
weak or contradictory. Mixed metaphors have, therefore, interrupted the coherence of 
descriptions and ideas on these pages, ‘associations are sparked, conjunctions bud and 
analogies grow’, I write. Seemingly oxymoronic terms like ‘bodily thought’ are paired. I 
shift to and fro between past, present, future, conditional and subjunctive tenses. But 
such friction-filled passages are tolerated because they are evidence of the immediacy 
of thoughts in progress, a theme that underlies this whole thesis. But they also appear as 
a means to make manifest, through the texture of language, non-systematic methods of 
thought. This inclusion of stylistically ‘incorrect’ forms leads us back to Manning again, 
and her study of ‘the rules of grammar’ as markers of power. She critiques the tendency 
for the sovereignty of Scottish idiomatic language to be undermined by the law of 
grammar which ‘provides boundaries to contain uncertainty, rules to protect speakers 
and writers from falling on the sword of their own expression’.   145
This chapter has already fallen 
Water has often worked as a metaphor to metabolise Doig and Pater and Manning and 
Dimock and others into the form of the text itself, to settle upon a form of writing that 
resonates with the sensation of my subjectively inflected attempts to apprehend – by 
which I mean at once capture and understand – in writing. Water is within us; we 
contain it, we need it, we excrete it. But it is also without us; it surrounds us, envelops 
 Dimock, ‘Weak Theory’, p. 749.144
 Manning, Fragments of Union, p. 243. It also points towards Dimock’s arguments in support of 145
‘weakness’ in theory discussed in chapter 1.
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us, its surface tension allows us to float upon it but a heavy mass of water can also 
drown us. But how do we take stock of a substance so fluid and amorphous?  
How do we find an equivalence for the sensation of its movement and effect upon us in 
words? Despite its potential dangers, in a large and forceful mass, water can also 
invigorate us. When waves unroll upon us and over us, in forms that are similar though 
never exactly the same, their repetitive action either slowly accrues or depletes 
depending on which way the tide is turning. The action plays out in the manner of a 
recurring regeneration of and turn to thoughts and ideas. That is to say, water is the 
carrier of sensation, a rising energy from which thoughts issue. And just as we cannot 
distinguish water from wave so we cannot distinguish sensation from thought. 
Reflections, meanwhile, force us to take a step back, separating us from the feel of 
water, off which we observe reflections bounce. Reflections force a slowing down, a 
sense of self-awareness, which enables us to view ourselves viewing, or to view our 
paintings being painted, our words being written or our thought thinking.  
That is a curious phrase – thought thinking – one which activates the process of thinking 
and the emergence of thought in productive ways. Perhaps, in the context of this thesis, 
we can extend it to the other activities specified above. Do the themes or metaphors of 
water and reflection allow us to view ‘paintings painting’, or ‘writing writing’? Thought 
thinking, though, is not my own, or rather not in these specific terms, though it figured 
in my earlier introduction of Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile.  But it seems to me 146
no coincidence that the gerund more effectively embodies acts in the process of 
unfolding, like this thesis being left to rise.  The gerund enacts the continuous 147
movement – in leaps, falls and sideways shuffles – that the process of creative thinking 
and writing entails. Like the site of rolling tides that finally unfurl along an area of 
familiar landscape that is neither sea nor land but a confluence of the two. A shoreline is 
 See Haddock and Wakefield eds., Thought Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, essays by 146
Gentile trans. Lizzie Lloyd and James Wakefield (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2015).
 See various texts on the continuous present especially, Jerome McGann, The Point is to Change It. 147
Poetry and Criticism in the Continuous Present (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2007) 
who claims that ‘Thinking, not knowledge, is the object of criticism’ and emphasises the emergence of 
thought in which ‘thinking always comes in that kind of continuing, ephemeral present’, pp. xix–xx.
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never contained, never absolute, never complete and certainly never graspable, not 
really a line at all. Along it, or in it or through it land and sea, solids and liquids, bleed.  
Words such as submerge, absorb, condense, resurface, wave, and rise, embody the 
connections I am making along the way, which are also driven by the character of the 
writing as it unfolds. Word follows word, and is generated by the peculiar character of a 
text or an image or the passage between the two. Impressions (Pater might call them) 
materialise, swept along by the meeting places of forms and threads. As analogies 
materialise, certainties are shed and currents cross. This meandering trajectory is 
propelled not by the desire for a specific point of arrival, but by a sense that, due to the 
nature of the interception of particular points of departure, something might happen 
along the way. 
!159
Chapter 4 
Thinking Through:  
Michael Simpson and Gertrude Stein 
A poem should be equal to: Not true. 
[...] 
A poem should not mean, But be.   1
Archibald MacLeish 
 Archibald MacLeish, ‘Ars Poetica’, in Collected Poems 1917-1982 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1
p. 106.
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Beginnings: This is the beginning 
Something about Michael Simpson’s paintings feels analogous to Gertrude Stein’s 
writing; something in Stein’s writing resonates with Simpson’s paintings. I have the 
feeling that their work is associative, that they can be annexed with a conjunctive ‘and’ 
– Stein and Simpson; Simpson and Stein. This chapter interrogates that feeling. 
Sometimes their conjunction here will merge, becoming Simpson as Stein or Stein as 
Simpson, closely aligning, even overlapping. At others their connection is comparative: 
Stein like Simpson, Simpson like Stein.  
This chapter takes a wide-angle view. Though it looks at particular instances of and 
details in the work of Stein and Simpson, it does not look at single works in isolation. In 
fact, sometimes its leaps between a variety of elements in a variety of works may appear 
vertiginous. This is intentional and in some senses enacts the idea that I am pursuing, in 
which ideas are arrived at simultaneously, or occur to us in snatched disjointed moments 
and whose arrival on the tip of our tongues cannot be readily traced. These moments 
occur, in my mind, as will become clearer, as analogous to Simpson’s inconstant 
rendering of perspectival fields or Stein’s skewed compression and elongation of 
conventional tenses. In all these cases the ground beneath the viewer or reader’s feet 
slips.  
This chapter distinguishes itself from the previous ones in a variety of ways. This is 
partly due to how their coupling first suggested itself to me. My interest in evolved from 
more contact with the artist than I would ever usually seek out in my research. Unlike 
through my freelance work as an art writer, which often necessitates studio visits, 
conversations and interviews with artists, I have, until now, avoided direct contact with 
artists for the purposes of my doctoral research in an effort to allow myself to look 
‘freely’, to allow a network of (relatively) unbound associations to issue from my felt 
engagement with Zurbarán or Doig’s paintings.  In the case of Simpson, however, my 2
encounter with his work (as opposed to their reproduction in books or online) began one 
bitterly cold January morning in 2016 in his carefully organised studio, a converted barn 
 Clearly no looking is ever wholly ‘free’ or unbound but in the case of both Doig and Zurbarán I sought 2
not to read about their work before looking at it for myself.
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in the small rural town of Bradford-on-Avon, with the artist by my side. Here paintings 
lay part-painted, or stacked up against walls. In the adjoining kitchenette was a six foot 
cork-board where, as I remember, postcards and images of works by Vermeer, Zurbarán 
and many others were pinned (I should really have documented all of this at the time 
but I our conversation took over). My viewing of the works inevitably felt, therefore, to 
some extent circumscribed by Simpson’s own account of his working methods, his 
contextualisation of his works within the canon of contemporary art and art history and 
by his perspective on his paintings’ meaning and aesthetic effect. I came to know his 
oeuvre better over the three month span of his exhibition at Spike Island, Bristol – a 
large converted tea packing factory with high ceilings, perfectly meeting the proportions 
of Simpson’s paintings, that is a mere 15 minutes walk from my home and therefore 
allowed my frequent solitary visits. 
There are other crucial differences, aside from the context of my encounter with 
Simpson’s work and my subsequent pairing of Simpson and Stein, that characterise this 
chapter. It not only draws out specific effects and themes and ways by which writing 
and painting appear to speak to each other and to me but Simpson and Stein’s 
similarities are further drawn out by my observation and comparison of their treatment 
by critics. The kinds of themes, cultural analogies, mannerisms, and moods that the 
reception of their work picks out often aligns in interesting, and sometimes surprisingly 
close, ways. By pulling on the thread of these instances this chapter does not seek to 
unravel Stein and Simpson’s considerable differences, however. It is, rather, another 
means of exploring the analogy that I have already intuited between them and to wonder 
how that analogy stacks up against the observations made by their critics also. It is, I 
suppose, to trace the connective points of Donald Davidson’s theory of triangulation.  3
If, this chapter says, I have thought these paintings and these texts appear in a 
relationship of analogy, why might that be? What is it about these works that leads me 
to this intuition? And if some of the characteristics that I see them sharing are also 
identified and explored by others then perhaps my ahistorical, acausal connection might 
not seem so far fetched. 
 Discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis.3
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But a good deal of what is to come turns on how the form of the chapter itself best 
demonstrates the feeling of analogy between Stein and Simpson. As with much intuitive 
thinking the form that this feeling takes is rather nebulous. In this case, it appears as a 
series of frieze frames, like slow motion blinking in which text and image merge and 
then shift, momentarily, and then align, and then again. To list the specific instances of 
this effect seems reductive – how could a list, a mere list, communicate the subtlety of 
the image’s and text’s compulsion, their haunting, their challenge. And yet there’s 
something about the list that also feels quite apt here. It might look like this: 
This is the beginning 
This is a beginning (of sorts) 
This is beginning again, by juxtaposition 
‘Beginning again and again is a natural thing even when there is a series’ 
‘It was all so nearly alike it must be different’ 
In their repeating something else emerges 








Conclusion in progress: ‘Making what is seen as it is seen’ 
Another way, partially delivered at a conference at University of East Anglia, is to 
perform my pairing of Stein and Simpson in the form of, what I called, a ‘Presentation 
as Explanation’, a contaminated take on Stein’s 1925 ‘Composition as Explanation’. 
Taking to the podium in 2016, without introduction, pre-recorded excerpts of Stein 
(read by me) played out over a slow moving slide show of a selection of un-captioned 
images of Simpson’s paintings. The enactment of this idea through visual and aural 
simultaneity conveys the important sense of my holding Simpson and Stein together, 
‘nextily’ as Stein would have it.  The idea of the relationship that I am proposing was 4
thus made manifest in the form of its presentation. I imagine this playing, on a loop, 
alongside your reading of this text which, as it goes, will start to pull together some of 
the critical threads that reach out and between and towards Stein and Simpson. 
And so. For example: 
 Stein, ‘In the Grass (On Spain)’, Geography and Plays, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4
33403/33403-8.txt [accessed 12 July 2018].
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I 
A black ladder  
Tilted against a worn-out wall.  5
I 
An impractically slim ladder  
Tilted at a few degrees against a not-quite blank wall. 
I 
A robust ladder  
Tilted at even fewer degrees against a less worn wall. 
I 
A leaner ladder  
Tilted at a few more degrees against a frayed edged wall. 
I I I I 
All topped by four small black squares 
Like dots on lower case ‘i’s 
.	 .	 .	 . 
Some rungs catch lines of light: 
Ladder shadows / shadow ladders / sadder ladows 
Sweep the wall and the floor, 
Italicising,  
(One way and another). 
[i]	 [i]	 [i]	 [i]  
The passage above performs a kind of textual assimilation of a sustained encounter with 
one of Michael Simpson’s paintings: Leper Squint (16) (Tate, London, 2014) (fig. 23). It 
constitutes the kind of ‘writing-through’ a piece of visual art, examples of which appear 
throughout this thesis. In each case they function as a means of making manifest the 
process of getting-to-know the images in question, from, as it were, the inside: 
embodying them and literally embedding them in my thesis. They are forms of ‘poetic 
imagining’ – to use Michael Oakeshott’s phrase introduced in the opening to this thesis 
– which usher in further thought and conversation around the images. 
Beginnings: This is a beginning (of sorts)  
Of Simpson’s work, I could begin by telling you where and when it was made, and how 
long it took. I could hitch it to a number of theoretical discussions on the role of 
painting or religion in contemporary art. I could describe the artist’s religious 
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upbringing by his mother, a Jewish émigré. I could link his work to Stein’s by means of 
their shared Jewish roots, and their positions as outsiders through most of their careers. 
Simpson exhibited little during the 1970s, and only sporadically from the 1980s 
onwards until his exhibition at Spike Island, Bristol in 2016 which generated renewed 
interest in his work. During this exhibition, entitled ‘Flat Surface Painting’, his Squint 
(19) (Walker Art Collection, Liverpool, 2015) won the John Moores Painting Prize. His 
work has since been bought by major national and international collections, and he is 
now represented by Blain Southern. Likewise Stein’s work remained unread until The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Tolkas (1933) and her work remains widely and openly 
criticised: T. S. Eliot has said of her work ‘It is not improving, it is not amusing, it is not 
interesting, it is not good for one’s mind’; Wyndham Lewis likens her style of writing to 
a ‘cold black suet-pudding’; and Elaine Showalter describes it as ‘unreadable’.   6
In connecting Simpson and Stein, I could, alternatively, call upon their works’ 
relationship to Cubism. There is abundant scholarship on Stein’s associations with 
cubism. Mabel Dodge’s article in Art and Decoration, for example, published 
reproductions of Picasso’s paintings alongside Stein’s textual portraits (first published in 
Camera Work, 1912) of Picasso and Matisse.  Indeed, the link between Stein and 7
Cubism has proven enduring and is further discussed by scholars such as L. T. Fitz, 
Randa Dubnick, and Henry Sayre.  From here I could look to the Cubist sensibilities 8
that are present in Simpson’s work too through his playful approaches to illusionism 
and realism, combining text and imagery, exaggerated articulations of perspective and 
light. The case has been made repeatedly that Italian art of the early Renaissance is an 
important precursor to Cubism. F. and S. Borsi pinpoint Paolo Uccello as the forefather 
 T. S. Elliot’s remark is referenced in Elizabeth Hardwick, The Collected Essays of Elizabeth Hardwick, 6
selected by Darryl Pinckney (New York: New York Review Books, 2017), p. 392; Wyndam Lewis 
referenced in Hardwick, The Collected Essays, p. 399; Elaine Showalter calls Stein a ‘self-promoter, 
endlessly self-important. And I just think that her work is unreadable – absolutely unreadable’, in http://
www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/literary-landmarks-a-history-of-american-women-
writers-56536736/#lKQmBVfspoWRKe7u.99 [accessed 14 November 2017]. 
 Referenced in Linda Marie Voris,‘Along the Spreading Surface: The Sequence of Gertrude Stein’s 7
Compositional Tasks in the 1920s’ (PhD Dissertation, Berkeley, 1998), p 1. 
 See L. T. Fitz, ‘Gertrude Stein and Picasso: The Language of Surfaces’, American Literature, 45(2) 8
(1973); Randa Dubnick, ‘Two Types of Obscurity in the Writing of Gertrude Stein’, in Gertrude Stein 
Advanced: An Anthology of Criticism, Richard Kostelanetz ed. (Jefferson, North Carolina and London: 
McFarland and Company Press, 1990), p. 64; and Henry Sayre, ‘The Artist’s Model: American Art and 
the Question of Looking like Gertrude Stein’, in Gertrude Stein and the Making of Literature (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1988), pp. 24 and 26.
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of cubist modernism.  Jaś Elsner identifies the self-consciousness of modern and 9
contemporary art as first arising during the Renaissance and post-Renaissance.  And 10
Christine Poggi’s relates Apollinaire’s interest in the illusionistic devices exhibited in 
Carlo Crivelli’s painting from the fifteenth century. In this Apollinaire makes an explicit 
link between Crivelli and Picasso and Braque’s interest in the interchange between the 
real and the illusory.  I could pivot on this last observation since Simpson’s work has 11
often been brought into association with the depiction of space in Crivelli’s work too, in 
particular through a number of group exhibitions curated by David Risley (Simpson’s 
then gallerist) such as ‘Crivelli’s Nail’ (Chapter Gallery, Cardiff, 2000) and ‘On the 
Immense and the Numberless’ (David Risley Gallery, Copenhagen, 2016).  We could 12
go further to note that Crivelli’s exaggerated depictions of architectural spaces, quasi 
illusionist rendering of decorative symbolic objects, and incorporation of text within his 
images are all a strong presence in Simpson’s work too.  
I could, but I will not, because this is not how the pairing first suggested itself. In fact, 
this series of connections only emerged after close observation and writing through of 
the mutual resonances of Simpson and Stein’s work. The current chapter, then, is a 
proposition, precipitated by a hunch, that the resonances identified might find even 
greater and more specific congruence by my writing through the proposition. I use the 
the term congruence to denote at once Simpson and Stein’s differences and 
compatibilities. The relationship that plays out below is one of at times juxtaposition, at 
others mirroring; sometimes it is like an awkward conversation between unwilling 
dinner guests.  
 F. and S. Borsi, Paolo Uccello (Paris: Thames and Hudson, 1992), p. 140.9
 Jaś Elsner, ‘Style’, in Critical Terms for Art History, pp. 106–107.10
 Christine Poggi, In Defiance of Painting: Cubism, Futurism, and the Invention of Collage (New Haven: 11
Yale University Press, 1992), p. 172.
 Simpson’s work was included in both ‘Crivelli’s Nail’ at Chapter Gallery, Cardiff (2000), see https://12
www.chapter.org/crivelllis-nail [last accessed 20 September, 2018] and ‘On the Immense and the 
Numberless’ at David Risley Gallery, Copenhagen (2016), see http://www.davidrisleygallery.com/
exhibitions/on-the-immense-and-the-numberless [last accessed 20 September, 20018].
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Beginnings: This is beginning again, by juxtaposition 
My attunement of Stein and Simpson, here, stems from my simultaneous exposure to 
his paintings, her words, my thesis writing and my freelance work and practice.What is 
at stake in this pairing is subtly different from, for example, Zurbarán and Sontag. In my 
first chapter the connection between the work of a painter and a writer grows from their 
intrinsic analogies; Sontag allows us a way to empathise with Zurbarán’s approach and 
sensitivity to pictorial construction and Zurbarán allows us to empathise with Sontag’s 
textual structure and style, in a way that other methodologies of investigation do not. 
The writing of their relationship brings to the surface unpredictable aesthetic, structural 
and formal similarities which Zurbarán and Sontag’s apparent temporal, geographic, 
political, social disparities might otherwise belie.  
Here, my underlying claim is that the work of Simpson and Stein is intrinsically, though 
also perhaps not obviously, attuned. This claim is founded on two overlapping though 
distinct scholarly values: One posits that the understanding of remote texts and artworks 
might be expanded when read in mutual conjunction; the second holds juxtaposition as 
a methodology by which to investigate art and writing. The force of both values actively 
impacts this chapter.  
In some respects, however, the work of Simpson and Stein seems quite opposed. 
Compare: Simpson’s ostensive and self imposed frugality with regard to subject matter 
– ladders, confessionals, benches, leper squints – with Stein’s range of topics that 
include composition, grammar, repetition, the domestic, and paintings. Frugality in 
Stein comes in the form of her restricted lexicon: pronoun and adverb heavy, adjective 
and noun light. One of her Fourteen Anonymous Portraits (1923) begins:  
He will find out. 
She will find out 
He will find out.  13
Her ‘Business in Baltimore’ comprises only simple, unsophisticated words like: ‘and’, 
‘yes’, ‘better’, ‘more’, and ‘most’. They are barely punctuated. Compare Simpson’s 
 Stein, ‘Fourteen Anonymous Portraits’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 194.13
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lofty and sometimes oblique references to weighty topics like religion, art, philosophy 
and history to Stein’s frequent reference to either no ostensible subject matter or the 
most banal subject matter – roast beef, an umbrella, shoes. Stein too points towards 
more obviously ‘substantial’ references – elucidation, history, painting, and war – 
though these are nonetheless expressed through childlike repetitions that emphasise 
naivety and ordinariness rather than learnedness: ‘The only thing that is different from 
one time to another is what is seen and what is seen depends upon how everybody is 
doing everything.’   14
Tonal juxtapositions like this abound. In Stein simple phrases are adjoined, 
theoretically, with a full stop but their effect is one of being abutted – like underground 
commuters intent on not conversing – rather than developing, one following on from the 
next. In Simpson a ladder is pictured, usually, underneath a black square or rectangle 
with a void of flat painting pointedly not joining the two. In his Leper Squint (36) 
(Private Collection: Aachen, 2016) (fig. 24) semi-illusionist detailed paintwork 
describes a graphic shiny yellow stool that floats part way up an erect matt black ladder 
against a background of grey-cream paint dragged flatly and intermittently across the 
width of the canvas. Stein’s oxymoronically titled Tender Buttons (1914) is full of 
examples whereby two adjacent sentences appear entirely unrelated: ‘The change of 
color, is likely and a difference a very little difference is prepared. Sugar is not a 
vegetable’.  It is hard to work out how the subject matter of the first sentence leads to 15
the next. Their contrasting tone is even more pronounced. The first is halting, accruing 
gradually and unsurely. The comma placed after ‘color’ is another hindrance, an 
obstacle over which we stumble. The second sentence, by contrast, is simple and 
assured. The stop that divides them feels like a chasm renting them apart, its delicate 
appearance on the page not full enough to do justice to the difference it bridges. These 
qualities of disparity see thoughts leap from one thing to another, in various stages of 
resolution, repetition and insistence.  
 Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 215.14
 Stein, ‘Tender Buttons’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 126.15
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Frequent contrasts in scale also contribute to the spirit of juxtaposition. Compare 
Simpson’s Bench Painting 77 (Schürmann Collection: Aachen, Germany, 2009) which 
measures 245 cm high and 518 cm wide to vertical Squint 4 (Private Collection 
Denmark, 2013–2014), modest by comparison, at 152 x 119 cm or even to his Squint 56 
(Private Collection, Berlin, 2015–2017) which measures just 46 x 30 cm. Likewise, 
compare the mammoth 1000 page continuous prose of Stein’s The Making of Americans 
(1911) to Tender Buttons which is broken up into small sections, some of which 
comprise just a handful of words. Sometimes Stein’s scales vary in a given piece. An 












Perhaps my points here would be more clearly conveyed had I formatted the previous 
three paragraphs in columns, the comparisons made ever more pronounced, literally 
juxtaposed on the page. But, more to the point, where are these mounting juxtapositions 
leading us?  
In 1871, Arthur Rimbaud wrote that, ‘It is wrong to say: I think. One should say: I am 
thought’.  This kind of thought and its means of communication is bound by uncertain 17
juxtaposition. One reading of ‘I am thought’ points to an inevitability, as if someone 
outside of myself has thought of me, has conjured me in their thoughts; in this 
proposition the self is somehow fated, final. Another reading might focus on the 
passivity of the expression, someone else has thought me. Still another, sees Rimbaud’s 
 Stein, ‘An Elucidation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 432. I have left Stein’s original formatting intact to 16
emphasis the contrast between modes.
 Arthur Rimbaud in a letter to Georges Izambard dated 13 May 1887, referenced in Reading Duncan 17
Reading: Robert Duncan and the Poetics of Derivation, Stephen Collis and Graham Lyons eds. (Iowa 
City: Iowa University Press, 2012), p. 112.
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words as summoning a kind of thought that is not a thing we possess, control or present 
but something that we do, a process by which we are. In this case the self is enacted by 
and inextricably linked to the nature of its specific thoughts. The spirit of this second 
reading underpins this chapter. Simpson’s paintings do not resemble illustrations of 
thoughts he has had, but are visual iterations of thought itself, that occur again and 
again, with and through his work. Put like this, it feels comparable with Stein who 
makes ‘writing as it is made’, which is ‘not there [as in finished], it is going to be there 
and we are here’.  And so ‘it confuses, it shows, it is, it looks, it likes it as it is, and this 18
is what makes what is seen as it is.’  This chapter also values making ‘what is seen as it 19
is’. Its form and expression find themselves rendering a kind of thought process that is 
suggested from the work itself: repetitive and sustained, specific and precise, 
speculative and dissatisfied, and ultimately unresolved. These thoughts built up in 
modified layers of sometimes gradual and sometimes forceful accretions. To modify 
Rimbaud’s aphorism for the context of this thesis I might say: It is wrong to say: I am 
thought. One should say: I am thought thinking thoughts, where ‘I’ is the writing writing 
not the writer who has written.  20
Beginnings: ‘Beginning again and again is a natural thing 
even when there is a series’ 
A beginning:  
an intake of breath, a margin.  
	 	  
(Signpost) Intent. 
In the beginning we say what we’re about to say.  
We say it.  
Then we say we’ve said it. 
What about,  
saying what we’re about to say while saying it? 
Beginnings loom large in Stein and Simpson’s work. They often, in fact, appear not to 
move beyond beginnings, never arriving at an end, just another beginning. Simpson’s 
 Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 498.18
 ibid., p. 500.19
 This phrasing also recalls Giovanni Gentile’s ‘thought thinking’ expounded on in chapter 1.20
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pared back paintings are inhabited by the rudimentary suggestion of a possible setting, 
objects either set within, underpinned by or otherwise located alongside architectural 
frameworks. They are the beginnings of certainly uncertain places. But before allowing 
you any sense of assurance of their specificity he stops and starts over. He does this 
obsessively, restricting his work to the representation of a very few objects over a period 
of, often, decades. Even then he is not satisfied: of his Bench series, which lasted twenty 
years and produced more than eighty paintings, he tells how ‘Part of me still wants to 
start all over again’.  And even when they are finished they are always left suspended 21
in an air of uncertainty. The unfinished, patchy painterly quality hints that in fact this is 
still just the beginning. 
Steinian beginnings pepper this chapter as asides, in betweens, and subheadings. Hers 
are of a different order. Her beginnings fleck her work throughout. Partway through The 
Making of Americans she will cut out with ‘To begin again with the children’, which is 
modified at the beginning of the next paragraph with ‘To begin again then with children’ 
and again a page later ‘[To begin again then with loving repeating in children.]’. A few 
pages later she begins a paragraph with ‘To begin again’. A page or so later she starts 
another paragraph with ‘This is then a beginning of the way of knowing everything in 
everyone’, followed shortly by: ‘There are so many ways of beginning this 
description’.  Later, in ‘Composition as Explanation’, ‘beginning again’, and 22
sometimes again, occurs mantra-like, fifteen times over fewer than six pages and halts 
the text’s development but also functions, as Stein herself says, as a way of ‘groping for 
a continuous present’.  Her beginnings, like Simpson’s, feel fraught with difficulty, 23
uncomfortable in their bald repetitive persistence but also symptomatic of the unseen 
process of creative thinking.  
 
Repetitions: ‘It was all so nearly alike it must be different’
 Michael Simpson, ‘Dexter Dalwood in Conversation with Michael Simpson’, in ‘Study #6. Michael 21
Simpson’, David Roberts Art Foundation (2014), no page numbers. Available at http://
davidrobertsartfoundation.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/STUDY-FINAL.pdf [accessed 1 July 2018].
 Stein, ‘The Making of Americans’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., pp. 62–67.22
 Stein, ‘Compositions as Explanation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 499.23
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Bench Painting (31)   24
244cm x 427.5 cm 
Bench: black, cage mesh. 
Floor: grey, roughed up. Intermittent shadow of bench.  
Wall: white, roughed up.  
Top right: Insectocutor.  
Bench Painting (42)   25
244 cm x 534 cm 
Bench: black, cage mesh (bolder this time).  
Floor: dark grey with group of pecking pigeons. No shadow of bench.  
Wall: white, roughed-up brick. Pink rectangle overlaid. 
Bench Painting (50)   26
238 cm x 520 cm 
Bench: black, cage mesh (tighter this time).  
Floor: Blue-grey. Clean shadow of bench. 
Wall: Pristine white brick. 
  
Bench Painting (63)   27
236 cm x 517 cm 
Bench: black, cage mesh (thinner). Small yellow identification tag: 63.  
Floor: No distinction between floor and wall. Pale grey-yellow. No shadow of 
bench. Shadow of hovering grille. 
Wall: No distinction between floor and wall. Pale grey-yellow.  
Top right: Hovering chunky grey grille.  
Bench Painting (64)   28
243 cm x 518 cm 
Bench: black, cage mesh (thin). Small more orangey identification tag: 64.  
Floor: No distinction between floor and wall. Slightly darker pale grey. No shadow 
of bench.Shadow of grille.  
Wall: No distinction between floor and wall. Slightly darker pale grey.  
Top right: Hovering chunky black grille, pivots open.  
This inventory, of sorts, presents a selection of Simpson’s Bench series which numbers 
over 78. Over its twenty year period, between 1989 and 2009, the basic structure and 
key elements of the work in the series are repeated. The format is always landscape, and 
large (between two and a half metres tall and four to five wide). The central bench 
 (Private Collection, 1993–1995) (fig. 25).24
 (Control Techniques The Arup Building, 1994–1995) (fig. 26).25
 (David Roberts Foundation Collection, 1996–1998) (fig. 27).26
 (Location unknown, 2006) (fig. 28).27
 (Location unknown, 2006) (fig. 29).28
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stretches across most of the length of the paintings. The floor may or may not include a 
shadow. There is always some kind of wall or nondescript plane behind it. An object 
also appears either under, hovering above, over, or behind the bench. This combination 
of elements remains relatively constant, yet individual varieties emerge, drawing 
attention to the differences that these shifts affect on the whole. No two paintings are 
ever exactly the same (how could they be) but they are often startlingly alike. Their 
systematic, list-like, presentation on the page above is deliberate. It communicates, or 
better enacts – to recall a term I used often in chapter 2 in reference to the phrase 
‘These. Are. Some. Pots.’ in relation to Zurbarán – a sense of the paintings’ own 
method, tone and systematicity.  29
In an interview between Simpson and the painter Dexter Dalwood, Dalwood describes 
the quality of Simpson’s repetition as like ‘a control experiment. What will come out of 
just keeping this thing going. It’s a bit like a joke that’s been told so many times that it 
becomes a threat. Because of the weight of all the pre-existing paintings that relate to 
this one, it becomes more than what it is’.  What that ‘more’ is is a matter of 30
contention. If, as I have already posited, we see Simpson’s paintings as embodiments of 
a proposition or thesis, then with each iteration the thought appears to gradually mutate, 
suggesting something that, like Stein’s ‘continuous present’, is ongoing. Indeed, 
Simpson’s long term interest in the renegade Italian philosopher and monk, Giordano 
Bruno, might vouch for this claim. Bruno once said ‘to think is to speculate with 
images’.   31
Simpson’s repetition – or what he often, in fact, describes as ‘persistence’ or ‘insistence’ 
– forms the backbone of his later series too.  Pictorial elements like ladders and leper 32
 See Section 1 in chapter 2 entitled ‘Thinking Still Life with Four Vessels’. The inventory also nods to a 29
Steinian approach to writing, though this was not a conscious decision and likely came about in part 
because of my exposure to Stein’s writing at the time of thinking about Simpson’s paintings.
 Dalwood, ‘Study #6: Michael Simpson’ (2014), no page numbers.30
 Roderic Harris, ‘To think is to speculate’, Turps Banana, 3 (2007), p. 52. Frances A. Yates, Giordano 31
Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 369, from Aristotle, De anima, 431 a, 
17. In an important way this thesis proposes that ‘to think is to speculate with [texts and] images’. See 
further discussion in my Conclusion.
 Simpson says, ‘I like stubborn. I like persistence and insistence’, in Simpson, ‘Study #6: Michael 32
Simpson’, no page numbers. 
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squints, minbars, and confessionals appear over and over again (see figs. 21–22, 23–27, 
and 33). The Leper Squint series dates from around 2011 and totals over 60 in number 
(though some have been destroyed or painted over by Simpson). As with the Bench 
series the Squints comprise few pictorial elements. The canvas is divided up between 
floors, walls or ambiguous planes, ladders and steps, shadows and an additional object: 
a stool, a cage, a grille or painted words. Some combination of these appear in endless 
variation that range from the slight to the extreme. Their ubiquity might point towards a 
reading of their religious, cultural and historical symbolism. Ladders, leper squints, 
Minbars, and confessionals might be read as symbols of means to separate, limit or 
control movement. A leper squint or hagioscope, for example, is an opening in an 
internal church wall. Directed at an oblique angle to allow for a view of the altar, it 
allowed lepers and other people with potentially contagious diseases to take part in 
services while separating them from the rest of the congregation. A Minbar is a pulpit 
arrived at by a series of steps from which the Imam addresses the congregation in a 
mosque: a symbol of authority. And the confessional is often portrayed as the method by 
which the Catholic church latently presides over (or controls) its congregants. A ladder 
might similarly be used as a metaphorical symbol to facilitate, or give the appearance of 
facilitating, human movement to a higher spiritual realm.   33
Ladders, for example, are embroiled in a whole series of religious parables. They are 
strongly associated with Christ’s ascent and descent from the cross, with Jacob’s ladder 
dreamt as a means to reach heaven, or with the Mi’raj which tells how the Islamic 
prophet Muhammad ascends to heaven. In philosophy the ladder calls to mind Plato’s 
allegory of the cave, long read as a metaphor for escaping from the darkness of 
ignorance to the light of knowledge. Or in Wittgenstein’s handling, the ladder functions 
as a method for attaining knowledge. In all these cases, and to various degrees, ladders 
are a means to arrive at self improvement. A logical reading of the Simpson paintings, 
then, might attempt to find meaning in the forms represented; they are painted with such 
assurance, authority, forthrightness. That which is depicted must, we assume, be 
important. But in Simpson’s treatment of them, if they are supposed to allow us to see 
 A good account of these kinds of metaphorical readings of both the squints and the benches is discussed 33
in Martin Herbert, ‘Michael Simpson: ‘It’s Compulsive!’’, Art Review (September 2017).
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more, he ensures we do not: We see nothing through his squints, save a mute black 
square; his confessionals are empty; his pivoted ladders unclimbable.  
Stein’s repetitions are sometimes even more explicit, transposing whole passages of one 
text into another.  More frequently she repeats words, phrases or sentence structures: 34
‘Now repeat it. Can I repeat it. I can repeat it. As I repeat it, as I repeat it, they and they 
do, do and do do, do and do too, do and do do’.  The rhythms of the sounds of syllables 35
are stacked up, echoed. They appear in such close proximity, always slightly reordered, 
which occasion their distortion. The simplest words like ‘do’, for example, become 
queered through reiteration. Their position in the sentence shuttles between functioning 
as signifier and as a more abstract demonstration of the felt nature of close but inexact 
repetition.  
Stein also plays on more indirect ideas of repetition, such as when her text is built to 
form a resemblance of the subject that she is writing about. Her portraits, for example, 
are intended to convey the impression of – embodying rather than describing – their 
subjects. She describes this process in terms of ‘the difficulty of putting down the 
complete conception that I had of an individual, the complete rhythm of a personality 
that I had gradually acquired through listening seeing feeling experience’.  Despite her 36
recognition of the gradual accrual of the personality of her sitter, their apprehension on 
her pages, she thought, should convey a sense of the immediacy and simultaneity of her 
experience of that person.  So, through her much studied portrait of Picasso, itself a 37
repetition of sorts, she intones: ‘Exact resemblance to exact resemblance the exact 
resemblance as exact as a resemblance, exactly as resembling, exactly resembling, 
 This is particularly the focus of Wendy Steiner, Exact Resemblance to Exact Resemblance: The 34
Literary Portraiture of Gertrude Stein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). See also Ulla E. Dydo 
who identifies whole passages that have been transcribed from one Stein text to another in ‘echoes in 
words and phrases that reappear, never by accident, across the years’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 280.
 Stein, ‘Business in Baltimore’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 200.35
 Stein, Lectures in America (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1957), p. 147.36
 Voris,‘Along the Spreading Surface’, p. 12.37
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exactly in resemblance exactly a resemblance, exactly and resemblance.’  Her 38
repetitions, it should be noted, are never absolute, their resemblances shift, adjusting 
and reproducing. According to Linda Voris, their modulation builds up the sense of a 
‘homogenous surface’ through which difference always nudges its way though, leading 
her to investigate ‘the working of difference in the apparent context of sameness’.   39
Retallack identifies repetitive patterns emerging from Stein’s repetitions too which, on 
the page and in the mind, resemble wallpaper. Retallack appears to agree with William 
Gass that Stein’s ‘use of repetition is not about saying something again’. It subverts the 
meaning attached, by association, to words, in favour of a build up of sounds, rhythms 
and sensations. In Retallack’s words this is ‘the embodiment of what [Stein] calls ‘her 
‘continuous present’’ – successive words or phrases reconfiguring what precedes them 
through repetition and variation’.  It is not, then, the repetition of particular words that 40
we should pay attention to, but the experience of a particular ordering of a particular set 
of words. According to Gass, whose early understanding of Stein is worth quoting at 
length, Stein ‘set out to render’ repetition: 
Almost at once she realised that language itself is a complete 
analogue of experience because it […] is made of a large but finite 
number of relatively fixed terms which are then allowed to occur in a 
limited number of clearly specified relation, so that it is not the 
appearance of a word that matters but the manner of its 
reappearance.   41
Much like in Simpson’s work it is not the specificity of the objects that we should pay 
attention to but the manner of their presentation and re-presentation, over and over, in 
variations that are subtly alike and different. Gass compares Stein’s project to the 
repetitions inherent in our life experiences (the repetitive punctuation of an alarm clock, 
 Retallack, Selections, p. 190. Voris’s discussion of the repetition and how it relates to Stein’s 38
epistemology is particularly intriguing, in ‘Along the Spreading Surface’, p. 8–9. Her readings of Wendy 
Steiner on resemblance and representation as well as Henry Sayre on ‘re-presenting representation’ are 
particularly useful, see Steiner, Exact Resemblance and Sayre, Gertrude Stein and the Making of 
Literature, p. 24.
 Linda Marie Voris, The Composition of Sense in Gertrude Stein’s Landscape Writing (London and New 39
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 125 and 38.
 Retallack, Selections, p. 43.40
 William Gass, ‘Introduction’, in Stein, The Geographical History of America or The Relation of Human 41
Mind (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 24–25.
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letters being pushed through a letterbox, tea breaks, school runs). Here repetitions 
accumulate, combining to form an analogue of a particular way of going about writing, 
and, if Voris’s understanding of Stein and my claim for Simpson are correct, of 
elucidating thought. 
But the usual uses of repetition – to emphasise, persuade, illuminate, remind – seem no 
longer relevant given that both Stein and Simpson use it to extremes. It functions to 
dissolve rather than foreground meaning and shroud their work in a veil of obscurity 
rather than lucidity. Repetition is one of the subheadings by which C. Namwali Serpell 
organises her Seven Modes of Uncertainty (2014), a study of degrees of uncertainty in 
modern and contemporary fiction. She identifies a pattern of ‘extreme’ repetition used 
to destabilise, to ‘trouble our sense of reality’ rather than shore it up.  Serpell picks out 42
Stein’s poetry for its manipulation of ‘repetition at the linguistic level to convey both 
the rhythms of quotidian speech and what linguists call semantic saturation or semantic 
satiation: the way a word will become meaningless if it is repeated enough times.’  43
This kind of use of repetition to nullify has been much exploited in art: think of Bruce 
Nauman’s audio pieces for ‘Raw Materials’ (Tate Modern, 2014) with their pestering 
repetition of ‘Work work work work’ or Morandi’s innumerable still life paintings of 
pots and bottles. I am not, therefore, suggesting that either Stein or Simpson are unique 
in their extensive use of repetition, only that it is one of many points of contact that 
warrant their relationship of congruence.  
So if, as I am suggesting following Serpell, Stein’s deployment of repetition functions 
to disintegrate the semantics usually associated with a particular ordering of words, 
could the result of Simpson’s use of recurrent imagery be comparable? In both the ritual 
of repetition comes to the fore. The recital of words as if of a prayer or a sermon intoned 
in unison, spoken over and over again. Repetitions are used as refrains. But to what 
end? Or, better, what are its implications? 
 C. Namwali Serpell, Seven Modes of Uncertainty (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 42
2014), p. 190.
 Serpell, Seven Modes of Uncertainty, p. 192.43
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As the opening ‘inventory’ to this section sought to reveal our repeated exposure to the 
basic format of a large landscape painting of a bench, alongside only a few other 
elements, has a rather surprising effect: the associational possibilities of these elements 
grow. Simpson himself writes of the bench’s ‘associations of confinement, alienation, 
restraint and industrial death […as] a place where justice and injustice are 
administered’  but he has also spoken to me about its associations with Samuel 44
Beckett’s Come and Go in which all the action of this play takes place on a bench or 
Waiting for Godot in which Vladimir and Estragon spend the entire play waiting for 
Godot, who never arrives.  As they wait the two protagonists engage in a series of 45
wide-ranging discussions encountering other unanticipated characters instead. The 
limitations imposed by repetition therefore actually lead to an opening out of 
imaginative freedom and variety by association. They become meaning-full, rather than 
less. 
Simpson, however, characterises his repetition as persistence, a distinction that is worth 
noting.  There is a neutrality and instantaneousness to the term repetition which might 46
account for Simpson’s avoidance of it. Repetition has also become a commonplace 
descriptor, one inextricably knotted with movements like pop or minimalism. It 
connotes the recurrence of an object or action in an attempt to recreate a, knowingly 
inexact, copy. Persistence instead conjures a sense of great effort being exerted, a 
determination to try something again and again, to make something new and, implicitly 
at least, better. Not only that, persistence speaks of a strength of character, of an extreme 
resolve to succeed at something often in the face of difficult circumstances.  
A comparable distinction is drawn by Stein around the question of what she terms 
‘necessary repetition’ which she defines by separating repetition from insistence. Of 
insistence she says, ‘its emphasis can never be repeating, because insistence is always 
alive and if it is alive it is never saying anything in the same way because emphasis can 
 Simpson, ‘Preface’, in Hymn. Psalm. Song. Prayer. Bench Paintings (The Barn and the Old Gasworks, 44
2005), no page numbers.
 A film of Beckett’s Come and Go was in fact shown alongside an exhibition of Simpson’s work at 45
David Roberts Art Foundation, 2014, referenced in A. R. Price, ‘On the Leper Squint Paintings of 
Michael Simpson’, Journal of Contemporary Painting, 4(2) (2018), 249–265.
 Simpson, Simpson and Dalwood in Conversation, ‘Study #6: Michael Simpson’, no page numbers. 46
!178
never be the same even when it is most the same’.  Here the distinction seems to turn 47
on a difference in tone. Repetition for Stein seems to invoke the possibility of a stable, 
neutral, even monotone expression. But this is a fiction. When something is repeated it 
is expressed again and ‘expressing any thing there can be no repetition because the 
essence of expression is insistence’ in contrast to insistence which is characterised as an 
imposition, a desperation to compel or control a situation outside of ourselves.  48
Insistence is flecked with emphases that are variable and emotional, its overtone erratic 
and potentially turbulent. She goes as far as to say that she is ‘inclined to believe there is 
no such thing as repetition’ which is not the same as saying there is no such thing as 
repetition.  49
But another purpose of repetition is to remember, navigate, respond to and (to some 
extent) make sense of the world and our experiences. Siri Hustvedt, after Søren 
Kierkegaard, sees repetition not as a matter of more-of-the-same but rather as an 
iteration of ‘something new’. By seeing memory itself as repetition Hustvedt sees it as a 
bridging between pasts, presents and futures. My metaphor here, however, is not quite 
right since Hustvedt also insists on a conception of time that is not ‘horizontal’ but 
‘vertical’.  It is founded on an understanding of the now as ‘retaining, anticipatory 50
phenomenological present’ which gets to the nub of how Stein and Simpson deploy 
repetition too.   51
Here Hustvedt relies heavily on Merleau-Ponty’s notions of vertical time as embodied; 
Merleau-Ponty dissolves Cartesian distinctions between our minds and our bodies, 
ourselves and the world around us, conceiving of time and perception as enveloped as 
well as enveloping. There are many ways to articulate this bodily engagement. We 
 Stein, ‘Portraits and Repetition’, in Lectures in America, p. 171.47
 ibid., p. 167.48
 ibid., p. 166. My emphases.49
 Hustvedt has strong misgivings about those art historians who ‘march through linear, horizontal time 50
with its periods and changing styles, their language colored by an almost phobic relation to the emotional, 
pretheoretical, vertical qualities of art viewing, a fear related to biases of agency and power and to the fact 
that passion and the body have been understood as effeminate and reason and the mental as manly, a 
dualist tradition that infects our memories, our expectations, and our perceptions’, in Hustvedt, A Woman 
Looking at Men, p. 472.
 ibid., p. 452.51
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might reference psychologist J. J. Gibson’s term ‘affordance’.  We might draw on the 52
long history of aesthetic theory on empathy from Robert Vischer to Vernon Lee.  As 53
different as these approaches are, the language of ‘affordance’ or ‘empathy’ articulates 
an entwined relationship between objects and beings, between emotional responses and 
histories which in turn enables non-specific precognitive engagement. Hustvedt’s 
thinking is posited on repetitions, not of specific things necessarily, but of sensations, of 
the suggestion of other things and is analogous to my reading of Simpson and Stein’s 
employment of sensorial or associational repetition. 
Associations are what leads the black apertures of Simpson’s squints – the portals which 
he depicts as the channel for our supposed enlightenment – to summon Malevich’s 
equivocal Black Square (Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow, 1915). The squints hover between 
Malevich’s black square and inversions or at least, shrunken versions, of the benches 
from Simpson’s earlier Bench series which are in turn a nod to Stanley Kubrick’s 
monolithic obelisk from 2001 Space Odyssey. I can say this, regardless of whether or 
not Simpson was thinking of Malevich’s black square when he painted his squints, 
because the squints register in me as a repetition of not just the colour and form of 
Malevich’s work but the feeling that Malevich’s work evokes in me – the sense of 
hopeful hopelessness, the sense of deceptively simple alterity, and the black humour 
that lies beneath its manifestation.  
Repetitions: In their repeating something else emerges 
Art criticism, history and writing are also predicated on a particular form of repetition. 
The identification of religious overtones in Simpson’s reception have become somewhat 
over-defining due partly to the need to marry conscious and rationally conceived 
positions – that Simpson is a fervent atheist, for example. But the sort of compulsive 
repetition at play in his work suggests to me a more implicit subject matter: something 
like thought. His gradual accrual, folding and unfolding of key elements recalls the 
 J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston and London: Houghton Mifflin, 52
1979).
 See, for example, Robert Vischer, Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873–53
1893, Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou eds. (Santa Monica: Getty Centre for the 
History of Art and Humanities, University of Chicago Press, 1994); Vernon Lee, Beauty and Ugliness 
(London: John Lane, 1912).
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precision of slowly formed, repetitive and sustained thinking. The structure of a thought 
is frequently similar to one already experienced: I recognise it as having issued from 
someone or something in particular – due to its tone, size, perspective and so on – 
though it might be differently inflected. So it is in the writing of art where echoes of the 
words and images and ideas of others haunt our retellings – more or less consciously. It 
is not necessarily the case that we are aware of our picking through the landscape of art 
and literature but that particular elements of art and literature show through our 
processes. Similarly, Simpson’s paintings should not be understood as illustrations of 
finished thoughts but as iterations of ongoing, non-specific (as Hustvedt would have it) 
thought that grow with and through his paintings, unfolding through variant repetition.  
Stein’s oxymoronic coupling: ‘Exact resemblance to exact resemblance the exact 
resemblance as exact as a resemblance, exactly as resembling, exactly resembling, 
exactly in resemblance exactly a resemblance, exactly and resemblance’ also embodies 
this. Resemblance is only ever approximate. It is not by accident that her coupling here 
gives up on an interconnective conjunction, settling instead for a side by side ‘exactly 
and resemblance’.  This spatial juxtaposition lies at the heart of Stein’s project as much 54
as Simpson’s, and mine.  
Repetitions: ‘Can I repeat it’: Essaying (lists) 
The previous section began as a list detailing the contents of five paintings by Simpson. 
Its skeletal form of ekphrastic representation of the paintings was an attempt to convey 
a sense of the paintings’ own inherent patterns of repetition. The format of the list felt 
appropriate in the context of these paintings and the subsection on repetition but it also 
draws out the essayistic form on which these chapters are predicated in both tone and 
genre, and which I explored at length in chapter 1 of the thesis.  
Essays are prone to pronouncements of lists. Lists cause a sense of change in tempo and 
perspectival relationships introducing ‘more or less violently,’ as Brian Dillon puts it, ‘a 
sudden verticality into the horizontal flow of text’.  Lists are repetitious though never 55
 Stein, ‘If I Told Him’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 190.54
 Brian Dillon, Essayism (London: Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2017), p. 24.55
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repetitive, and indicative of an obsessive, and naive, desire to control, pin down, hold 
on, articulate, remember, gather, grasp – surely the task of any doctoral thesis. But a list 
also conveys a certain melancholy mood, shared by Stein and Simpson, owing to its 
inevitable failure to achieve all that it essays. Simpson’s ladders appear on the canvas 
with the verticality of a list too and are numbered chronologically according to the order 
of their making. The numbers are not however complete, since some works have been 
destroyed and, anyway, to describe the body of work as complete would suggest that 
Simpson has an endpoint in mind for them, which he does not.  
For Stein the function of a list as enumerator or as an aid to recall is dissolved as she 
pushes the form to breaking point: ‘I begin you begin we begin they begin. They began 
we began you began I began’. She goes on, 
Another Example. 
I think I won’t  
I think I will 
I think I will 
I think I won’t. 
I think I won’t 
I think I will 
I think I will 
I think I won’t.  56
These indexing tendencies bestow her text with a staccato fragmentariness that focuses 
on rhythm and appearance on a page, rather than content, which is the purpose of most 
lists. Yet she approaches them with seemingly objective pragmatism: ‘In this natural 
way of creating it then that it was simply different everything being alike it was simply 
different, this kept on leading one to lists. Lists naturally for a while and by lists I mean 
a series.’  Yet her intoned congregation of ‘to begin’ stretches out like a horizontal list 57
– surely a throwback to days spent in a classroom learning a foreign language: ‘repeat 
after me’. Lists stretch horizontally in the manner of a Simpson bench, as well as 
vertically, in the manner of a Simpson ladder. Usually they are both a symbol and a 
 Stein, ‘An Elucidation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 436.56
 Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 500.57
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means of consolidating decisiveness and planning, yet in Stein’s hands they function 
more as evidence of ongoing writerly indecision. These are not to-do-lists; these, like 
Simpson’s, are doing-lists.  
Adverbs: Mechanically 
Part of the upshot of Stein and Simpson’s deployment of repetition is that it exerts 
considerable pressure on the limits of their media. Their work often appears to arrive at 
a point at which, for example, their use of clear figurative language, narrative or 
historical frames of reference crystallise into obscurity either as formal or theoretical 
abstractions. Detailed correlations between their reception by critics at this point help 
draw out their aesthetic and theoretical similarities. 
Simpson has oft repeated his overarching interest in the ‘mechanics of painting’ a 
phrase with undertones of 1960s American Minimalism.  Godfrey compares Simpson’s 58
cage benches to Sol Lewitt grids, his heavy black benches to Donald Judd boxes 
identifying in them not a shared seriality but ‘much the same gravity and 
immutability’.  The scale of Simpson’s work, its overt compositional simplicity, its 59
restricted colour palette and subject matter, the stage-like choreography of its settings 
that hint at a dependence on the presence and/or absence of a real body as well as its 
antipathy to expressionist gesture – through extensive use of the roller – all point to the 
language of minimalism. All of these qualities add up to what Simpson describes as his 
overriding interest in the ‘gospel of vertical and horizontals’.   60
Many readings of Stein’s work similarly foreground the formal nature of her words as 
innovative writerly experiments, free from ulterior signification. Her work is 
‘autonomous’ according to Richard Kostelantetz, revealing ‘a love of the word as 
resonance or a shape in space’ according to William Gass. And for Marianne DeKoven 
it is ‘incoherent, open-ended, anarchic [and] irreducibly multiple’ as well as 
 Simpson, Simpson and Dalwood in Conversation, ‘Study #6: Michael Simpson’, no page numbers.58
 Tony Godfrey, ‘Un-named Paintings’, in Bench Paintings 1992–1995 (Bristol and Powys: Arnolfini and 59
Oriel, 1996), no page numbers.
 In conversation with the artist 3 March 2016.60
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simultaneously ‘linear, orderly, closed, hierarchical, sensible, coherent, referential’.  61
Stein’s interest in extreme repetition as well as a deliberately sparse use of punctuation 
– she considers commas ‘degrading’ and ‘enfeebling’, ‘writing should go on and on’  – 62
intimate a sympathy with minimalist aesthetics. Stein lets ‘nouns speak for themselves’ 
says Retallack. Her minimalism ‘maximised the sensual presences of matter out of 
which [her work] is constructed’ maximising ‘the sensual presence of forms of life that 
invest particular words with their energy’.  The sensual presence of even the most 63
mundane words are suspended, often in expanses of blank page: 
In circles.  64
Stein’s minimalism, however, is not straightforward. Though replete with pronouns, 
nouns are far scarcer. Their lack of specificity lead to a sentence like: ‘He was then 
understanding something and understanding any one else who was understanding 
something of that thing’, in which the ‘something’ and the ‘any one else’ and ‘that thing’ 
are never referred to concretely.  This makes for syntactically wrought rather than 65
simple sentence structures but for Stein ‘complications make eventually for simplicity 
and therefore I have always liked dependent adverbial clauses.’  The paradox of this 66
dual tendency towards complication and simplicity is drawn out by Elizabeth Hardwick 
who describes how Stein ‘stripped, reduced, and simplified only to add up without 
mercy, making her prose an intimidating heap of bones’.  ‘Her work,’ Hardwick 67
 Richard Kostelanetz, ‘Introduction’, in The Yale Gertrude Stein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 61
1980), xii; William Gass, ‘Gertrude Stein: Her Escape from Protective Language’, in Fictions and 
Figures of Life (New York: David R. Godine, 1970), pp. 92 and 95; Marianne DeKoven, A Different 
Language: Gertrude Stein’s Experimental Writing (Madison Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 
cited by Chessman, The Public is Invited to Dance, p. 10; Chessman favours what she calls a ‘dialogic 
reading – a reading incorporating both the body’s and the imagination’s response’ that takes into account 
a multiplicity of possible interpretations, see pp. 10 and 12–13.
 Stein, ‘Poetry and Grammar’, in Lectures in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), p. 215.62
 Retallack, Selections, p. 35.63
 Stein, ‘A Circular Play’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 338.64
 Stein, ‘Making of Americans’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 97.65
 Stein, ‘Poetry and Grammar’, p. 220.66
 This reductionism is a skill that Hardwick says Hemingway learned from Stein, see Hardwick, The 67
Collected Essays, p. 398.
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continues, ‘unlike the resonating silences in the art of Samuel Beckett, embodies in its 
loquacity and verbosity the curious paradox of the minimalist form’.  Less in more. 68
In some ways her minimalism manifests more obviously, though. A breakdown of her 
‘Composition as Explanation’, one of her more conventional texts, is revealing of the 
restrictions she imposes upon the variety of words used in a single text. Verbs figure 
strongly; in the 3876 word text, conjugations of the basic verbs ‘to be’, ‘to do’ and ‘to 
make’ feature 365 times. Pronouns and determiners are used indeterminately but also 
with pronounced frequency: ‘this’: 47 times; ‘that’: 107 times. ‘Thing’, including the 
variations ‘nothing’ and ‘something’, appears 122 times. The conjunction ‘and’ appears 
192 times.  This restriction of word variants lends her sentences a skeletal quality.   69 70
Adverbs: Metaphysically 
In fact this minimalist inflection leads both Stein and Simpson’s work to be regarded as 
either having a strongly metaphysical bent or, at the very least, being underpinned by 
some kind of conceptual or philosophical impulse. This effects a distancing between the 
visual and textual quality of non-expressive ‘objectivity’, building up a sense that we 
might be in the presence of higher order thinking. For Allegra Stewart the ‘experience 
of contemplation and creative dissociation’ leads to just such a reading of Stein’s 
work.  Robert Bartlett Haas, in a tone of reverie, wonders ‘Who else has for over thirty 71
years struggled to give our literature the backbone of a native metaphysics?’.  And 72
Hardwick puts Stein’s achievement of conceptual limitlessness down to her self-
imposed textual restrictions: ‘[Stein] wrote at length and with a very very small 
 ibid., p. 403.68
 Marjoree Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder, Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary 69
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 90.
 This method of analysing Stein’s text is borrowed from Tanya Clement, ‘The Story of One: Narrative 70
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Language, 54(3) (2012).
 Allegra Stewart, Gertrude Stein and the Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), cited in 71
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vocabulary.  It was her original idea to make this vocabulary sufficient for immensities 
of conception’.   73
These immensities are communicated through the familiar and the quotidian rather than 
the abstruse. Thornton Wilder, in his introduction to Stein’s Narration (1969), has a 
particular take on the repercussions of Stein’s ‘almost terrifying exactness in [her] use 
of the very words that the rest of the world employs loosely: everybody, everything and 
every way’. This, he says, leads her discussion ‘into the realms of psychology, 
philosophy and metaphysics, to a theory of knowledge and a theory of time’. Stein, he 
argues, speaks of what might be interpreted as the subjective and objective but refers to 
these modes as ‘the inside and the outside’, rooting her thoughts in the language of the 
everyday but resulting in a surprising abstraction.   74
The philosophical resonances present in Simpson’s work, however, are more grandiose. 
References to higher order thinking are rife: Religion or Bruno as a symbol of free 
intellectual thought, for example. As a result, readings of his work on these terms are 
recurrent. Barry Schwabsky describes Simpson’s paintings as ‘austere, solemn, grave’ 
as if inherently ruminative.  Harris makes a direct connection between Simpson’s 75
paintings and Hermetic Art, framing the former as ‘thought pictures’ capable of 
‘intuitive insights’ by means of a ‘quiet but thinking presence’.  Simpson’s inclusion in 76
the group exhibition ‘Revolt of the Sage’ (Blain Southern, 2016), whose title comes 
from a painting of the same name by Giorgio De Chirico, is explicit. It aligns Simpson’s 
work with the suspended, dreamlike and timeless reality of De Chirico’s self-named 
‘metaphysical interiors’.  Simpson’s tight foreshortening, and exaggerated and 77
inconsistent use of perspective and shadow to compose physically impossible stages, 
 Hardwick, The Collected Essays, p. 393.73
 Thornton Wilder, Narration: Four Lectures by Gertrude Stein, Thornton Wilder intro. (New York: 74
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via inexpressive paint marks and cold colour tones, contribute to their pervading mood 
of melancholy. It is all strongly reminiscent of the work De Chirico produced during the 
second decade of the twentieth century.  
The presence of the metaphysical, however, even in Simpson, should not be understood 
as solely conceptual. Its sensual, bodily effect is, in fact, fundamental. As Craig Burnett 
emphasises of the benches, they deal in a wholly corporeal ‘metaphysic proposition’: 
‘We feel the bulk of the bench in our bodies; it measures the timbre of our limbs’.  This 78
is partly, I suspect, due to the lack of actual bodies represented to us in paint: a single 
cherub is one instance, a rare gaggle of pigeons, another. The corporeal is not staged for 
us. The benches are nearly two times larger than life size which according to Godfrey’s 
reading, renders them ‘strangely intimate’, allowing us to ‘project intuitively our bodies 
into their space’.  This projection is compelled, but it is also precarious since the space 79
of the paintings is so ambiguous: objects are at once weighty but also weightless, in 
levitation; walls and floors may or may not meet; the surface drag of rollered paint 
guides our eye, which our bodies inevitably follow, across the plane of the canvas rather 
than into it; and the frequently abraded nature of the paintings’ rim, where the 
uppermost layer of paint stops short of the edge, interferes with the illusion of space.  80
As a consequence, almost because Simpson places so many such obstacles in our way, 
we meet his paintings’ resistance with equal insistence; the potential for physical access 
to his scenes feels somehow inevitable.  
Adverbs: Systematically 
In holding back from overt aesthetic expressiveness the stylistic austerity manifest in 
Stein and Simpson appears aloof to the effects of subjective foible. Stein’s eschewal of 
adjectival flourishes or metaphor, for example, acts as the counterpart to Simpson’s 
emphatic spurning of what Godfrey calls ‘aesthetic confectionary’ or ‘frippery’, that is, 
any elements that might distract from the essence of the painting.  Instead, both Stein 81
 Burnett, ‘The Timbre of Our Limbs’, p. 4–5.78
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and Simpson appear to turn to a method of systematising that calls to mind scientific or 
mathematical problem solving.  
In Stein, the mathematical impulse is much reflected upon. Laura Riding and Robert 
Graves relate how the ‘design’ of Stein’s words, their appearance in formation on the 
page, is ‘literally “abstract” and mathematical’. They account for this effect by her use 
of ‘commonplace words’ which amount to ‘mechanical and not eccentric’ utterances.  82
They are functional rather than expansive or gestural. Retallack describes Stein’s use of 
grammar as structurally enacting ‘a differential geometry of attention’.  The absence of 83
metaphor in mathematics – whether spatial (geometry) or numerical (arithmetics) – with 
its inherent resistance to interpretation, clearly appeals: 
Are there arithmetics, irresistible, in part. 
Are there arithmetics irresistible resisted a part. 
Are there arithmetics irresistible apart. 
Ever say ever see, as ever see, ever say. 
Notably. 
Arithmetics.   84
Steven Meyer builds a whole thesis around Stein’s perceived method of ‘reconfigur[ing] 
science as writing’, making claims for her ‘performing ‘scientific experiments in 
writing’.  Part way through ‘We Came. A History’, Stein’s text turns from a piece of 85
prose organised into reasonably conventional paragraphs to a body of text on a page 
with no paragraph breaks in which sentences or clauses, often without verbs, are linked 
by equals signs: ‘History is made and remains = A delight by reason = Of certainty and 
certainty = Depends upon a result = Achieved directly by a = Surprise not a surprise = 
In fact nor in thought’.  This goes on for over four pages, as if Stein is in the process of 86
developing a complicated formulaic equation for the effect of history which never quite 
works out. Tanya Clement goes further, arguing that Stein’s mechanistic deployment of 
 Laura Riding and Robert Graves, A Survey of Modernist Poetry (Folcroft, Pa.: Folcroft Press, 1969), p. 82
281.
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language should also be replicated by her readership. The method of best processing 
Stein’s work is not as a human, even critical, reader but as a machine. Through digital 
reading tools – text analysis and visualisations – Clement is able to identify patterns of 
‘recombinations and recombinatory words’ around which the whole of The Making of 
Americans is structured.  Systemising should be met by systematising. 87
This, in turn, is comparable to Simpson’s commitment to the construction of paintings 
by a systematicity, a measure and accuracy akin to mathematical formulae.  Simpson 88
has described his paintings as being about neither ladders, squints, nor shadows but 
geometry: ‘the gospel of verticals and horizontals’.  For Godfrey, it is the paintings’ 89
roles as still-lifes or vanitas that inform Simpson’s tightly choreographed compositions. 
He makes the analogy with Juan Sanchez Cotán’s sixteenth-century mathematically 
precise arrangements of compositions of fruit and vegetables suspended against a black 
background.  Less sharply executed, but in keeping, is Zurbarán’s Four Vessels who 90
forms one part of chapter 2 of this thesis. The symmetry is apt.  
To suggest that Simpson and Stein’s approaches are in some way scientific sits 
somewhat uneasily. It might suggest a degree of pre-planning (hypothesising) and 
implementation (proving or disproving) which is at odds with the spirit of this thesis 
which foregrounds emergent ideas and intuitive associations over positivist claims and 
methods of research. I have discussed how Simpson reduces the pictorial elements of 
his paintings, varying each element almost in turn, a process that Dalwood likens to ‘a 
control experiment’.  Godfrey has also related how ‘thoroughly planned’ Simpson’s 91
paintings are, their ‘measurements calculated and then executed’.  If that is the case 92
then how does the reality of this working method stack up against my suggestion that 
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these paintings appear as embodiments of thoughts in progress? Surely, they are more 
like examples or illustrations of carefully drafted preconceived thoughts. 
A more detailed view of Stein’s dichotomous relationship with the idea of writing as 
crystallisation of imminent thought alleviates some of this tension. She is torn between 
the difficult aim to render the immediacy of experience and the desire for her work to 
enact a rigour that this immediacy counteracts. Retallack, for example, recalls B. F. 
Skinner’s criticism of Tender Buttons for its laxness and evident use of automatic 
writing.  Riding and Graves similarly accuse Stein of using ‘language automatically to 93
record pure ultimate obviousness’.  Stein herself, in ‘Composition as Explanation’, is 94
adamant that the nature of composition is ‘naturally’ processual, at once receptive of 
and sensitive to the process of its making: ‘no one formulates until what is to be 
formulated has been made’.  95
Retallack, on the other hand, argues that Stein’s projects are ‘consciously framed 
investigations.’  Likewise, Nicola Shaughnessy’s reading draws out the inherent 96
artifice at play in Stein’s dichotomous relationship to spontaneity and rigour. 
Shaughnessy points to the ‘remarkable and frustrating’ degree to which the handwritten 
manuscripts in the Stein archive differ very little from the published version: ‘The vast 
majority of manuscripts are completely clean, and fluently written without the 
amendments, deletions or marginalia which one would expect from a draft manuscript.’ 
This, argues Shaughnessy, ‘gives the impression of spontaneous writing which barely 
requires editing’, suggesting that there is an inauthenticity about Stein’s ostensibly 
spontaneous writing.  Shaughnessy goes on to point out that there is, however, a great 97
degree of planning that goes on before the stage of drafting manuscripts as evidenced in 
Stein’s carnets. The kind of thinking that appears through her manuscripts is therefore 
still in the process, a continuation of the rougher beginnings held in the earlier 
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notebooks. In fact Stein herself holds that of ‘the few who make writing as it is made,’ 
and we must assume that she is among the few, ‘the most decided of them are those that 
are prepared by preparing’. In Stein’s mind, then, no such dichotomy between the 
intuitive and the choreographed exists, it is all comprised of ‘the time when and the time 
of and the time in that composition’.  Sustained thinking, in other words, happens 98
through the course of writing. 
Adverbs: Continuously  
Framing Stein and Simpson’s work as embodying such sustained and continuous 
thought characterises it as enacting extended moments of meditation on and through an 
experience, or the idea of an experience. Those moments are not, however, momentary. 
Stein coined a term for this; she called it the ‘prolonged’ or, more frequently, 
‘continuous present’.  In her retelling of how The Making of Americans came about, 99
for example, this continuous present lasts for a thousand pages ‘creating a more and 
more continuous present including more and more using of everything and continuing 
more and more beginning and beginning and beginning.’  Even in its recounting the 100
continuous present endures: her continuous present was not created but is ‘creating’, 
everything was not included but ‘including’, her beginnings not continued but 
‘continuing’. And then doubling back to the use of the past tense: ‘I went on and on’.  101
How should we conceptualise such movements between past, present, and future in 
Stein’s work? In another text, Stein tightens and heightens the effect of these 
intertwining temporalities still further. She writes: ‘They were what I knew America 
was when I used to say what America is, only now it had been done, America had been 
able to do what America is.’  It could be claimed that the frequent veering between 102
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tenses renders the text ‘unreadable’ or ‘confusing’ as many have done.  But Retallack 103
thinks otherwise: ‘This bundle of swerving tenses’, she says is, ‘an example of a 
revolutionary grammar as literary innovation as the composing of a new temporal 
logic’.  This goes beyond a continuous present because it also appears to crystallise 104
the past and present in the manner of transparent overlays compressing the space of 
Stein’s past, present and future.  
It is as compressed, we might say, as the space in Simpson’s squint series. Perspective, 
the means by which space is traditionally rendered, is always a little off, a little wrong, 
as a pedantic reading of Stein’s entanglements of tenses also have it. Leper Squint 28 
(Private Collection, Düsseldorf, 2015) (fig. 30) depicts a ramp with a small step at its 
base. Pictured in profile the top of the ramp is rendered as neither a proper plan view 
nor a perspectival view. There is no recession. It is skewed and mimetically nonsensical. 
The back of the ramp, which presumably we would hold to steady ourselves as we peer 
through the squint at the top right of the painting, is deep black, and, unlike the rest of 
the ramp, is pictured as if level with our line of sight. He also uses shadow to distort 
three dimensional space; light appears to hit the squint from above and to the left of the 
painting casting a softening shadow aslant around its edges. The shadow of the ramp, 
however, is pictured as a simple clean edged rectangle directly beneath the ramp itself, 
the angle of light even and vertical. The slight shading that appears on the end of the 
sloping step, however, suggests another source of light again, from the right hand side, 
this time. Spatial relations are thus not only compressed but conflicted or rather 
conflated. If we imagine the direction of the light source as relating to a particular time 
of day, then this painting captures morning, noon and afternoon in one continuous 
moment. 
Adverbs: Historically 
All of this discussion of Stein and Simpson’s surface, rhythm, and seriality is not to 
argue that their work is formalist, however. Both, as we have seen, commit to modes of 
 For a fuller historiography of the ‘unreadability’ of Stein see Natalie Cecire’s excellent ‘Ways of Not 103
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!192
philosophical, poetic and literary thinking, either by knowing reference or by a 
subconscious exploration of ideas that root their work’s value beyond itself. Simpson is 
a bibliophile; his library of rare editions, periodicals and twentieth-century experimental 
literature that abuts his painting studio is given frequent mention by his critics.  In the 105
1980s he painted an enormous work entitled Burial of Books (Artist’s Collection, 1984–
85), which pictures a deluge of non-specific tomes and embodies his conflicted 
relationship with them as a ‘symbol of knowledge that is both imposed on the individual 
but can also liberate him’.  The History of Art and the History of Ideas figure more 106
specifically.  
The motifs Simpson returns to are loaded by the history of their associations. His Bench 
series takes as its starting point the history of the execution of Giordano Bruno, a 
Neapolitan philosopher, astrologer, mathematician, poet and Dominican friar who was 
tortured before being gruesomely executed in the Roman square of Campo de’ Fiori by 
the Inquisition in 1600. Bruno was charged with heresy for denying the existence of key 
catholic doctrines, as well as making such daring endorsement and extension of 
Copernican claims about the infinite nature of the universe. This history provides the oft 
cited backdrop to Simpson’s Bench series which the artist himself describes as an 
‘homage’ to Bruno, allowing Simpson a way to make reference to ‘the infamy of 
religious history’.  Bruno is the invisible protagonist in this series, referenced in the 107
classical typescript that spells out ‘The Shadow of Ideas’ (a translation of Bruno’s 
seminal study on memory De Umbris Idearum) that hangs above one levitating bench, 
in the bench that carries the date of Bruno’s death, 17 2 1600 in Bench Painting 67 
(Bruno Resurrect) (Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, 2008) (fig. 31).  
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Stein, though, has often been read as an all-out self-conscious modernist, spurning 
content or narrative in favour of a life-long obsession with form.  In an interview 108
between Nada Gordon and Benjamin Friedlander, Friedlander recounts how Jena 
Osman saw an ‘erasure of history as a liberatory gesture’ in Stein’s work.  Whereas 109
for Friedlander, Stein ‘replaced Joyce’s historicism with a kind of writing which 
conceived of language as an autonomous system of signs’.  In fact, her work 110
repeatedly makes references beyond itself, to time and history, among other things. 
Publications like, ‘History. Or Messages from History’ (1930), ‘We Came. A 
History.’ (1930), The Making of Americans, and ‘The Winner Loses: A Picture of 
Occupied France’ (1942) all explicitly consider the effect of history and historical 
thinking.  ‘Let me recite what history teaches. History teaches.’ ‘This is not historical 111
[…] This might be historical […] This is historical […] This is history because it is 
accompanied by reluctance. Reluctance is not necessarily history nor is decision,’ Stein 
intones.   112
The impact of history in Stein and Simpson’s work often manifests obliquely, though. 
Retallack’s reading of the role of ‘the historical’, as opposed to ‘history’ – a term Stein 
considers homogenising and patriarchal – is particularly interesting, as she holds the 
effects of World War I and II as permeating Stein’s thinking in abstract ways. Her 
grammatical experimentation, Retallack argues, exposes the nature of Stein’s 
relationship with her historical moment. Her sentence structures and syntaxes are 
folded, compressed, and undone; they make possible a ‘reinvention of new ways of 
being in one’s time’.  But they also, as Natalie Cecire describes, add up to form a 113
‘mimetic experience of History’: violent, dislocated, mechanistic.  114
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Harriet Scott Chessman builds a convincing case for Stein’s interest in instances of 
historical literature too. She reads Stein’s work as partaking in a distinct dialogue with 
words and their histories by reference to the romantics, Emerson and Keats. Chessman 
argues that Stein knowingly plucks Emerson’s image of the rose, the apogee of 
perfection – ‘There is simply the rose; it is perfect in every moment of its existence’ – 
and redeploys it to draw attention to the perfection of the word ‘rose’ by knowingly 
tugging it from its historical roots. In Stein’s version it is reformulated: ‘Rose is a rose 
is a rose is a rose’. It is a technique she uses often, at once echoing and disowning 
nouns.   115
Simpson’s relationship with history, and art history in particular, is equally conflicted. 
‘Every time I begin a painting’, he says, ‘I have to really get myself together, and try to 
ignore the weight of history. The weight of the history of art, I mean’.  He senses it as 116
a psychological threat while also counselling young artists not to fear it.  He talks at 117
length about the breadth of his interest in visual forms which spans early Dutch church 
interiors, portraiture and De Stijl, Russian constructivism, seventeenth-century Spanish 
still-life painting and Surrealism, as well as Carlo Crivelli, Alexander McQueen, 
Samuel Beckett and John Cage. The way his paintings manifest these multiple traditions 
is distinctive, sometimes specific, at other times indirect: the drama of Cotán’s 
mathematical arrangements reverberate; Mondrian’s scrupulous high-contrast structures 
order, the rumpled fabric that lies under the tomb-like bench in Bench Painting 73 
(Blain Southern, 2009) (fig. 32) is haunted by the cloth of the draped figure of Poussin’s 
Landscape with the Funeral of Phocion (National Museum, Cardiff, 1648) (fig. 33). 
Historical references are not appropriated, borrowed directly or necessarily even 
intended (I have not heard of Simpson referencing Poussin, for example), instead they 
exert forces akin to magnetic fields – at times hovering almost impalpably, at others 
exerting considerable pressure.  
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Stein (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 79– 87.
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Even his surfaces repel and attract history; allowing history itself to become material in 
its own right, as vital as his brushes and rollers, ladders and benches, whites and 
blacks.  The use of the roller, as opposed to primarily the paintbrush, for example, 118
carries particular connotations. When rollered paint adheres to the canvas it creates 
seams where one application overlaps another. Paint applied in this way tends toward a 
regularity, an evenness that is more emotionally distanced than the application of paint 
by the stroke of a brush. Given the scale of Simpson’s canvases rollers are also more 
practical, allowing for quick coverage across a large area. But their connotations as the 
favoured tool of painters and decorators slapping on a pot of Dulux cannot be 
overlooked, although Simpson has perfected a highly skilled, controlled and painterly 
technique through his use of rollers of various textures, shapes and sizes. This enables 
him to achieve not a pristine uniform finish, in the manner of a minimalist like Sol 
Lewitt, but a choreographed blemishing of colour, tone, and texture by recurrent 
layering, stripping, and degrading of surface. His use of the roller, therefore, functions, 
unexpectedly expressively. Yet again, the relationships his paintings make to the 
histories they reference are never straightforward. 
There are references at play in his work other than those Simpson himself identifies. 
Harris describes them as ‘vocal catalysts but [which] remain in a final sense, mute’.  119
They prompt Burnett to see in Simpson’s squints Malevich’s black square, and therefore 
a reference to ‘utopian ideas of modernist abstraction’, or as ‘portals to the infinite’ 
recalling Lucio Fontana’s slashed canvases.  Harris sees them as ‘Kapoor-like’, the 120
black slabs of benches as reminiscent of Kubrick’s 2001 A Space Odyssey.  John-Paul 121
Stonnard sees in them Beckett’s sparse stage sets and directions.  And the classical 122
lettering that Simpson employs in his signs above various benches recalls Roman street 
signs or perhaps Ian Hamilton Finlay’s stone poem collaborations. 
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Some historical connections are quietly borne out in Simpson’s colour palette. The hue 
of his intense black, for instance, resonates widely. Its deployment inverts that of the 
seventeenth-century still-lifes of Zurbarán or Cotán in which scrupulously arranged and 
meticulously rendered vessels, fruit and vegetables usher from pitch-dark backgrounds. 
Simpson’s black is pushed to the forefront, where it appears suspended. His 
backgrounds are never pure white but always not-quite-white and range deliciously 
from lilac tinged to coffee stained. Victorian aesthete John Ruskin once wrote, in a text 
that Simpson holds dear, that ‘Velasquez is the greatest master of the black chords’. He 
tells how you must make ‘the white in your picture precious and the black 
conspicuous’.  And so Simpson’s fervent blacks press forth, standing proud, never 123
appearing cavernous (like Anish Kapoor’s Vantablack S-VIS, apparently the ‘blackest 
black’ pigment).  Simpson deals not in black, but blacks by degrees. 124
Sometimes his black is crystalline, akin to Wilhelm Sasnal’s or Édouard Manet’s. Or 
like Velasquez’s Philip IV of Spain (National Gallery, London, 1627) in which the 
king’s pious all-black attire picks out the stark white letter held in his hand. This kind of 
black evokes a glamour and mystery akin to Bench Painting 67 (fig. 31). At times 
Simpson’s black is matt (Bench painting 77) at others it clings to the shallow grooves of 
the painting’s outermost layer (as at the base of Minbar). At others its surface is mottled 
with hairline cracks like Bench Painting 77 (Schürmann Collection, Aachen, 2009), 
which recalls the current state of Malevich’s Black Square whose surface has crazed 
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with age.  In his Confessional series, the sheer quantity and luminosity of Simpson’s 125
black is striking. The diptych, Unnamed (Confessional) (Private Collection, 2015) (fig. 
34), is made from the most lustrous, sensual black velveteen; a slick that is buoyed by 
the surface painting but that also, when prodded, promises to leave behind an oily 
coating. 
Adverbs: Sensually 
The musical kinship of Stein and Simpson’s work appears, at first sight, unlikely, 
especially so in Simpson’s muted canvases. Many of Stein’s critics cite musicality as a 
general characteristic of her writing. Wilder sees her lectures as ‘written reposes upon 
an unerring ear for musical cadence’.  Hardwick reads Stein’s rhythmical variant 126
repetitions as sharing something with Philip Glass’s layered orchestral compositions.  127
Virgil Thomson considers Stein’s structures as lying ‘closer to musical timings than to 
speech timings’, and Leonard Bernstein compares Stein to Berlioz, Stravinsky, and 
Richard Strauss.  Others, like Retallack, emphasise her texts ‘oral-musical properties’, 128
which are conveyed less effectively in their appearance on a page, where they resemble 
the patterning of wallpaper, than when performed or spoken aloud.  Perhaps all this is 129
not surprising given Stein’s relationships with composers like Virgil Thomson and 
Reverend Al Carmines. Her plays and operas, which number over 75, were performed 
and often accompanied by music.  130
 Philip Shaw, ‘Kasimir Malevich’s Black Square’, in Nigel Llewellyn and Christine Riding eds., The 125
Art of the Sublime (London: Tate Research Publication, January 2013). https://www.tate.org.uk/art/
research-publications/the-sublime/philip-shaw-kasimir-malevichs-black-square-r1141459, [accessed 07 
February 2017].
 Wilder, Narration, p. v.126
 Hardwick, The Collected Essays, p. 103.127
 Virgil Thomson, Virgil Thomson: The State of Music and Other Writings (New York: Knopf, 1966), p. 128
105. The reference to Leonard Bernstein comes from Johanna Frank, ‘Resonating Bodies and the Poetics 
of Aurality; Or, Gertrude Stein’s Theatre’, Modern Drama, 51(4) (2008), p. 519.
 Retallack, Selections, p. 12. See also Frank, ‘Resonating Bodies’, p. 515.129
 Bonnie Marranca, ‘Introduction: Presence of Mind’, in Gertrude Stein: Last Operas and Plays, 130
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), p xxii. Marranca does, however, suggest in this 
introduction that in fact Stein ‘didn’t like music and expressed an interest in seeing her work done 
without it’, p. xxii. 
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More surprising is the frequency with which Simpson’s critics turn to music in their 
efforts to convey a specific sense of the experience of his paintings. Harris meditates on 
how, ‘Hovering before us they invite synaesthetic interpretation. I venture they might 
effuse something like a low hum, or even an organ chord, of the kind of opening / 
closing chimes on a track by somebody like Autechre’.  Schwabsky invites us ‘to be 131
with [Simpson’s Bench paintings], to be affected by them, immersing oneself in their 
rich though understated visual harmonies’ which leads him to speculate that ‘the 
experience of sharing a large room with a significant number of them would be 
something like hearing an austere but complicated piece of music like Thomas Tallis’s 
Spem in Alium, 1570, a work for massed choirs surrounding the listener’.  And, 132
coincidentally, in a small room just off Simpson’s ‘Flat Surface Painting’ (2016) 
exhibition at Spike Island, was Ruaidhri Ryan’s Belt Craft Studios, a film about filming 
food but which also featured a tongue-in-cheek transcendent soundtrack of choral music 
which bled into the space of Simpson’s paintings too.  133
These synaesthetic readings of Stein and Simpson are the result, partly, of the difficulty 
of finding appropriate words to describe them, so critics find themselves turning, albeit 
briefly, to examples of equivalence or at least comparison, in music, art or literature. 
These analogies appear as if compelled by the works themselves, a means to better 
come to terms with them. This is not a reading into the work, in the manner of the kind 
of archaeological interpretations that Sontag so objected to, but a reading across, 
triggered by the works’ sensorially charged surface textures.  
This sensuousness manifests in various ways. Meyer identifies Stein’s ‘waltz-like 
syntax’.  But this goes a step further when we realise that this dance is enacted with 134
Stein’s words, by you, her reader. It is as if as your eyes pass her words on a page, you 
join her in turning words over and over, as if handling them, exploratively fingering 
them. This becomes even more explicit when read aloud or whispered, as I so often find 
 Harris, ‘To think is to speculate’, p. 57.131
 Schwabsky, ‘Michael Simpson’s Bench Paintings’, no page numbers. 132
 This coincidental link is also made by Peter Carey-Kent, ‘Michael Simpson’, Frieze (January 2016) 133
https://frieze.com/article/michael-simpson [accessed 12 November 2017].
 Meyer, Irresistible Dictation, p. 97.134
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myself doing, to ensure that the words enter me, don’t just pass me by. I mouth them, 
my tongue makes space and also knots around them in an attempt not only to utter them, 
but to render them graspable. Stein’s take on this is overtly sexualised. She relates how 
she ‘caressed completely caressed and addressed a noun’.  Retallack’s reading of 135
Stein’s eroticism is highly reminiscent of what Sontag calls ‘an erotics of art’.  ‘What 136
does an eros of language mean?’ Asks Retallack, ‘In part, it is about pleasure in the 
words as fondled objects of poesis, radiant in their everyday connotations, not needing 
to point to transcendent meaning.  But the performance of language is also a 
performance of a particular kind of desire – a desire to touch others, to know and be 
known through words’.   137
Her attempts ‘to render the world present in language’ are dependent on an intimacy of 
relations whereby writing almost literally embodies the world in its very texture.  Take 138
Stein’s articulation of colour. ‘A sad size,’ she writes, ‘a size that is not sad is blue as 
every bit of blue is precious. A kind of green a game in green and nothing flat nothing 
quite nothing flat and more round, nothing a particular color strangely, nothing breaking 
the losing of no little piece.’  It is not that Stein describes the straightforward visual 139
appearance of a colour here but the rhythm of her sentences evokes a texture that is 
halting, undulating, uneven, suggesting in some sense the difficulty (or impossibility) of 
articulating colour in words. The ring of texture spreads still further, seeping beyond the 
confines of the example just given. Her text evokes, for me, in the context of this thesis, 
the metaphorical texture of thought through writing. This kind of texture functions to 
convey how a thing – an object, a painting, a drawing, a text – came to look or feel or 
sound as it does. Its process of becoming perceived through its surface texture.  
 Stein, Lectures in America, p. 231.135
 Sontag, Against Interpretation, p. 13. I discuss her ‘erotics of art’ in chapter 2.136
 Retallack, Selections, p. 36.137
 Chessman, The Public is Invited to Dance, p. 79.138
 Stein, ‘Tender Buttons’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 131.139
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‘The sensual beauty of [Simpson’s] surfaces’, as Godfrey calls them, are also built on 
texture.  It is, of course, more commonplace to imagine a painting as a caressing of 140
forms, a kind of fetishised stroking, wiping or dripping of viscous liquids across a 
surface with brushes and fingers. But these paintings are largely undertaken with rollers, 
a more physically detached mechanistic application of paint to canvas. But even a brief 
inventory of the effects of his paint application reveals the variety of touch that Simpson 
achieves. Paint is stippled, dimpled, dragged, streaked, even, raw, and smooth. It is 
glossy, matt, translucent, ragged, tacky, and patchy. It is applied with abandon, in 
underlayers, at other times, with exquisite precision. Some elements appear supremely 
human, almost skin-like in texture and tone, others appear mechanical in their 
meticulousness.  
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick suggests ways in which textures like these foster certain 
physical or even sexually charged responses. After Renu Bora, Sedgwick relates how 
‘to perceive texture is always, immediately, and de facto, to be immersed in a field of 
narrative hypothesising, testing, and re-understanding of how physical properties are 
acted upon over time’. Texture, or more specifically texture perception, is both seen 
and, either actually or imaginatively, felt and heard; it is inherently bodily. She 
continues: ‘To perceive texture is never only to ask or know What is it like? nor even 
just How does it impinge on me? Textual perception always explores two other 
questions as well: How did it get that way? and What could I do with it?’  And, with 141
this last question, Sedgwick frames texture – or as Simpson would put it, surface – as a 
sexualised overture. Texture is multi-sensory, it is an open, overtly flirtatious invitation 
that bridges the gap between the viewer and the viewed. 
The intensity of Simpson’s colour adds to his works’ sexual aura. His use of black is 
especially interesting because of its funereal, depressive and also sexual connotations. 
Unnamed (Confessional) (fig. 34) is a painting of a church confessional rendered 
mainly in silhouette using a particularly luscious black. A vertically oriented diptych, 
one part is partially concealed by a grey-white curtain, the other inset with a white 
 Godfrey, ‘Un-named Paintings’, no page numbers.140
 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p. 13.141
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opening that houses a simple silhouetted black chair in profile. It might be a scene of 
refuge, promising anonymity, a safe place to bare all, psychologically. But an 
undulating, hyper-sensual white curtain, its ripples rendered in rubbed, dry black, hint 
that what goes on behind the curtain might entail a revelation that is more than 
metaphorical. 
This suggestion of heightened sensual stimulation, enacted at once by the arrangements 
of objects and their rich rendering in painted surfaces, lends an immediacy to our 
experience of the works which is at odds with their subject matter. This in many ways is 
obscure; neither the leper squint, nor Giordano Bruno are exactly household names. 
Nevertheless their surfaces are flirtatious. And sometimes more or less ambiguously 
sexually suggestive. The idea of the bench, for example, resonates, for Simpson, as ‘a 
place where people might fuck.’  More ambiguously the rich blue cloth in Bench 142
Painting 67 (Bruno Resurrect) (fig. 31) hints at a respectful covering, albeit captured in 
the moment of slipping off (provocatively?) draped in baroque folds as if to respect the 
body we imagine shut up in the sarcophagus-like bench. On the floor below Bench 
Painting 73 (fig. 32) the cloth, white this time, has fallen to the floor in a rumpled heap, 
its swirls of folds reminiscent of a dollop of whipped cream. I may be reading too much 
into these cloths but it does not seem so far fetched for markers of love and death to be 
so conjoined.   143
Adverbs: (Non) sensically  
Simpson and Stein’s work teases in other ways too. So far I have not held back on 
tracing the paths that the associations of colours, textures, and sounds suggest. But 
tracing these lines is different from reading into them, in order to make sense of them. It 
is worth noting, in fact, just how ordinary many of Simpson’s painted objects are: step 
ladders, drains, benches, and pigeons. Even the way in which they are rendered in paint 
is straightforward, largely free of ornament or flourish. ‘There’s nothing unusual about 
it,’ William Pym writes, it is formally clear and simple, ‘legible’ and ‘completely 
 In conversation with the artist January 1 2016.142
 Evocations of death in Simpson’s work have similarly been drawn out in Schwabsky, ‘Michael 143
Simpson’s Bench Paintings’ and Price, ‘On the Leper Squint Paintings’, p. 253.
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conventional in many ways, yet completely unresolved’.  This ordinariness does not, 144
however, amount to straightforwardness; the paintings do not, strictly speaking, make 
sense. 
But is it the role of the critic or historian to iron out the logical or rational discrepancies 
which haunt Stein’s writing and Simpson’s paintings? Of Simpson’s depicted spaces we 
might ask: What are they? Where are they? Can I enter? Much of his work, at first sight 
at least, holds the suggestion of ‘theatricality’, in the words of Michael Fried.  Almost 145
always unpeopled, chairs appear to be waiting to be filled, benches vacant, ladders 
unused. The implied possibility of human presence, by its very absence, compels. The 
paintings are surely invitations for us to sit, climb or, somehow, enter. But the 
suggestion is but a tease; closer inspection reveals walls and floors that never meet, 
ladders propped up at angles that are untenably sheer, his benches levitate, revealing 
that the forces of gravity, which make the world intelligible to us, are absent,  
and the shallowest depths of plane which physically exclude us from the scenes, and 
propel us back into the space of the gallery. The space Simpson renders is, mimetically 
speaking, nonsensical.  
Trying to elicit meaning from these spaces and the objects propped up in them is a 
fool’s errand. Stonnard draws on their Beckettian implications of a ‘world past claim to 
meaning’.  This realisation leads to an understanding that, in fact, however 146
metaphorically cryptic and visually ambiguous Simpson’s subject matter appears, by 
focussing our attention on the objects represented and how they relate to us, as objects 
of potential use, we miss the point. His work is about neither ladders, nor benches, nor 
stairs, nor leper squints. It is about how the representation of these particular objects 
might behave, in the larger context of art history as well as the local context of each 
painting. 
 William Pym, ‘The Confidence Man’, in Study #6: Michael Simpson, no page numbers.144
 Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Chicago 145
and London: Chicago University Press, 1980).
 Stonnard, ‘A Miracle of Escape’, p. 53.146
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Stein’s fascination with the stuff of everyday life in a text like Tender Buttons can be 
read in a similar vein to Simpson’s depiction of the quotidian (holes, pigeons, 
stepladders).  Here she takes a series of simple familiar objects: a box, a chair, a dog, a 147
red hat but the simplicity with which she treats them is more complicated. Under the 
subtitle ‘A dog.’, for example she writes of monkeys and donkeys.  Our mistake, 148
according to Marjorie Perloff, is that those critics who have so often complained that 
Stein does not make sense, have fundamentally misunderstood the purpose and real 
subject of a text like Tender Buttons. In the subsection on roast potatoes Stein simply 
writes: ‘Roast potatoes for’.  This is not, Perloff argues, a reference to cooking but a 149
‘game of testing the limits of language, which is, for Stein, the game that matters’. It 
triggers certain semantic associations. Perloff offers a number of possible readings of 
the function of ‘for’ here: it begs why, what and for whom these potatoes be roasted; it 
plays on the number 4; it is a contraction of the preposition before (as in ‘fore); it is a 
hidden reference to the rhyme ‘One potato, two potato…’; and it plays on ‘four’ the 
French for oven. Perloff’s reading reveals considerable substance in Stein’s apparently 
slight phrase, again, not by reading into the text but by close observation of its surface, 
its sonic and visual effect, as well as its semantic implications.  150
Conclusion: ‘Making what is seen as it is seen’  
I have, at various points in this chapter, framed both Simpson and Stein’s work as 
crystallisations of thoughts. The relationship between form and content in Stein’s work 
is predicated on the idea that her thought, and therefore her writing, arises as it goes 
along, as one word follows another, as a clause abuts another, as a sentence, or semi-
sentence adjoins the next. These appear spontaneous, not thought and then transcribed, 
but thought as they are written. ‘The great question,’ Stein writes in ‘Sentences and 
Paragraphs’, ‘is can you think a sentence’. Note, that she does not ask can you think of a 
sentence, the act of thinking and the sentence are not detached by a preposition which 
 See Riding and Graves and their equivocal praise of Stein’s ‘divinely inspired ordinariness: her 147
creative originality [...] was original only because it was so grossly, so humanly, all-inclusively ordinary’, 
in A Survey, p. 280.
 Stein ‘Tender Buttons’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 140.148
 ibid., p. 157.149
 Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder, p. 85.150
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might imply that one leads to the other. Rather they are one and the same, and 
temporally synchronous.   151
Elsewhere, Stein’s conception of writing is contextualised even more openly and 
precariously as temporally actual: ‘what is seen depends upon how everybody is doing 
everything. This makes the thing we are looking at very different and this makes what 
those who describe it make of it, it makes a composition, it confuses, it shows, it is, it 
looks, it likes it as it is, and this makes what is seen as it is seen.’ The act of seeing and 
the act of doing are mutually dependent where one affects the other. Not only that but 
‘those who describe’ ‘the thing’ appear to have little control in determining the shape of 
their compositions. It is the meeting of seeing and doing that ‘makes a composition’; it 
is not a person with free will writing down what they have seen. Even writing with 
misses the mark. The writing of which Stein speaks ‘shows’; it does not tell, it is not 
about. In fact it doesn’t even just do it also ‘sees’ and also just is. All of this happens 
through the continuous present which ‘makes what is seen as it is seen.’  It does as it 152
is doing; it writes as it is writing; it thinks as it is thinking.  The process and the form 153
and the content all project into the space of the sentence as it appears on a page. 
Many have remarked on Stein’s intact manuscripts, revealing few mistakes, edits, or 
revisions. ‘What she did,’ argues Retallack, ‘was something more like pinning a 
succession of sketches of the same object next to one another on a wall, where each 
revisiting leaves the previous one intact.  Each moment in the writing is a new take in a 
process of revision as continuous permutation. This is her ‘continuous present’ – 
successive words or phrases reconfiguring what precedes them through repetition and 
variation.’  Put like this recalls Simpson’s images which each, in their finished states, 154
encapsulate a current moment of thought. Though Simpson throws away, or burns or 
cuts up or over paints images that displease him, the processes entailed in this 
 Stein, ‘Sentences and Paragraphs’, in Selections, Retallack ed., p. 253.151
 Stein, ‘Composition as Explanation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 495.152
 The similarities between this phrasing and Giovanni Gentile’s ‘thought thinking’ will not have gone 153
unnoticed. 
 Retallack, Selections, pp. 43–44.154
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discarding are not usually made visible.  He does not usually leave the markings of his 155
underdrawings visible in the manner of Richard Diebenkorn, whose amends are clearly 
visible through the transparent layers of successive paint. But the process of ‘constant 
revision’, as Retallack has it of Stein’s work, is clearly evident in Simpson’s extensive 
works in series: paintings of very few objects (like Stein’s relatively restricted palette of 
words) repeated, shifted, but with each iteration made ever more present.  
This, my final substantive chapter, is the last iteration of the pairing of the work of a 
painter and writer. I cannot resist returning to the words of Oakeshott whose words 
inserted themselves in chapter 1 of this thesis.  
Painters, sculptors, writers, musical composers, actors, dancers, and singers, 
when they are poets, are not doing two things – observing, thinking, 
remembering, hearing, feeling etc. and then ‘expressing’ or making analogues, 
imitations, or reproductions of what they have seen, heard, remembered, felt etc. 
in the practical world, and doing it well or ill, correctly or incorrectly – they are 
doing one thing, imagining poetically.   156
So here the poetic imagining at stake is to see one genre in the form of another, to 
envisage words reaching out of a page and tracing the striations of paint dragged across 
a canvas. It is to see painted forms speaking across their borders, the tongue of a brush 
touching words. It is to see the glide of a roller as the sweep of a hand, pressing the page 
flat, in readiness to write or read. And this work, my work, is only to see how these 
forms resemble one another, how they respond when placed side by side on a page, in a 
mind. This work mouths the conjoining of theirs so that the sounds it makes are a 
continuation of, an echoed reverberation of, the shapes and sounds of thoughts that 
theirs suggest.  
This manner of going about research relies upon, indeed champions, imaginative leaps. 
It seeks to carve out a space in which to legitimise the flourishing of connections 
between, say, paintings and texts and the criticism written of them. It sees history and 
 Though Squint (2016) reveals its state of having been cut away from one canvas and stretched over 155
another by the fact that its painted surface wraps around the frame of the canvas, something Simpson 
rarely does – he usually paints up to or stops just short of the edge of the canvas.
 Oakeshott, The Voice of Poetry, p. 39.156
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criticism as the site of ‘potential space’ and emergent thought.  The ‘most deep rooted 157
errors with philosophy’, notes Siegfried Zielinski via Wittgenstein, is that it 
considers possibility ‘a shadow of reality’. The associations I am suggesting, here and 
elsewhere, depend on ‘the possible’; ‘reality, which has actually happened, becomes a 
shadow by comparison’.  The shadow-characters that haunt Simpson’s paintings upset 158
the order of naturalistic spaces by disconnecting objects from their neighbouring 
objects. And yet, the inconstant shading of objects and the outline of their forms cast 
below and beside them, take on the hum of Stein’s words as imperfect echoes: 
Two next.  
To be next to it.  
To be annexed.  
To be annexed to it.   159
Each word or phrase is cast from the felt sound or form of the one before as if light is 
shone on the first phrase and casts a mutating shadow over the next, and so on. So Pym 
has said of Simpson’s shadow ladders: ‘The shadow is proof of the sun, which allows us 
to grow. That’s the painting’  160
Is it too much to return to Stein’s oxymoronic: ‘Exact resemblance to exact resemblance 
the exact resemblance as exact as a resemblance, exactly as resembling, exactly 
resembling, exactly in resemblance exactly a resemblance, exactly and resemblance’ as 
an articulation or enactment of the spirit of this chapter which builds and modifies and 
repeats and turns over? Elsewhere I have called it analogy but even so the resemblance 
it draws out, and that it performs, is only ever imperfect.  But it is the thought that 161
counts. It seems to me that this kind of investigation, that juxtaposes two or more bodies 
is at the nub of Stein’s project as much as Simpson’s: what happens when two or more 
 See Siegfried Zielinski, ‘An Archaeology and Variantology of the Arts and the Media’ (University of 157
Bristol: Spring Lecture Series, 11 March 2013) on the idea of History as a ‘potential space’ rather than a 
‘fact factory’.
 Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media: Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing by Technical 158
Means, Gloria Custance trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), p. 28.
 Stein, ‘An Elucidation’, in A Reader, Dydo ed., p. 435.159
 Pym, ‘The Confidence Man’, no page numbers.160
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things sit side by side, opposite, close by, askew? What is the nature and effect of these 
juxtapositions? When it comes to my project the arrangements of bodies mirror and also 
conflict and also merge. To what degree, these words wonder more than once, can 
writing (about/on/with) art ‘exactly resemble’ the art and the writing from which it 
emerges? 
!208
End Matters:  
Improvisation and the Documentation of Felt 
Encounters 
We make language depend upon an awareness of truth when it is actually the 
vehicle of truth.  1
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, Claude Lefort ed. and John O’Neill trans. (Evanston: 1
Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 14.
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This thesis puts art-historical writing, subjectivity and association into practice by 
taking seriously the facts of feeling in the process of research in the visual arts. I have 
avoided the term ‘Conclusion’ for this section; what I offer here is less a winding-up 
than a winding on. The stray ends, usually the stuff of a conclusory tying-up, are here 
left to fray further. Many such loose strands are alluded to in the body of this thesis but 
yet to be woven into patterns of their own, for example: metaphor as (improvised) 
method;  documentary as fiction/fiction as documentary;  transhistorical research;  and 2 3 4
site-specific art writing/history;  But does all this come under the remit of Art History?  5
On this last point I return to a phrase that surfaced in my fourth chapter: ‘To think is to 
speculate with images’.  At stake throughout this body of work has been a speculative, 6
or, to return to a term I used early on in this thesis, an improvisatory thinking through, 
and with, images – visual and verbal, literal and figurative. This begs a further question: 
is it still art history if art and writing take priority over claims of historical veracity? 
That is not to say that this thesis is unhistorical since it frames thinking as a speculation 
with and between words and images, between subjectivities and between historical time 
periods. Transhistorical coincidences and associations like the ones I have performed 
have been evoked by others too, of course. For Michael Ann Holly, Adrian Stokes’s 
 For important discussions on metaphor see, Jan Zwicky, ‘Mathematical Analogy and Philosophical 2
Insight’, For the Learning of Mathematics 30(1) (2010), pp. 9–14; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Metaphors We Live By, Second Edition (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2003); Ted 
Cohen, ‘Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy’ in Critical Inquiry 5 (1) (1978), pp. 3–12; Jacques 
Derrida, ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’, New Literary History, 6(1) (1974), pp. 
5–74; Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2003).
 G. Douglas Atkins, Tracing the Essay: Through Experience to Truth (Athens and London: The 3
University of Georgia Press, 2005).
 This theme is flagged in chapter 1, and alluded to throughout, but its implications for a philosophy of 4
art-historical thinking are not fully developed through the thesis.
 Alluded to in relation to Wai Chee Dimock, ‘Weak Theory’, p. 737. Jane Rendell, Site Writing; and more 5
obliquely, through Steven Connors on the topological writing of Michel Serres in ‘Serres and the Shape 
of Thought’, http://www.stevenconnor.com/topologies/ [accessed 2 December 2018].
 This particular phrase is often quoted on treatises on the art of memory, a field of scholarship which 6
indirectly informs the kind of associative threads I follow in this thesis but which I do not overtly address. 
For further research in this area see the seminal Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (London: Pimlico, 
1999); as well as Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, 
Second Edition (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Lina Bolzoni, The 
Gallery of Memory: Literary and Iconographic Models in the Age of the Printing Press, Jeremy Parzen 
trans. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). A more recent particularly interesting text which 
combines memory, philosophy, science-fiction and visual images by artist Liam Gillick is Simon 
Critchley’s Memory Theatre, (London: Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2014).
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writing – which, incidentally, appeared earlier as one of Matthew Rampley’s examples 
of poetic art histories – is ‘evocative of a few unforgettable passages about the past in 
the disparate writings of Aby Warburg, Fernand Baudel and Martin Heidegger’. Holly 
goes on to observe that it is ‘almost as though a conversation were going on among the 
four of them – which of course, chronologically could not have been – beneath or 
beyond their manifest subject matter’. This leads her to ponder: ‘Where do 
correspondences come from, and how else do we write about these resonances except 
through the melancholic imagination that gathers bits and pieces together to construe 
another kind of narrative?’  This a-chronological gathering together of correspondences 7
is certainly present here (less so her sense of the melancholic) and her identification of 
these correspondences as contributing to an alternative ‘kind of narrative’ very much 
overlaps and runs parallel with the desire – expressed by Michela Atienza who appeared 
in chapter 1 – for the hybridity of fictocritical writing to ‘allow us to say “something 
else”’.   8
In trying get to grips with the nature of the correspondences Holly is interested in, she 
turns to Christopher Bollas’s characterisation of aesthetic appreciation as consisting of 
‘a deep subjective rapport with an object’ which is ‘an uncanny fusion with the object’ 
and the result of ‘something never cognitively apprehended but existentially known’.  9
The ‘subjective rapport’ enacted in this thesis is less of a fusion and more, as I have put 
it elsewhere, a confluence or bleeding or bringing into orbit. Though the various agents 
at play – the artwork, the text and my own thinking – at times merge, they also remain, 
at the same time, discrete.  
But Holly bases her other ‘kind of narrative’ on a distinction between making art and 
writing about it, between intentions and consequences, both of which distinctions run 
counter to the spirit and tone of this thesis. Bollas’s claims for aesthetic appreciation, 
Holly argues, are perhaps ‘the aim of making art [...] but not the result of writing about 
 Michael Ann Holly, The Melancholy Art (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 7
62.
 Atienza, ‘Strange Technology’, p. 42.8
 Christopher Bollas, The Christopher Bollas Reader, Arne Jemstedt intro. (London and New York: 9
Routledge, 2001), pp. 3 and 11, and referenced in Michael Ann Holly, ‘The Stones of Solace’, in The 
Coral Mind, Stephen Bann ed. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007) pp. 206–207.
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it, for language inevitably puts distance between the work and the apprehending 
subject.’  This assertion brings to the surface three issues which this thesis presses 10
against. First, the implication of Holly’s remarks is that making art does not include 
language, which of course it does both literally in the fact of physical words being 
included in art but also conceptually where art might function as a form of non-verbal 
language or means of communication or expression. Secondly, I hope that language, in 
the way that I have used it here does not ‘put distance between the work and the 
apprehending subject’ but draws out convergences, distils instances of analogy and 
draws attention to coincidences between instances of art and writing that, at first sight, 
appear remote. Language here is, as I have put it, absorbent of its environment. And 
thirdly, I have aimed throughout this thesis, to dilute the distinction between making art 
and writing about it, seeking in the course of its composition, to do both at the same 
time, or as we saw Oakeshott put it, ‘doing one thing, imagining poetically’.   11
The upshot is to move art-historical thinking closer to the practice of making art. In 
Gavin Parkinson’s account of a Metafictional Historiography of Art, for example, he 
challenges  
deductive art history’s increasingly prevalent formula of theory = 
meaning = truth, allowing the discipline to renounce historicist and 
“sciencist” empiricism for the poetry, fiction, and parody of play. In 
place of interpreting, describing, representing, circumscribing, 
immobilising, or making art mean, [Metafictional Historiography of 
Art] writes through, mirrors, echoes, and rebounds off art. It aims not 
to inquire into what art means but to discuss how it creates meaning 
and to show what it can do. It wants to position art history closer to 
art than to history’.   12
To frame the current thesis in this way, teasing out the art from the history, also brings 
my thesis back to the way in which it sits, deliberately, between a traditional humanities 
research-based PhD and a practice-led PhD and exploits the resultant friction that its 
positioning between these two camps creates.  
 ibid., p. 207.10
 Oakeshott, ‘The Voice of Poetry’, pp. 36–37.11
 Gavin Parkinson, ‘Metafictional Historiography of Art’, https://courtauld.ac.uk/people/gavin-parkinson 12
[accessed January 31, 2013], since removed.
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Put like this, the material, referential and linguistic differences and similarities in this 
thesis become something less oppositional, something more like divergences, analogies, 
confluences and associations which are set to work in particular and mutable ways. Its 
texture and approach is threaded through with ideas of joining and mirroring, metaphor 
and comparison. These qualities are present in the way the words, my words, write 
themselves – embody, rather than solely convey – and the way that words and images of 
others converge. Through the writing of the pairings and clusters that inhabit each 
chapter, ideas and modes of thinking around and between art, writing, criticism, history 
and literature are enacted slippily, discordantly, intermittently and swarmily.  
Though the poetic and imagistic overtones, present in the previous paragraph as 
throughout this work, should not be understood as undermining the more familiarly or 
conventionally ‘art-historical’ thought that underpins this thesis. In fact the balance that 
I have at all times been negotiating, here, between scholarly rigour and experimental 
innovation, is a tension that characterises all improvisatory practices. On this point I 
could go further than I have up until now and frame this entire thesis as resulting from 
what amounts, often subconsciously, to an improvisatory research methodology.  13
The absence of more explicit, and indeed frequent, reference to ‘improvisation’, though 
inadvertent, is worth flagging. In The Oxford Handbook of Critical Improvisation 
Studies Volume 1 (2016) George E. Lewis and Benjamin Piekut argue that contemporary 
culture has, until recently, been reluctant to embrace the term ‘improvisation’ due to its 
associations with dilettantism and a lack of rigour. Among the many publications Lewis 
and Piekut reference to support this claim is a research proposal by Susan Foster, 
Adriene Jenik, and Lewis himself which identifies the extent to which ‘improvisative 
practices were often erased, masked, or otherwise discussed without reference to the 
term. Substitutions such as ‘happening,’ ‘action,’ and ‘intuition’ often masked the 
 On improvisation see: Gary Peters, The Philosophy of Improvisation (London and Chicago: University 13
of Chicago Press, 2009); Landgraf, Improvisation as Art; Lewis and Piekut, The Oxford Handbook of 
Critical Improvisation Studies Volume 1; Ben A. Owen and Kit Poulson, ‘Mutter Physics’, an evening of 
improvisation and collaboration in which I performed ‘I am writing in a room’ (2018) alongside Ben A. 
Owen, Spike Island, 12 April 2018.
!213
presence of improvisation’.  In this thesis I have found myself using terms that 14
similarly closely relate to the improvisatory. My references to, for example, ‘intuition’, 
‘spontaneity’, ‘activity’ and thinking or working ‘in progress’ (as Eco would put it ) are 15
not used to mask the ad-hoc nature of my approach to research – on this I have been 
consistently overt – but as another way to register the unplanned, open-ended, 
responsive and receptive nature of my ‘speculation’ through images and texts.   
But perhaps ‘improvisation’ functions as a useful umbrella term that covers many of the 
processes and approaches to research that I have been negotiating. I have, for example, 
referred to various socially defined modes of intercommunication, both scholarly and 
quotidian, that share improvisatory properties. I speak of coupling and pairing, 
ventriloquising, triangulation, noticing, observing and cross-referencing. In fact, after 
Michael Oakeshott, I ground much of what goes on here in conversation. One of the 
underlying claims made in Landrgraf’s study of improvisation is that ‘dialogue and the 
dynamics of communication [constitute] a model of improvisational practice’.  The 16
model has lead to a crucially, for my purposes, reflexive approach since as author I have 
been at pains to maintain at once my agency in this discussion without dominating it. I 
work hard to understand the rules of the disciplines within which I work but choose to 
work between and sometimes against them. The decision to take this work in certain 
directions was not made wholesale or on a whim, but piecemeal and with caution; ideas 
and images (metaphorical and literal) emerged gradually, as conversations with the 
work of other scholars and writers were staged, as images were dwelled upon, as 
associations were sparked, and as Holly puts it, as convergences are followed up.   
According to Landgraf, after Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811) and later Judith Butler 
(1956–), another way in which improvisation manifests is through the assertion of 
 See Lewis and Piekut, ‘Introduction: On Critical Improvisation Studies’, in The Oxford Handbook of 14
Critical Improvisation Studies Volume 1, p. 4. Referencing Susan Foster, Adriene Jenik, and George E. 
Lewis, ‘Proposal for a 2002–2003 Resident Research Group: Global Intentions: Improvisation in the 
Contemporary Performing Arts.’
 Eco, ‘The Poetics of the Open Work’, p. 174.15
 Discussed in Landgraf, Improvisation as Art, p. 10. And Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: 16
Routledge, 2004), p. 1.
!214
agency from within a context of laws or strict rules.  Crucially this thesis holds its 17
subjective ‘mode’, as I have called it, at all times in productive tension with the 
discipline (the ‘rules’, as it were) of Art History at large. Indeed, just as performed 
musical improvisations are predicated on a thorough mastery of one’s instrument and 
understanding of musical genres, this thesis depends upon a firm understanding of the 
rules of the art-historical game and which I have laid out in-depth, especially in chapter 
1.  But, more broadly, the fact is also that I have chosen to work on this project from 18
within a History of Art department, with all the particular expectations and highly 
structured requirements that a thesis written from within such an environment demands. 
Even in my final chapter, which at face value is the most loose, the most overtly ‘poetic’ 
or ‘experimental’ of all, I have chosen to keep the lines of communication between this 
thesis and art history alive. 
Another way to account for my lack of explicitness in referencing improvisation up 
until this point is Gilbert Ryle’s assertion, made in 1976, that all thinking is 
improvisatory because it situates itself between understanding, gained from previous 
experience and/or learning, and an ad hoc encounter with new experiences. Ryle makes 
his point based on ‘a general notion or notions of thinking’ explaining how in the 
thought response of, as he calls his speculative thinker, ‘Le Penseur’,  
There must be […] a union of some Ad Hockery with some know-
how. If the normal human is not at once improvising and improvising 
warily, he is not engaging his somewhat trained wits in some 
momentarily live issue, but perhaps acting from sheer unthinking 
habit. So thinking, I now declare quite generally, is, at the least, the 
engaging of partly trained wits in a partly fresh situation. It is the 
pitting of an acquired competence or skill against an unprogrammed 
opportunity, obstacle or hazard.   19
But if all thinking is improvisatory then surely we could just call it ‘thinking’ or 
‘thought’? Both of these terms, as I have discussed, feature strongly throughout this 
thesis. The problem, though, arises when thinking is not always presented as an exercise 
in improvisation. Given the unjustified but enduring stigmatisation of the model of 
 Landgraf, Improvisation as Art, pp. 9–10.17
 Lewis and Piekut, ‘Introduction: On Critical Improvisation Studies’, p. 5.18
 See Gilbert Ryle, ‘Improvisation,’ Mind 85(337) (1976), 69–83, pp. 71 and 77.19
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improvisation – stereotyped as casual, undirected and self-indulgent solipsism – 
scholars and academics (that is, professional thinkers) have sought refuge in framing 
thought in terms that appear quite non-improvisatory.  The lack of rigour, again, 20
wrongly associated with improvisation, may in part be why scholars are reluctant to let 
this element show through their work, therefore leading to the kinds of art histories – to 
return again to Parkinson, whom I referenced early on – that consist of, 
the communication of thoughts, feelings, findings, and arguments 
about objects, events, and the past by means of the carefully and 
coherently organized plan; observation of and respect for causality 
and the clock and calendar time of the world; dissolution of 
authorship or announcement of subjectivity in the capture of the 
surveyed material; use of reason in search of rational connectivity 
between human beings, their contexts, behaviour, and work; and the 
exercise of balance and ‘critical distance’ in search of underlying 
motivations, interpreting phenomena in the services of conclusivity 
by means of methods that mimic those of scientific causality 
(whether this goes undeclared or not).  21
Any notion of ad hoc, impromptu, risk-taking approaches to researching, thinking and 
writing are for the most part eviscerated from the kinds of art histories which Parkinson 
here characterises. So perhaps this is the moment to call out, in hindsight, the kind of 
thinking performed in this thesis as, by nature, improvisatory. 
  
Due to this intuitive handling of its materials this thesis deals, as I have said, with 
connections-in-the-making by bringing discrete works, bodies of work, and their 
receptions, together. Its overall effect is one of ‘real-time’ unfurling. But we should also 
be mindful of the end results and implications of the ideas to which this lived thing has 
given rise and, to return to a discussion I raised in chapter 1, of its potential future uses 
in scholarship. Early on, for example I asked – after Matthew Rampley’s critiques of 
‘poetic’ art histories – whether a thesis written in this mode can also be described as 
useful? Does it provide a followable method on which other scholarship can build? 
Does it ‘tame’ the images and texts to which it refers, or submerge them in its own 
 For a discussion of improvisation’s stigmatisation see David Gere, ‘Introduction’, David Gere and Ann 20
Cooper Albright, eds., Taken by Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2003), p. xv.
 Gavin Parkinson, ‘(Blind Summit) Art Writing Narrative, Middle Voice’, in Grant and Rubin eds., 21
‘Creative Writing and Art History’, p. 270.
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anomalous language and style? Following my initial explicit discussion of these 
questions I deliberately allow the chapters themselves to demonstrate – to show, not tell 
– how the approach enacted here might be of scholarly use. Chapter 2, for example, 
begins with what might be called a poetic iteration of Francisco de Zurbarán’s Still Life 
with Four Vessels. As a strategy for ‘getting to know’ an artwork this is eminently 
‘followable’. But the chapter also compares this initial approach with close readings of 
extant interpretations of the painting and, later, through an expansive, experimental 
coupling of the still life with the work of Susan Sontag. In doing so the initial poetic 
mode is put to ‘work’ on a discussion about the possibilities and limitations of 
interpretation and understanding. These shifting, reflexive perspectives into and out of 
the painting (and indeed the pairing) mean that neither Zurbarán’s still life nor Sontag’s 
words are ever, as I put it in chapter 2, ‘grasped’ or brought to heel, or as Rampley 
would put it ‘tamed’.  
The phrasing above, where I suggest that the works of art that appear in this thesis are 
‘put to work’ is a curious one and worth flagging. Though I have not as yet addressed it 
explicitly in this thesis, it is an implicit function of the way that my writing responds to 
and grows out of the particular pairings of artworks and texts that appear in each 
chapter. Art and text have, quite literally, enabled the subsequent discussions around and 
between them to emerge. I am suggesting that the pairings themselves, and their 
handling in this thesis, are equivalent of the way that Mieke Bal, for example, 
characterises artworks like Louise Bourgeois’s Spider as a ‘theoretical proposition’ 
wherein the artwork ‘effectuates [a] proposition – “enunciates” it – through its 
imposition of a bodily participation’.  But it also keys into Andrew Benjamin’s resolve 22
to draw out ‘how a given work of art works as art’.  This thesis takes that proposition 23
further by asking how the given works of art work in relationships of association and 
also, how the work of this thesis itself works.    
The work of these chapters can, therefore, be followed and built upon by others in a 
number of ways. Its basic structure homes in on and assimilates the resonances 
 Bal, The Architecture of Art Writing, p. 34.22
 Andrew Benjamin, Art’s Philosophical Work (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015), p. 23
xvi.
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perceived between a given image and a text. These ‘pairings’ set in motion particular 
discussions – ranging from methodology, to the function of writing on art, to 
interpretation – which emerge from the frissons generated by the particularity of the 
couplings themselves. At the heart of all this is my effort to register the personal and 
scholarly encounters that ensue through research into art and writing, and to document 
and embody the feeling of those encounters here. The possibilities for this model of 
scholarship are far-reaching. If, as I have argued, this thesis documents a sustained 
encounter with art, writing and research, can it also, more provocatively, be said to be 
more real than art-historical accounts that tend to overlook these human encounters?  
Certainly, if we follow G. Douglas Atkins’s claim that the form of the essay is an 
‘embodiment of truth’ or conveyor of ‘embodied truth’, this assertion seems viable.  24
Atkins argues this case by situating the essay on a continuous line that links fiction and 
philosophy: experience is the preserve of fiction, reflection of philosophy, he says. The 
essay, as ‘reflection upon experience’, lies somewhere in-between.  Atkins, also sees 25
the essay as a means for transcendence that points towards ‘Ultimate Truth’ which 
religious connotations, do not, however, ring true for my work.  Nevertheless, we 26
could take a step back and think about the role that writing has played here in the on-
going generation of material, of thought, of associations and their concomitant 
improvised entanglements here dwelled upon. In being thought, do these observations 
or entanglements become real? We might then modulate Merleau-Ponty’s critique, with 
which this section began: rather than understand art history writing as depending upon 
‘an awareness of reality’, in this thesis is art history writing actually a ‘vehicle of 
reality’?  27
If that is the case instead of allying this thesis with creative fiction, as accounts 
developed in this mode have previously done, we might instead frame it as 
 Atkins, Tracing the Essay, pp. 5, 133–144, and 147–151.24
 ibid., pp. 148–149.25
 ibid., p. 152.26
 Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, p. 14.27
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documentary.  That is not to say that some of those fictional strategies do not remain; 28
this thesis enjoys its performativity, often using rhetoric (metaphors, simile, ellipses, 
tricolons), employing devices such as delays and opening chapters in medias res. These 
were usually not employed deliberately but through the process of writing particular 
strategies seemed most accurately to convey a sense of how the research material I was 
addressing appeared to coalesce in my mind and on the page. I make no claims, of 
course, to an un-mediated re-presentation of the reality of this research, since the 
research and its presentation happened hand-in-hand. Rather the reality it presents is 
thoroughly mediated, complicated by its interest in moving art-historical thinking closer 
to art. 
I am not claiming originality in my interest in nudging art history and art into closer 
alignment, of course. I have already drawn attention to Stephen Bann and Gavin 
Parkinson, among others, who express a similar interest. But Christa-Maria Lerm-
Hayes, goes further suggesting, more positively that this is already the case: ‘Modern 
and Contemporary Art History,’ she writes, ‘is creative art history – and it reaches into 
curatorial practice, creative writing, art writing, conceptual writing – as well as the 
mediation and contestation of cultural production in and through all modes of 
practice’.  Though Lerm-Hayes overstates her point – not all modern and 29
contemporary art history does cross over in this way – I agree that the preserves of art 
history, art, writing and curatorial practice can be mutually porous. But even if we agree 
on this point in principle, we should nevertheless be asking how the interpenetration 
between art, writing and history might actually materialise in art-historical practice. 
How can we contribute to, develop and expand this strand of ‘creative art history’?  
In this thesis I have interrogated this question by being alert to the implications of its 
intrinsic improvisations. Throughout I am alert to the consequences or what I am doing 
 For examples of alignments with creative fiction see: Stephen Benson and Clare Connors eds., Creative 28
Criticism: An Anthology and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014); Catherine Grant and 
Patricia Rubin eds. ‘Creative Writing and Art History’, Art History, 34(2) (2011), Paul Barolsky, ‘Art 
History as Fiction’ in Artibus et Historiae, 17(34) (1996), pp. 9–17. See also the forthcoming session for 
the Association of Art History Annual Conference 2019 entitled, ‘Fiction with footnotes’: Writing Art 
History as Literary Practice’.
 See Christa-Maria Lerm-Hayes, Writing Art and Creating Back: What can we do with Art (History)? 29
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2015), p. 17. My italics.
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as I am doing it; I am doing while seeing and responding to what is being done. I have 
not, in the main, sought to iron out the apparent contradictions or clashes that emerge 
when these two modes – the active and reflective – collide, after the moment of their 
thinking and writing. As such the words that appear here retain a sense of the 
provisionality, mutability and presentness of thought, a sense in which these thoughts 
would, at a different time, according to a network of other research, professional and 
personal interests, have appeared quite otherwise. The particular pairings, clusters and 
their expression in my words are markers of site-specific moments of thinking and seek 
to capture, or again, document, these moments in their open, unresolved and relatively 
unpolished states.  
The writing of the authors who feature in my chapters operates similarly: Gertrude Stein 
pinpoints the importance of her portraits as explorations of ‘the way that portraits […] 
are written, by written I mean made. By made I mean felt’; for Susan Sontag ‘The 
function of criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, 
rather than to show what it means.’; and what I described as ‘the flowing and eddying’ 
of Walter Pater’s text enacts the accumulative, responsive and intuitive effects of his 
freewheeling thought.  This written, made, and felt thesis does likewise. And as it does 30
it ‘pursues its own ideas’, as Roland Barthes would have it.  In a way this is why it 31
does what it does in the way that it does: to pursue associative and expansive and 
critical ideas that I could not have thought without it.  
One of the many considerations when putting together an extended essay such as this, 
that veers between the conventionally scholarly and the experimental, is how the whole 
thing will hang together. When I began, and even finished the first complete chapter 
(chapter 2 as it appears here) I had no idea what the following chapters would hold: 
would the dots of each discrete case study – or imaginary portrait, in the language of 
Pater and Stein – ever join? I had a strong feeling that but not how they would. It is 
 Gertrude Stein, ‘Portraits and Repetition’, in Lectures in America, Wendy Steiner intro. (Boston: 30
Beacon Press, 1935), p. 165; Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 2001), p. 14; see 
chapter 2 of this thesis.
 This pursuit comes about for Barthes through the pleasure of the text and quality that is implicit in the 31
writing of this thesis. Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, Richard Miller trans. (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1976), p. 17.
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worth taking stock of some of their unforeseen interconnections; interconnections that, 
again, only became evident through the writing into orbit of these pairings. Pater 
devoted a book to Giordano Bruno to whom Michael Simpson dedicated over a 
decade’s worth of paintings. Sontag’s ‘Against Interpretation’ is identified by Gabriel 
Roberts as being ‘remarkably Paterian’.  Shadows and/or reflections play a pivotal role 32
in Zurbarán’s still life, in many of Doig’s landscapes and also in Simpson’s paintings of 
ladders and benches. I should re-emphasise that none of these connections were 
intended, conscious, and only revealed themselves through the process of thinking the 
thesis. 
We return, then, to a sense in which this thesis documents the improvised process of 
everyday thinking. This claim might at first sight, seem at odds with some of the writing 
at play here which is flecked with characteristics and emphases more closely affiliated 
with creative writing than the documentary, with its pretensions towards objectivity and 
proximity to the ‘real’. Lyrical expression, metaphor, description, narrative, invention, 
personification, drama and mood all prevail here. The structure of this thesis and its 
embrace of webs of expansive, transhistorical, serendipitous, associative thinking might 
sooner be termed ‘creative’ or even ‘fictional’ rather than ‘scholarly’ or ‘non-fictional’. 
But instead of understanding these as fictionalised additions, I suggest that the modes 
and tones I employ here, are in fact, closer to the ‘real’ or ‘felt’ processes of 
(improvised, as Ryle has it) thought, research and the experience of encounters between 
and around images and texts, which other more systematic methodologies might in fact, 
conceal. That said, I am also apprehensive of setting up a reductive or false dichotomy 
between fiction and reality by aligning the documentary with reality and fiction with 
creativity; the relationship between fiction and documentary is more nuanced than that.  
This strand of thought also raises the possibility that the associative and subjective 
approach I have taken here provides a mimetic counterpart to a phenomenological 
encounter through art, writing and research. When I express, for example, a hope to find 
 Gabriel Roberts writes: ‘The literariness of Pater’s writing (whether in its vast imaginative scope or its 32
studied indeterminacy of phrasing) gets lost in the pursuit of meaning, system, and theory. The 
teleological pursuit of expressible meanings has resulted in unwarranted exegesis, critics too often guilty 
of what Susan Sontag termed (in a remarkably Paterian essay) ‘the habit of approaching works of art in 
order to interpret them’’, in ‘‘Analysis leaves off’: The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Walter Pater’s 
Renaissance’, The Cambridge Quarterly, 37(4) (2008), 407–425, p. 409.
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in my writing an equivalence to a work of art or an encounter with a work of art, or – as 
I do here – a desire to document the feelings of an encounter, I introduce the possibility 
of enacting a real, felt, experience. Holly suggests rather that it is ‘the objective 
impulse’ not the subjective, that is, ‘in its own way, a mimetic impulse: the attempt to 
make the historical representation and the “real” coincide’.  Rather than making two or 33
more agents or impulses ‘coincide’ this thesis simultaneously enacts and reflects upon 
such coincidences. The approach taken here instead attends to (rather than compels) real 
– by which I mean felt – coincidences of thought, and of resonance, and explores the 
implications that emerge from these non-historical, non-causal relationships. 
The nature of the insights that come about through such an approach to research 
materials – that dwells on and through an explicitly subjective mode but that at the same 
time claims to document the feeling of encounters – has, I argue, wide-ranging 
implications for thinking from a variety of perspectives.  
To this Giovanni Gentile, who formed an important part of chapter 1, would respond: 
‘The only solid reality that I must affirm—and to which any reality I might think must 
be tied—is this: only through the act of being thought can that which thinks and is 
realised become a reality’.  Reality is, therefore, not an entity which is external to us, 34
that we are responsible for communicating, representing or reenacting; it is a state that 
we ourselves create through the act of thinking, perceiving, observing, experiencing and 
articulating. I merge this claim with elements drawn from Davidson’s theory of 
‘triangulation’ in which multiple observations of external matter are shared and cross-
referenced, thereby ensuring scholarly rigour. In chapter 3, for example, I identified 
similarities between the linguistic responses of scholars to Pater and Doig’s work. These 
similarities appeared to align with my own sense of the analogical relationship between 
Pater’s writing and Doig’s painting which were rendered in similarly watery terms, 
through condensation, confluence, reflection, drifting and surfacing. This wide-ranging 
cross-referencing in some ways tests the value of my subjective observations and 
associations, resituating them in a broader academic context. Its remit of interest and 
 Holly, ‘Melancholy’, p. 65.33
 Giovanni Gentile, ‘Basic Concepts of Actualism’ in Bruce Haddock and James Wakefield eds., Thought 34
Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2015), p. 345.
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use, therefore, goes beyond the relative, the incidental, or – as Rampley would put it – 
the anomalous.  
The form of the essay has stood me in good stead, then. ‘The essay’, as Atkins rather 
beautifully puts it, ‘is a creature of poise [...] a thing of composure that, balanced, hangs 
between’ – here, between the documentary and fiction, between art, art writing, history, 
criticism, as well as philosophy, and between self and other.  Whatever our preferred 35
methodological approach to the visual arts, this thesis is intent on demonstrating that we 
should also embrace our disciplinary in-betweens and the productive tensions wrought 
by our improvised shuttling between felt experiences and extant contextualising 
frameworks or historiographies. We should be alert to the living murmurations – to 
return to the image with which this thesis opened – of mood, shape, tone and timbre of 
our thought and writing and its far-reaching reverberations. Channeling an associative, 
subjective and, ultimately, improvisatory mode has enabled me to pay attention to and at 
the same time, contribute to these murmurations. I have been able, simultaneously, to 
anchor my thinking within existent art-historical methods while pointing towards a 
model of art history writing that not only confronts the presence of its encounters, but 
critically and creatively assimilates them. The coincidences of attention I tease out 
between these encounters would be difficult to anticipate through other methodological 
means. I therefore linger long over how those associations manifest, how they are drawn 
into orbit and what their wider implications might be by performing, interrogating, 
documenting, even mapping, the encounters that emerge through my approach to 
thinking and writing around visual and textual matter.  
 Atkins, ‘Tracing the Essay’, p. 151.35
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Oil on canvas 
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Bench Painting (42) 
1994–1995 
Oil on canvas 
534 x 244 cm 
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Bench Painting (50) 
1996–1998 
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Bench Painting (63) 
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Bench Painting (64) 
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Leper Squint 28  
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Fig. 31 Michael Simpson 
Bench Painting 67 (Bruno Resurrect)  
Reworked 2008 
Oil on canvas 
517 x 236 cm 




Fig. 32 Michael Simpson 
Bench Painting 73 
2009 
Oil on canvas 





Fig. 33 Nicholas Poussin 
Landscape with the Funeral of Phocion  
1648 
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114 x 175 cm 




Fig. 34 Michael Simpson 
Unnamed (Confessional)  
(sometimes referred to as Untitled (Confessional)) 
2015 
Oil on canvas 




Due to the wide-ranging nature of this thesis not every work that is footnoted in the 
body of this text is included here as to do so would render the bibliography unwieldy. 
Here I have limited myself to those texts which I either make extensive use of or to 
which I refer specifically in the body of my thesis, or which contextualise my thinking 
less specifically. At various points throughout my project I point towards other fields or 
sub-fields of interest on which my thesis touches but does not dwell. At points like these 
I have allowed myself extensive footnotes that function as mini-bibliographies guiding 
my reader to further relevant reading. In cases like these I do not, on the whole, repeat 
such references here. I have organised the following references, in the first instance, 
into categories to help my readers’ navigation of the bibliography, where that category 
of belonging is reasonably clear, such as when texts are used to research a specific 
artist, image, writer or text in particular chapters. The sub-fields that relate to topics 
such as ‘The Essay’, ‘Practice-led PhDs’ and so on, are an indicator, again meant for 
ease of navigation.    
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